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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff appeals a decision by the district court granting summary judgment in
favor of defendants on her claim for defamation. Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit after she
was allegedly "forced to resign" her employment as the KTVX Channel 4 Health
Reporter. At the time of her resignation, Plaintiff was an at will employee who could
have been terminated for any reason, with or without cause under Utah law.
Plaintiff was given the choice of resigning or being terminated after she revealed
to KTVX management that she had, without obtaining prior permission as required by
station policy, approached the Huntsman Cancer Institute (one of the health care
organizations on whom she routinely reported) and solicited the Institute's monetary and
other support for a non-profit foundation she desired to establish.
This obvious conflict of interest with her duties as the station's health reporter
resulted in her termination by defendant Jon Fisher, the KTVX news director. Because of
Plaintiffs concern that her being "fired" might adversely affect her previously
undisclosed employment discussions with a competing TV station, KUTV, Channel 2,
Fischer agreed to allow Plaintiff to "resign" and take two weeks "vacation" so she could
conclude her discussions with her prospective employer before her departure became
public. During this "vacation" period, there was speculation and gossip among some in
the KTVX newsroom staff about the reasons for her absence, such speculation being
fueled, in part, by Plaintiff's own comments and actions to her fellow workers.
Defendants Jon Fischer and Patrick Benedict, the KTVX assistant news director,
made no comments about the reasons for her departure from the station. This was in
keeping with the station policy to not comment on terminated employees and consistent
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with a commitment Jon Fischer made to Plaintiff when he terminated her that he would
not discuss the reasons for her departure in the newsroom.
Following her termination, Plaintiff filed suit asserting claims for breach of
contract, defamation, intentional interference with economic relations and injunctive
relief. She subsequently amended her claims and narrowed them to wrongful termination
and defamation. After discovery showed no basis for her wrongful termination claim,
she amended her complaint to assert a single claim for defamation. In search of factual
support for her defamation claim, Plaintiff deposed seventeen current and former KTVX
employees and other interested parties. Tellingly, Plaintiff could not find a single witness
who heard the Defendants make any of the allegedly defamatory statements.
Given Plaintiff's lack of any direct evidence, as well as the applicability of legal
privileges that protect the type of speech allegedly made in this case, Defendants moved
for summary judgment. In opposing summary judgment, Plaintiff relied on inadmissible
double and triple hearsay, conjecture, speculation, and circumstantial evidence; none of
which was sufficient to withstand dismissal.

The district court correctly rejected

Plaintiff's novel, yet incorrect legal arguments, and in the absence of any material factual
dispute, granted summary judgment. For the numerous reasons outlined below, any of
which alone would require affirmance, this Court should uphold the decision of the
district court.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j) (2004) (appeals from judgments over which Court of Appeals lacks original
jurisdiction).
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellees Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., dba KTVX Channel Four, Jon
Fischer, and Patrick Benedict (collectively "Appellees" or "Defendants") offer the
following statement of issues in lieu of that contained on page viii of Appellant's
Opening Brief (hereinafter, uBr. of Appellant"). This formulation of the issues more
accurately captures the arguments presented to the district court, the basis for the court's
decision below, as well as an additional basis for affirming the district court's judgment.
Each of the following issues was raised before the district court both in Defendants'
memoranda in support of their motion for summary judgment (R. 248-265; R. 450-460.)
and at oral argument on the motion.
ISSUE # 1
Was the district court correct to grant summary judgment in Defendant's favor on
Ms. Wayment's defamation claim on the basis that Ms. Wayment was a public figure
who was required to show actual malice on the part of Defendants to overcome the
privilege protecting speech related to public figures?
Defendants agree with Ms. Wayment that summary judgment is an issue of law,
which is to be reviewed for correctness. Additionally, the applicability of the privilege is
a legal issue to be reviewed for correctness. See Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1254
(Utah 1997) ("The existence of a privilege is a question of law for the court, which we
review for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's determination."); Russell
v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1992).
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ISSUE # 2
Was the district court correct to grant summary judgment in Defendants' favor on
Ms. Wayment's defamation claim on the basis that there was no admissible evidence
linking Jon Fischer to any of the allegedly defamatory statements?
Defendants agree with Ms. Wayment that generally summary judgment is an issue
of law, which is to be reviewed for correctness. However, even at summary judgment, a
trial court's decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for both correctness and abuse.
Utah v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 713-14 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) (excluding affidavit on hearsay
grounds and photograph for lack of authentication); In re: Gen. Determination of Rights
to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d 65, 71-72 (Utah 1999) (excluding affidavits made without
first hand knowledge). First, it is determined if the trial court was correct in its selection,
interpretation, and application of a rule of evidence. Horton, 848 P.2d at 714. Next, an
abuse of discretion standard is applied to whether the trial court reasonably determined
that the excluded evidence failed to satisfy evidentiary requirements. Id.
ISSUE # 3
Was the district court correct to grant summary judgment in Defendant's favor on
Ms. Wayment's defamation claim on the basis that none of the alleged statements made
by Patrick Benedict are the defamatory statements Ms. Wayment pled in her Amended
Complaint?
Defendants agree with Ms. Wayment that summary judgment is an issue of law,
which is to be reviewed for correctness.
ISSUE # 4
Should this Court affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on Ms.
Wayment's defamation claim on the alternative basis that she failed to offer any evidence
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of common law malice on the part of Defendants which is required to overcome the
qualified privilege attached to employer-to-employee communications?
Defendants agree with Ms. Wayment that summary judgment is an issue of law,
which is to be reviewed for correctness. Additionally, the applicability of the privilege is
a legal issue to be reviewed for correctness. See Price, 949 P.2d at 1254; Russell, 842
P.2d at 900.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL
This appeal turns upon issues of constitutional and common law rather than the
upon interpretation of statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations.

However, the

determination of this appeal could involve interpretations of Rule 801(c), Rule
801(d)(2)(B), and Rule 801 (d)(2)(D) of the Utah Rules of Evidence as well as Rule
8(a)(1) and Rule 9(b) pf the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Proceedings Below

On July 26, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint in this matter. In that
Complaint, Plaintiff sued Defendants asserting four claims for relief: breach of contract,
defamation, intentional interference with economic relations and injunctive relief.
On November 13, 2002, Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint
which eliminated the contract and injunctive claims and added a wrongful termination
claim. After discovery demonstrated that her intentional interference with economic
relations and wrongful termination claims were without merit, Plaintiff filed a Second
Amended Complaint on February 6, 2003, leaving a single claim for defamation. 1

1

The Second Amended Complaint purports to set forth a second cause of action for
"Malice." However, this claim does not constitute an independent, substantive cause of
586546 1
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On April 22, 2003 Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
supporting memorandum and exhibits.

(R. 237-304.). Plaintiff filed an Opposition

Memorandum on May 28, 2003. (R. 305-446.) On June 16, 2003 Defendants filed a
Reply Memorandum and Notice to Submit for Decision. (R. 447-464.)
On August 15, 2003, the matter came before the Court for hearing and, after oral
argument, was taken under advisement. (R. 470.) On August 25, 2003, a Memorandum
Decision issued from the Court granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
(R. 484-489.) On September 12, 2003, the Court entered an Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice. On October 29, 2003, the Court entered final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)
URCP. (R. 495-496.) On October 9, 2003, Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal.
B.

Statement of Facts
The Parties

1.

Plaintiff is an experienced journalist, having received a Masters Degree in

journalism from Northwestern University and having been employed in the TV news
profession for 9 years.

(Supplemental Record "Sup. R." at 561; Resume of Holly

Wayment, attached as Exhibit 7 to Plaintiff's deposition.)

Plaintiff was the KTVX

Health Reporter from March, 1999 until her termination in May of 2001. (Id.) Plaintiff
was an at-will employee at the time of her termination and a well known public figure in
Salt Lake City and the State of Utah. (R. 268 f 7.)
2.

Defendant Jon Fischer is an experienced journalist, having worked in the

TV news profession for 25 years. (R. 267-68 at f 2.) Fischer has been the news director

action. The claim merely alleges that Defendants acted with malice toward Plaintiff in
making their alleged defamatory statements, thus entitling Plaintiff to an award of
punitive damages if she recovers on her defamation claim.
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of KTVX from October of 2001 to the present. (R. 268 at f 4.) Fischer was Plaintiffs
boss and had regular contact with her during her employment at KTVX. (IdL at ff 5, 6.)
3.

Defendant Patrick Benedict was the assistant news director at the time of

Plaintiffs termination, although he had been employed at KTVX for only approximately
one month prior to Plaintiffs termination. (R. 275 at f 1.)
4.

Defendant Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc. does business in the State of

Utah as KTVX Channel 4, having acquired KTVX in October of 2001. (R. 268 at f 3.)
Plaintiff's Termination for Conflict of Interest
5.

KTVX has a policy that requires its reporters and anchors to obtain prior

management approval before undertaking any significant or publicly visible involvement
or contact with community or charitable organizations. (R. 268-69 at % 10.)
6.

Plaintiff was terminated in May of 2002 after she revealed to Defendant

Fischer in a meeting on May 3, 2002 that she had approached, without prior approval of
Mr. Fischer, the Huntsman Cancer Institute ("HCI") (one of the healthcare organizations
she routinely covered as a reporter) and solicited HCFs support for a non profit
organization she wanted to establish to help kids with cancer. (R. 268-69 at ff 8, 12.)
7.

Fischer believed such actions (a) were in violation of the KTVX policy

described above and (b) constituted a conflict of interest with her duties as the KTVX
Health Reporter, even if no final agreements had yet been reached between HCI and
Plaintiff regarding her foundation. (R. 269-70 at <H 16,17.)
8.

At Fischer's request, Plaintiff sent Fischer a memorandum describing her

contacts with HCI after Fischer expressed his shock and concern in the May 3, 2002
meeting about what she had done. (R.269 at f 13.)
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9.

The requested memorandum (R. 278.) was prepared by Plaintiff and was

truthful and accurate in its contents. (R. 243 at f 12, uncontested at R. 309.)
10.

Dr. Joseph Yost (the primary person at HCI with whom Ms, Wayment

discussed her proposal) had detailed conversations with Plaintiff in which HCFs support
of the foundation, both monetary and in other ways, was discussed.

(R. 279-83.)

However, Dr. Yost was advised by the Senior Director of Public Affairs at HCI that his
dealings with Ms. Wayment raised a serious concern regarding a conflict of interest
because as a health reporter, Ms. Wayment regularly covered HCI and other health care
organizations. (R. 281-82 at f 9.)
1L

Plaintiff was terminated by Fischer on May 14, 2002. (R. 270-71 at f 19.)

Because of Plaintiffs expressed concern that her being "fired" might adversely affect her
previously undisclosed discussions she had been having about employment with KUTV,
Channel 2, Fischer gave Plaintiff the option to "resign" and allowed her to take two
weeks "vacation" to finalize her discussions with Channel 2 before her departure became
public. (Id.) Plaintiff submitted a letter of resignation dated May 14, 2002 which letter
was accepted by Fischer. (Id.)
12.

Because of Plaintiffs expressed concern to Fischer that her being fired for

a conflict of interest might adversely affect her future in the broadcast news business,
Fischer promised Plaintiff he would not discuss or comment on the reasons for Plaintiffs
departure. (R. 271 at 121.)
The Alleged Defamatory Statements
13.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Jon Fischer and Pat Benedict made certain

defamatory statements regarding Plaintiff following Mr. Fischer's decision to terminate
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Plaintiff's employment. The alleged statements made are that Plaintiff was terminated
because:
(a)

"She was taking money from the Huntsman Cancer Institute";

(b)

"Was in bed with the Institute"; and

(c)

"Had used her reporting contacts to try to set up a foundation for her
benefit."

(R. 228 at f 48; Sup. R. 557 at lines 7-20.)
14.

Plaintiff is very specific in pleading her defamation claim based only on

these three statements. (R. 228 at f f 45, 48.) No other statements, either generally or
specifically, are alleged to have been made by the Defendants. (Id.)
15.

The corporate Defendant, KTVX, is alleged to have defamed Plaintiff

through the statements of its agents—Fischer and Benedict. No other basis for liability
against KTVX is asserted. (R. 228-29 at ff 47-54.)
16.

The Second Amended Complaint does not allege which statements were

made by which Defendant or to whom the statements were allegedly made. (R. 288-29 at
1147-54.)
17.

Discovery demonstrated the following:

(a)

Plaintiff admits that neither Fischer nor Benedict made any of the alleged
defamatory statements to her. (Sup. R. 558 at lines 3-25; 559 at lines 1-5.)

(b)

Plaintiff admits that she never personally overheard Jon Fischer or Pat
Benedict make any of the alleged defamatory statements to others. (Id.)

(c)

Fellow employees reported to Plaintiff that there was newsroom gossip and
speculation about the reasons for her termination. (Sup. R. 559-60, 562.)
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(d)

Of the 17 current and former KTVX employees deposed by Plaintiff none
of them (including Adam Rodriguez and Jeremy Castellano) have first hand
knowledge that Jon Fischer made any of the challenged statements.
(Compare R. 245-46 to R. 308-11; Plaintiff does not contest this fact.)

(e)

Of the 17 current and former KTVX employees deposed by Plaintiff only
one person, Jeremy Castellano, purports to have first-hand knowledge of
what Defendant Pat Benedict said about why Plaintiff was terminated.
(Compare R. 245-46 to R. 308-311; Plaintiff does not contest this fact.)

(f)

Castellano testified that he approached Benedict to find out "what
happened" with Plaintiff and the only statements he heard Mr. Benedict say
were: (1) "she abused her contacts as a reporter to start this foundation;" (2)
"she was in charge of a large sum of money;" (3) "it's unethical" (4) "you
can't do stories on a place that you receive money from" and (5) "The
worst thing is that she doesn't even understand what she did was wrong."
(R. 336 at pp. 10,35-36.)
Plaintiffs Public Figure Status

18.

Ms. Wayment was an on-air TV news personality for over three years at

KTVX Channel 4. (R. 286 at 14.) During that time, Plaintiff was the KTVX Health
Reporter where she appeared in news broadcasts almost every day doing either live or
taped news stories on health-related topics. (IdL at fj[ 5 and 6.) Plaintiff produced and
presented at least one health report five days a week. Her reports included a two-minute
"4 Utah Health Headlines" presentation and/or a "health package," which was a longer,
more in-depth story on health issues. (Id at % 7.)
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19.

Plaintiff's stories (which often aired on all three KTVX newscasts each

day) would run between one minute, 30 seconds and four minutes in length. (R. 286-87
at M 8-10.)
20.

In addition to her daily health stories, Plaintiff was also featured in several

half hour Special Reports regarding health matters and public safety issues. She was part
of an award-winning, highly promoted special titled "The Truth About Tobacco" which
aired twice in 2001. (R. 287 at f 13.)
21.

Ms. Wayment also reported live from various highly promoted special

events in the Utah community, including Utah AIDS Foundation's annual Oscar Night
Gala benefit which was attended by hundreds of people. Ms. Wayment would report live
from the celebration during the evening newscast directly following the Oscars, a
newscast that is watched by tens of thousands of viewers. (R. 287 at f 14).
22.

Plaintiff did 63 stories about the HCI or its employees during her

employment at KTVX. (R. 288 at f 16.)
23.

KTVX's geographic broadcast coverage area extends to the entire State of

Utah and to portions of five neighboring states. Ms. Wayment's weekday health reports
during the years 1999-2001 were seen by an average of 49,000-59,000 viewers during the
KTVX 5:30 p.m. evening news program; an average of 38,000-50,000 viewers during the
KTVX 6:00 p.m. evening news program and an average of 51,000 to 75,000 viewers
when her stories were rebroadcast in the 10:00 p.m. evening news. (R. 288 at f 17.)
24.

On occasion, Plaintiff's stories broadcast on KTVX would be picked up by

the ABC Network and broadcast nationally or by other ABC affiliates around the
country. (R. 287 at f 15.)
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25.

Plaintiff was the subject of various KTVX promotions in 2000 and 2001

during each of the four annual ratings periods or "sweeps." During these sweeps periods,
Plaintiff and her stories were promoted on KTVX and other television stations in 15-30
second commercials prior to the broadcast of her particular story. These commercials
totaled over 500 in number. (R. 291-92 at If 3-4.)
26.

Ms. Wayment maintained a highly visible public presence in the greater

Salt Lake area through extensive community and volunteer work. She was a member of
the Board of Directors of the Candlelighters for Childhood Cancer, a Utah non-profit
organization. She acted as the celebrity Master of Ceremonies for the Utah Diabetes
Center Annual Gala in March of 2002. She was the March of Dimes WalkAmerica
Spokesperson in the spring of 2001 and she was a celebrity runner in the Race for the
Cure Fun Runs in 2000 and 2001. (R. 312 at f 4.)
27.

Ms. Wayment was featured in a fashion segment of Oprah Winfrey's

Magazine "O", which included a full body photograph and reference to her as a TV
reporter in Salt Lake City. (Sup. R. 560 at lines 10-24.)
28.

Ms. Wayment described herself as a "local celebrity."

(R. 278 at last

paragraph.)
29.

The local media did stories about the filing of her lawsuit against

defendants. See, e.g., Deseret News Story dated July 27, 2002, titled "Former KTVX
Reporter Sues Company" (R. 293-94.)
Plaintiff's Lack of Evidence Regarding 111-Will or Hostility
30.

Defendant Benedict had never spoken to Ms. Wayment before beginning

his employment at KTVX only two weeks prior to Plaintiff's termination. (R. 275 at
fft 1-3.) Benedict believed Ms. Wayment was a competent employee, had a pleasant
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working relationship with her and harbored no ill will or animosity towards her. (Id. at
54.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In this case, there are three compelling basis for affirming the summary judgment
granted by the district court.
First, (as addressed in Sections I and II of this brief), the undisputed evidence
establishes Plaintiff was a "public figure." Plaintiff failed in her effort to affirmatively
produce any evidence (let alone the clear and convincing evidence the law requires) to
prove that Defendants made the alleged statements with the "actual malice" required to
overcome the privilege protecting speech about public figures.
Second, (as set forth in Section III herein), despite extensive discovery, including
the depositions of 17 current and former KTVX employees, Plaintiff has discovered no
admissible evidence that the alleged defamatory statements were made by Defendant
Fischer (as opposed to idle gossip and speculation by others whom she has chosen not to
sue). Similarly, Plaintiff has produced only one witness that purports to have heard
Patrick Benedict make any statements about her. These statements (as discussed in
Section IV herein), are not the ones Plaintiff has sued upon in her Second Amended
Complaint.
Third, (as set forth in Section V herein), Plaintiff has failed to produce any
evidence that Defendants Fischer or Benedict (even if one assumes they made the alleged
defamatory statements) acted with the requisite "common law malice" to overcome the
protections afforded employer-to-employee communications (or communications to a
interested third parties).
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Any one of these reasons, standing alone, is sufficient grounds for affirming
summary judgment. All together, they provide overwhelming justification for dismissal
of the case and impose an insurmountable barrier to Plaintiff's claims on appeal.
ARGUMENT
L

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS A PUBLIC FIGURE WHO WAS REQUIRED TO
PROVE ACTUAL MALICE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANTS IN
ORDER TO AVOID DISMISSAL OF HER DEFAMATION CLAIM.
The District Court was correct in determining that Plaintiff was a public figure

who needed to prove actual malice on the part of defendants in order to avoid dismissal
of her defamation claim. Despite Plaintiff's arguments on appeal that she was not a
public figure, her position lacks any factual or legal support and must be rejected for the
following reasons:
A.

A Public Figure Is One Who Has Assumed a Role of Prominence in
Society, Occupies a Position of Influence, or Who Has Invited Public
Attention And Comment,

Under both U.S. and Utah constitutional law, persons attain public figure status in
one of three ways.

They are persons who either have "assumed roles of especial

prominence in the affairs of society" or who occupy "a position of persuasive power
and influence" or who "invite attention and comment."

Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626

P.2d 968, 972 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct 2997, 41 L.
Ed. 2d 789 (1974)) (emphasis added); see also Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc.,
627 F.2d 1287, 1294 n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (public figure's broad influence allows [her]
to capitalize on general fame by lending [her] name to products, candidates and causes)
(emphasis added). To achieve public figure status, Ms. Wayment's prominence or fame
need not have been gained on a national basis, but merely within her community. Gertz,
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418 U.S. at 351-52 (general fame and notoriety in community or among local population
is required); Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295 n. 22 (D.C Cir. 1980) ("We therefore conclude
that nationwide fame is not required"). See also SARO Corp. v. Waterman Broad. Corp.,
595 So.2d 87, 89 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992) (only fame or notoriety in community required for
general purpose public figure).
Further, this Court has noted that a person who ". . . forsakes the anonymity of
private life and enters the limelight of the public arena . . . must accept the attendant
personal risks." Seegmiller, 626 P.2d at 974; see also Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294-95
("When someone steps into the public spotlight . . . [s]he must take the bad with the
good"); San Antonio Express News v. Dracos, 922 S.W. 2d 242, 255 ("As a journalist
and self-described public commentator, [Plaintiff] cannot hold himself out as a popular
television personality and yet deny he is a public figure for purposes of the New York
Times standard and the First Amendment"). Consistent with these pronouncements, the
voluntary nature of a person's ascent into the limelight will be a determinative factor in
finding her a public figure. Seegmiller, 626 P.2d at 972 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342,
345) (vigor and success with which person seeks public attention is one determinative
factor in achieving public figure status).
As set forth in Section C below, the record before the trial court unequivocally
demonstrates that Plaintiff meets not one, but all three criteria for public figure status —
she was "prominent" within our state, she occupied a position of "influence" and she
voluntarily sought "public attention."
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B.

Reporters, Journalists and Media Personalities Such As Plaintiff Are Public
Figures.

Plaintiff fails to cite a single case where a news reporter, journalist or other media
personality was not found to be a public figure. In contrast, there are numerous cases
holding that media personalities, such as Ms. Wayment, are public figures. See, e.g.,
Dracos, 922 S.W.2d 242, 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (finding defamation Plaintiff, a
television reporter, was a public figure and citing ten additional cases where journalists,
authors, columnists, publishers, and radio personalities were found to be public figures);
Cole v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., Inc., 435 N.E.2d 1021, 1024-25 (Mass. 1982) (finding
defamation Plaintiff, a television reporter, was a public figure in lawsuit against his
former station for statements made regarding the reasons for his termination; "the
circumstances surrounding his dismissal were a matter of public interest, as evidenced by
the newspaper articles published concerning his dismissal").2
In Dracos, a case very similar to the instant one, a television reporter sued a
newspaper for defamation arising out of a column regarding the reasons for his
termination from his station. 922 S.W.2d 242. The court found that Plaintiff was a
public figure, stating: "[W]e note that journalists and television reporters like Dracos, as
well as other individuals who regularly comment on public affairs, have often been
considered public figures." IcL at 252. The court continued, "Like other journalists,
reporters, and media personalities, [Plaintiff] has vigorously sought and achieved
publicity for his journalistic efforts" Id, at 253 (emphasis added).

2

See also Stolz v. KSFM 102 FM, 30 Cal. App. 4th 195, Cal. Rptr.2d 740, 745-46 (1994)
(general manager and owner of radio station found to be general purpose public figure
based, in part, on his "voluntary exposure to public scrutiny").
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In the instant case, and as demonstrated in the following section, the situation is no
different for Plaintiff.
C.

As a Well Recognized Health Reporter for KTVX News Who Reported
Daily on Health Issues of Vital Importance to the Public and Who Covered
the Activities of Major Health Care Providers and Insurers Throughout the
State, Plaintiff Attained Public Figure Status.

Plaintiff's extensive local and national news broadcasts on matters of public
importance, her public appearances in support of charities and local causes, and her own
admitted celebrity status evidence her status as a public figure for all purposes, or at least
for purposes related to her termination as a reporter. Tellingly, Plaintiff never disputed at
the summary judgment stage any of the material facts establishing her "prominence," her
"influence" or the fact she "invited public attention" in the Salt Lake community.3 Nor,
on appeal, is she able to marshal any evidence negating her public figure status.
Some of the many undisputed facts demonstrating her public figure status include
the following:
Plaintiff was the KTVX Channel 4 Health Reporter for three years (R. 286 at f 4)
and was featured in daily health reports as well as several half-hour segments regarding
health matters and public safety issues. (R. 246 at f 18; 286 at f 5-7.) During this time,
she broadcast more than a thousand news stories and other TV specials. (R. 287 at f 1112.) Ms. Wayment often reported live from highly promoted special events such as the
Utah AIDS Foundation Annual Oscar Night Gala benefit. (R. 287 at f 14.) Some of her
stories were picked up by the ABC Network and broadcast nationally or by other ABC

3

In Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment, her Statement of
Material Facts admits paragraphs 18-29 of Defendants' Statement of Facts by not
disputing them. (R. 308-317.) These undisputed paragraphs (18-29) all relate to
Plaintiffs status as a public figure. (R. 246-248.)
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affiliates around the country. (R. 287 at f 15.) Her stories were seen by over a hundred
thousand viewers each evening.

(R. 288 at f 17.)

Ms. Wayment reported on the

activities of Utah's major health care providers, such as the Huntsman Cancer Institute,
various hospitals, etc. (R. 268 at f 8.) These facts, alone, demonstrate that Ms. Wayment
was "prominent" throughout the state, occupied a "position of influence" in our
community and "invited public attention and comment."
Additionally, Ms. Wayment herself, acknowledged that she was a "local
celebrity." (R. 278—last paragraph.) In fact, she voluntarily utilized her celebrity status
by lending her name to many high-profile charities and events. (R. 247 at f 21; R. 248 at
f 26; R. 312.) For example, she acted as the celebrity Master of Ceremonies for the Utah
Diabetes Center Annual Gala in March of 2002. (R. 248, 312, 413.) She was the March
of Dimes WalkAmerica Spokesperson in the spring of 2001 and she was a celebrity
runner in the Race for the Cure Fun Runs in 2000 and 2001. (R. 248, 312, 412.) She was
a member of the Board of Directors of the Candlelighters for Childhood Cancer, a Utah
non-profit organization. (R. at 248, 312, 406.) Further indicative of Plaintiff's public
figure status is the fact that the filing of her lawsuit generated stories in the Utah media.
(R. 248, 293.)

As such, the record is clear that the district court made the correct

determination that Plaintiff was a public figure.
D.

Contrary to Plaintiff's Arguments, the Defendants' Media or Non-Media
Status and the Medium Through Which the Challenged Statements Were
Made Does Not Negate Her Status As a Public Figure And She Had
Sufficient Access to the Media As a Public Figure.

Rather than dispute the fact of her prominence, influence or notoriety, Plaintiff
seeks to strip herself of her public figure status by asking the Court to adopt a novel and
never-before-recognized approach. Plaintiff argues misguidedly that she is not a public
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figure because: (1) no media of any sort was involved in publishing the allegedly
defamatory remarks about her so there are no "freedom of the press" issues (Br. of
Appellant at 11-12); (2) the controversy between the parties was a "private employeremployee" issue (Br. of Appellant at 11, 13-14); and (3) she lacked access to the media
and did not intentionally invite attention or comment (Br. of Appellant at 15).
1.

The Relevant Inquiry for Determining A Public Figure Is Not Based
on the Status of Defendants or the Medium Through Which the
Alleged Defamation Is Published.

Plaintiff's principal rationale for challenging her public figure status is premised
on two inconsequential factors. First, Plaintiff contends that Defendants were not true
"media defendants" since her case involves a private employment dispute.

Second,

Plaintiff argues that the alleged defamatory statements were not published through the
channels of media news. (Br. of Appellant at 12.) As such, Plaintiff posits that all of the
cases relied upon by Defendants, in which media personalities were found to be public
figures, are inapplicable because such cases involved actual media defendants and the
challenged statements in those cases were published through the media. (Id.) In other
words, Plaintiff does nothing to distinguish these cases or challenge the underlying legal
principles. Rather, she argues that since they involved media defendants and defamatory
statements published through a media outlet they are irrelevant.
Plaintiff patently misunderstands the relevant inquiry for analyzing public figure
status.

In direct contradiction to Plaintiff's position, it is always the status of the

Plaintiff, and never the status of the defendants or the medium, that determines if the
Plaintiff is a public figure. See e.g., Van Dyke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52, 54-55 (Utah
1983) (analyzing public official status of Plaintiff without any consideration of
defendants' status or the nature of the medium); Cox, 761 P.2d at 556, 559-61 (same).
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Beyond that, Plaintiff has failed to cite a single case, within Utah or any other
state, that predicates public figure status on whether or not the speaker of the alleged
defamatory statement was acting as a media entity. Likewise, Plaintiff has provided no
cases which adopt her novel argument that public figure status turns on whether the
media was the medium for publication. The whole notion that Plaintiff can somehow
avoid being a public figure merely because the alleged defamation was not published in
print or on-air is nonsensical. Accepting Plaintiff's argument would lead to the illogical
and undesirable result of increasing protection to libelous statements which are widely
distributed through a paper, on radio or television. By taking this position, Plaintiff is
effectively arguing that the challenged statements about her would be granted more
protection had Mssrs. Fischer and Benedict broadcast a story about the reasons for her
termination rather than allegedly make the statements within the KTVX newsroom.
A final reason Plaintiff's argument must fail is the well-established doctrine that
application of public figure status is not limited to cases where the defendants are media
entities. Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784,105 S. Ct.
2939, 2958, 86 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1985); Cox, 761 P.2d at 560. In fact, one state supreme
court overruled a trial court's decision to treat a non-media defendant differently from a
media defendant on issues related to public figures.

Anderson v. Low Rent Hous.

Comm'n of Muscatine, 304 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1981).4 As such, it is irrelevant whether
or not the speakers of the alleged defamatory statements are considered "media
defendants" or the alleged defamation took place in the context of an employment

4

See also Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Commission of Muscatine,304 N.W.2d 239
(Iowa 1981) (citing Iowa law and several cases from other states recognizing there is no
distinction between media and non-media defendants). In Anderson, the court overruled
the lower court's distinction between media and non-media defendants.
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dispute.

Plaintiff's status, not the status of the defendant, is the controlling

determination.
2.

Plaintiff Had Access to the Media And Sought Attention Through
Her Job As a Television Journalist.

Another reason Plaintiff contends that she should not be considered a public figure
is that she lacked sufficient access to the media and never thrust herself into the forefront
of the public eye. (Br. of Appellant at 15.) As addressed previously, Plaintiffs fame and
prominence as a television reporter were clearly voluntary. Thus, to say that she did not
welcome her notoriety is disingenuous.

Moreover, the record contradicts Plaintiff's

assertion that she did not have sufficient access to the media to counteract the challenged
statements. For example, a local newspaper published an article regarding the filing of
her lawsuit.
In that article, Plaintiff had a chance to express her perspective on the alleged
statements had she chosen to do so. Under similar circumstances, the Dracos court noted,
"As a successful and well-known journalist, [Plaintiff] enjoyed access to the media—and
the self remedy of rebuttal—which is not available to the ordinary citizen." 922 S.W.2d
at 253. In this case, that Plaintiff chose not to seek rebuttal more actively in a public
forum does not diminish the access she had to the media even after her termination.
In summary, once a person such as Ms. Wayment becomes a public figure, they
cannot escape, for their own convenience, the highly visible status they sought out to
begin with. This is true regardless of whether Defendants acted as "media defendants" or
whether the allegedly defamatory statements were made through the media.
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E.

Plaintiff Was Not a Limited Purpose Public Figure, But Even If She Were,
The Public's Interest in Reporter Bias, Conflicts of Interest or Misconduct
Requires Plaintiff to Show Actual Malice on the Part of Defendants to
Avoid Dismissal of Her Defamation Claim.

Plaintiff, alternatively, argues that a public controversy is required to establish
public figure status and there was no public controversy at issue in this case. As set forth
below, a public controversy analysis is only applicable where an otherwise private
individual gains notoriety regarding a limited issue of public interest. Seegmiller, 626
P.2d at 972. That person then becomes a "limited-use" or "limited-purpose" public
figure.

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.

Plaintiffs two-page analysis of this subject is

unnecessary because the undisputed facts already demonstrate that Ms. Wayment was a
general purpose public figure. However, even if Plaintiff were not a general purpose
public figure, she would still qualify as a "limited purpose" public figure.
1.

Plaintiff Also Qualifies As a Limited-Purpose Public Figure.

Even using the criteria outlined in the Brief of Appellant for determining a
limited-purpose public figure (Br. of Appellant at 13-14), Plaintiff satisfies each relevant
requirement to be considered as such.

See Waldbaum, 627, F.2d 1287, 1296-1298

(Plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure if he voluntarily thrusts himself into a public
controversy, or involuntarily finds himself in public controversy but does not reject his
role, and the alleged defamation relates to his role in the public concern). To begin with,
the alleged defamation relates precisely to what Plaintiff is publicly famous for (her
reporting). Next, there were two specific public controversies or concerns in which
Plaintiff became involved; namely, the caring for terminally ill children with cancer and
reporter bias or conflict of interest.
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a.

Because Plaintiff Voluntarily Thrust Herself to the Forefront
of the Public Concern over Assisting Children with Cancer,
She Qualifies as a Limited-Use Public Figure.

Plaintiff is a limited-use public figure because of the public interest in assisting
children who were terminally-ill with cancer. To Plaintiff's credit, much of the local
public interest and concern was generated by her own stories and reports over a three
year period detailing the plight of these children and their families. With regard to
helping them, Plaintiff clearly "thrust herself to the forefront" of the issue by: (a) airing
numerous stories about these children, including her own efforts to support one young
cancer victim, (b) by joining the Board of Candlelighters for Childhood Cancer, and (c)
by trying to establish her own foundation for assisting these children. Given her position
as a high-profile health reporter at a major television network, she achieved "special
prominence" in this public concern. Finally, the alleged defamation is directly related to
Plaintiff's proposed foundation and the issue of caring for children with cancer.
b.

Because Plaintiff Voluntarily Injected Herself into Activities
Constituting a Conflict of Interest, the Public Concern over
Reporter Ethics Qualifies Her as a Limited-Use Public Figure.

Plaintiff is also a limited-purpose public figure because of the great public interest
in news reporter conduct. One need not look too far back in time to realize the firestorm
of local and national concern over the media's ability to report fairly and without bias.
For example, Utah's local media came under much public scrutiny after the terminations
of Salt Lake Tribune reporters Michael Vigh and Kevin Cantera for selling false
information to a tabloid regarding the Elizabeth Smart ordeal. Likewise, on a national
level, the public interest in media bias and reporter ethics has been extremely high after
the resignation of New York Times editors over the plagiarism scandal surrounding their
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reporter, Jason Blair, and after New Republic reporter Stephen Glass revealed he
fabricated entire news stories.
Based on Plaintiff's own written explanation to Jon Fischer of her actions which
led to her termination (See R. 278), it is undisputed that KTVX had the right to fire
Plaintiff for a conflict of interest. Indeed, Ms. Wayment could have been terminated for
any reason, with or without cause, as she was an employee at will. (R. 268 at f 7.) By
voluntarily engaging in the acts which led to her termination (and which are undisputed),
it was at least foreseeable that she or the station would come under public scrutiny or
criticism. Indeed, public attention was drawn to the issue of media ethics by the filing of
her lawsuit, which was subsequently covered in local newspapers and detailed the
reasons for her termination. Finally, the alleged defamation is directly related to the
perception of Plaintiff's ability to report fairly and the public's concern over media ethics
and misconduct.
2.

Plaintiff Is Not a Private Figure Like the Plaintiffs in the Firestone
and Seegmiller Cases.

Plaintiff is not a true "private figure" who enjoyed anonymity and who no one
would listen to in the press if she wished to challenge what was supposedly being said
about her. In her Opening Brief Plaintiff likens her case to that of the Plaintiff in Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457, 96 S. Ct. 958, 966, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976), whom
the court found to be a private figure (Br. of Appellant at 16.) However, the Firestone
Plaintiff was an otherwise private person who was drawn involuntarily into the public eye
due to her well-publicized divorced proceeding.

Id. at 96 S. Ct. 967.

The same

absolutely cannot be said about Plaintiff in this case. Unlike the Firestone Plaintiff, Holly
Wayment for years sought out the limelight and the attendant benefits of being a 'local
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celebrity" and public figure. She cannot now turn back the hands of time and arbitrarily
label herself a private figure for the purposes of this litigation after she has enjoyed the
fruits of her popularity for many years.
Similarly, Ms. Wayment is not at all like the Plaintiff in Seegmiller who was
found to be a private figure. In Seegmiller, the Plaintiff was a resident of a small-town
who, without seeking any attention, became the subject of a television reporter's
investigative piece.

626 P.2d at 970-71.

In that report, Plaintiff was blamed for

mistreating certain horses he was raising. IcL The unflattering report caused his other
businesses in the small town to suffer. Id. at 971. In finding Plaintiff a private figure,
this Court noted that he did not occupy a position of persuasive power or influence and
"was plucked from the anonymity of private life and thrust against his will into the
limelight." IcL at 972.
In contrast, Ms. Wayment occupied a position of great persuasive power and
influence in the community as a well known television journalist and was not thrust
against her will into the public eye. Indeed, it was Plaintiffs own conduct (soliciting
financial support for her private foundation from an organization she regularly reported
on as part of her newsbeat) which resulted in her termination and her own decisions
(filing a lawsuit with detailed allegations without sealing portions of the complaint) that
brought the specific alleged defamatory statements to the public's attention.

Thus,

neither the Firestone nor the Seegmiller cases, relied upon by Ms. Wayment are
applicable to the instant case.
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II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO OFFER ANY EVIDENCE, MUCH LESS THE REQUISITE
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, OF ACTUAL MALICE TO
OVERCOME THE PROTECTIONS ATTACHED TO SPEECH
PERTAINING TO PUBLIC FIGURES.
Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence, much less the requisite clear and

convincing evidence, of actual malice to overcome the constitutional privilege protecting
speech related to public figures.5

Where a defamation Plaintiff is either a "public

official" or a "public figure" the Plaintiff must show that the defendant published the
false statement with a state of mind known as "actual malice." Russell v. Thomson
Newspapers, Inc. 842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah
1988). Both at summary judgment and in her appeal, Plaintiff misconstrues the type of
malice required to overcome the protections related to speech regarding public figures as
well as her burden of proving such malice with clear and convincing evidence.6
A.

Actual Malice Defined.

Actual malice is not to be confused with common law malice or malicious or evil
intent. Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, (1991).7 Actual malice
focuses on the state of mind of the defendant and whether the defendant had a subjective
awareness the defamatory statements were false. Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of U.S.,
5

Limited-use public figures must also establish actual malice. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d
1287, 1298 (Plaintiff is limited use public figure and cannot establish actual malice; thus,
summary judgment was appropriate).
6
The malice Plaintiff tries to establish is actually for her exemplary damages claim. (R.
321.)
7
Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988). As the United States Supreme Court has
noted, "the phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do
with bad motive or ill will." Harte-Hanks v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 105 L. Ed. 2d
562, 576 fn. 7. "We have used the term actual malice as a shorthand to describe the First
Amendment protections for speech injurious to reputation." Masson, 501 U.S. 496
(1991). Some courts and commentators have referred to the heightened standard as
"constitutional malice." See, e.g. Cox, 761 P.2d at 560.
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Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). In the seminal
case of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court defined
actual malice as the publication of a statement "with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity."8

Thus, actual malice has two prongs: (a)

knowledge that a statement is false; or (b) reckless disregard for whether a statement is
false or not.
The actual malice standard is a subjective, not objective, standard and requires an
inquiry into the speaker's state of mind at the time of publication. As noted by the Tenth
Circuit in Hardin v. Santa Fe Reporter, Inc., 745 F.2d 1323, 1325 (1984), the standard is
"difficult" to satisfy. Only where the defendant "actually knew" the statement was false
or "subjectively entertained serious doubts" as to its truth or "purposefully avoided" the
truth, can the actual malice standard be met. Id at 1326. This constitutional hurdle is
made even more difficult to overcome by virtue of the high burden of proof a Plaintiff is
required to meet in establishing actual malice. Appellate Courts conduct independent
appellate review to determine whether sufficient evidence of actual malice exists. Bose.
B.

Clear And Convincing Evidence of Actual Malice Is Required.

In a series of decisions following New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that the importance of a free press requires that proof of actual malice be
made by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Bose, 466 U.S. 485 (1987); Masson,
501 U.S. 446, supra. This high burden of proof is necessary because "our profound
national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment,
demands that the law of libel carve out an area of breathing space." Gertz, 418 U.S. at

8

The Utah Supreme Court adopted the New York Times definition of actual malice in
Seegmiller, 626 P.2d 968; See also Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d at 559 (same).
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342 (quoting NAACP v. Bulton, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). This requirement of "clear
and convincing evidence" extends to state courts as well.9 Utah has not yet expressly
adopted the "clear and convincing standard." As such, Defendants respectfully request
this Court to do so consistent with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and
other states.
C.

Summary Judgment Is Appropriate in the Absence of Clear and Convincing
Evidence.

In 1986, the United States Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986), settled a long-standing dispute over
the proper role summary judgment should play in libel cases. The Court held that a
Plaintiff in a public figure case could not defeat a defendant's motion for summary
judgment without affirmatively producing clear and convincing evidence of actual
malice. The Court held that:
Thus, where the factual dispute concerns actual malice,
clearly a material issue in a New York Times [public figure]
case, the appropriate summary judgment question will be
whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable
jury finding—either that the Plaintiff has shown actual malice
by clear and convincing evidence or that the Plaintiff has not.
Id. at 2514.
Actual malice is thus a question of law in the first instance, Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1991). On appeal, courts will
independently review the record to determine whether clear and convincing evidence of
9

See e.g., Anderson v. Low Rent Hous. Comm'n of Muscatine, 304 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa
1981) (citing many other states' adoption of the clear and convincing standard). The
Anderson court further noted: "In New York Times the Court held that the provisions of
the first amendment apply to the states through the due process clause of the fourth
amendment, and, consequently, state laws must require clear and convincing evidence
of actual malice" when a public figure is involved. Id (citing New York Times, 376 U.S.
254 at 276-77, 283-86, 84 S. Ct. at 724, 727-29, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 704, 708-10).
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actual malice existed.

Bose, 466 U.S. at 508; see also Piper v. Mize, 2003 WL

21338696, *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (stating '[I]t is incumbent on this Court, in
reviewing this grant of summary judgment as to the issue of actual malice, to determine,
not whether there is material evidence in the record supporting Plaintiffs, but whether or
not the record discloses clear and convincing evidence upon which a trier of fact could
find actual malice").
This independent search for clear and convincing evidence assures that First
Amendment rights are protected. Bose, 466 U.S. at 508 ("We must make an independent
examination of the whole record, so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.") (internal citations
omitted).10 Given this heightened evidentiary standard, appellate courts routinely affirm
summary judgment dismissing public figure defamation claims for failure to
affirmatively produce evidence of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.11 In
fact, this Court has recognized that even in non actual malice cases, there exists " . . . a
First Amendment interest in disposing of libel cases on motion and at an early stage when
it appears that a reasonable jury could not find for the Plaintiffs." Cox, 761 P.2d at 561.

10

Eastwood v. National Enquirer, 123 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9m Cir. 1997) ('The purpose of
[this Court's] review is to satisfy ourselves that plaintiff proved malice by clear and
convincing evidence, which we have described as a heavy burden, far in excess of the
preponderance sufficient for most civil litigation") (internal citations omitted).
11
See, e ^ , Peterson v. New York Times Co., 106 F.Supp.2d 1227 (D. Utah 2000)
(applying Utah law); Revell v. Hoffman, 309 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2002); Cobb v. Time,
Inc., 278 F.3d 629 (6tn Cir. 2002); Worrell-Payne v. Gannett, 49 Fed. App. 105 (9m Cir.
2002); Carafamo v. Metrosplash, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (CD. Cal. 2002); McFarland v.
Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C.Cir. 1996); El Deeb v. Univ. of Minn., 60
F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1995); Underwager v. Salter, 22 F.3d 730 (7th Cir.), Cert, denied, 513
U.S. 943 (1994); Meisler v. Gannet Comp., 12 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 512
U.S. 1222 (1994).
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D.

Plaintiff Has Not and Cannot Establish Actual Malice By Clear And
Convincing Evidence Based on Fischer's Inaction Nor Circumstantial
Evidence (Based on Double And Triple Hearsay).

The trial court properly rejected Plaintiff's argument that she could establish
actual malice by clear and convincing evidence based on Fischer's inaction or on
circumstantial evidence that consists of double and triple hearsay. Plaintiff argued in the
court below that Fischer's refusal to quell the newsroom rumors about her and the
testimony of witnesses who allegedly heard Fischer's secretary make some of the
challenged statements, were sufficient proof for establishing actual malice. (See R. 322.)
Plaintiff's reliance on these facts is misplaced. Fischer's silence does not establish
a subjective awareness in his mind that the statements he is accused of making were false
and Plaintiff offers no case authority where silence has been so applied. Indeed, Fischer
testified that he did not respond to any rumors or speculation about why Plaintiff had
been terminated because (i) it was station policy not to discuss personnel matters (R. 271
at 122.) and (ii) Plaintiff had requested Fischer not divulge the reasons for her
termination (R. 271 at 121.) Neither does the purported fact that Fischer's secretary
made some of the challenged statements establish any improper state of mind as to
Fischer. This is underscored by Plaintiff's failure to cite a single case that allows such
marginal, circumstantial evidence to defeat summary judgment on the actual malice
issue. Plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to raise a material dispute at any level of proof,
much less at the heightened clear and convincing evidentiary standard applied to
determining actual malice.
In sum, Plaintiff is a public figure who failed to meet the heightened constitutional
and evidentiary burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that defendants
made the allegedly defamatory statements with "actual malice." Plaintiff's failure to
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meet her burden of proof is a sufficient and independent basis for this Court to affirm the
decision of the District Court.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRODUCE ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT
LINKED DEFENDANT JON FISCHER TO ANY OF THE STATEMENTS
ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.
The District Court correctly determined that Plaintiff failed to produce admissible

evidence that Defendant Jon Fischer made any of the statements alleged in Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint.
A.

Plaintiff Must Establish Defamation with Facts That Would Be Admissible
in Evidence.

Under well-established Utah law, a witnesses' testimony offered in opposition to
summary judgment must set forth facts that be would be admissible in evidence. Norton
v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (finding Plaintiffs affidavit insufficient for
opposing summary judgment where it lacked specificity required to be admissible). To
be admissible, this evidence must be based on the personal knowledge of the witness. In
Re: Gen. Determination of Rights to Use of All Water, 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999)
(affirming exclusion of affidavit testimony in opposition to summary judgment where
many facts asserted in affidavit were not based on personal knowledge and contained
hearsay).12
B.

Double Hearsay Statements Are Not Admissible to Establish Defamation
on the Part of Defendants.

Double or multiple hearsay cannot support a defamation claim. A witness'
testimony that merely re-states what another individual has said is inadmissible hearsay

12

See also GNS P'ship v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157, 1164-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(affidavits not based on personal knowledge were properly stricken).
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that cannot be relied upon in opposition to summary judgment. Western States Thrift &
Loan Co. v. Bloomquist, 504 P.2d 1019, 1020-21 (Utah 1972) (affirming summary
judgment where non-moving party based his opposition on his own affidavit; affidavit
excluded because it contained hearsay testimony merely recounting what another witness
told affiant).13
Utah courts have not specifically addressed this evidentiary issue in the context of
a defamation claim. However, it is well accepted in other jurisdictions that a Plaintiff
opposing summary judgment on a defamation claim cannot rely on testimony that merely
recounts what another person allegedly heard regarding a challenged statement. See,
Starr, 54 F.3d at 1555 (finding summary judgment appropriate on defamation claim
where the only evidence was deposition testimony of witness recounting what a third
person allegedly heard from defendant; testimony amounted to inadmissible hearsay);
Molenda v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 60 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303 (S.D. Flor. 1999) (citing
5th and 11th Circuit authority and granting summary judgment on former employee's
defamation claim because he offered no more than his "double-hearsay" testimony of

13

Accord Starr v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 54 F.3d 1548, 1555 (10m Cir. 1995) (adopting
"unanimous weight of authority" from other jurisdictions that a court may not consider
hearsay evidence in depositions submitted to defeat summary judgment; citing U.S.
Supreme Court, 5th Circuit, 9th Circuit, and 7th Circuit law as well as legal commentators).
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what others had allegedly witnessed); Dull v. St, Lukes Hospital of Duluth, 21 F. Supp.
2d 1022, 1028 (D. Minn. 1998) (citing 8th Circuit precedent and holding that former
employee's defamation action could not survive summary judgment when she offered
merely her own testimony that another witness overheard allegedly defamatory
statements; her testimony constituted inadmissible "double hearsay").14

14 See also Hauteur v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 811 P.2d 231, 239 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)
(granting summary judgment on libel claim because "inadmissible hearsay evidence
cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment"); Franzon v. Massena
Mem'l Hosp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 270, 276-77 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting summary judgment
and finding affidavit of plaintiff's wife inadmissible hearsay when it only related another
woman's testimony of what she overheard); Marshall v. Planz, 13 F. Supp. 2d. 1246,
1255-56 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that defamation plaintiff cannot survive summary
judgment by relying upon his own deposition testimony that others informed him of what
defendant said; such testimony constitutes inadmissible hearsay); Bush v. Barnett Bank
of Pinellas County, 916 F. Supp. 1244, 1256 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (granting summary
judgment in defamation action where only evidence proffered was affidavit of a manager
that she was told by another manager that an announcement was made accusing plaintiff
of theft; affidavit constituted inadmissible hearsay); Baker v. McDonald's Corp., 686 F.
Supp. 1474, 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (granting summary judgment on defamation claim
because plaintiff's deposition testimony was inadmissible hearsay when it consisted of
what his brother-in-law heard from defendant); Barber v. Daly, 185 A.D.2d. 567, 570
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding summary judgment warranted where plaintiff's assertion
that other witnesses personally told him of slanderous statements made by defendant is
mere hearsay and insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact); Land v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
250 S.E.2d 188, 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (summary judgment on defamation claim
affirmed where plaintiff relied solely on her own deposition testimony that she was told
by a third person that defendant had made defamatory statement; statement constituted
inadmissible hearsay); Humiston v. ATOTECH USA, Inc., 1995 WL 708660, 4 (D.
Mass. 1995) (granting summary judgment on defamation claim because plaintiff's only
evidence was his deposition testimony that another person told him that a third person
had heard challenged statement by defendant; statement is double hearsay and fails to
show existence of genuine issue of material fact); Martinez v. U-Haul Co. of Illinois,
2001 WL 648637, 17 (N.D. 111. 2001) (finding plaintiff's defamation claim cannot
survive summary judgment when her only evidence that defamatory statements were
made constituted inadmissible double hearsay); Interstate Commercial Bldg. Serv. v.
Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Sav. Assoc, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1176 (D. Nev. 1998)
(granting summary judgment on defamation claim where plaintiff relied on testimony
that defendants' representatives made allegedly defamatory statements to others who in
turn repeated them to vendors that finally reiterated such words to plaintiff; such
testimony is inadmissible "double hearsay"); Albert v. Loksen, 239 F.3d 256, 267 (2nd
Cir. 2001) ("When challenged on a motion for summary judgment a plaintiff may not
rely solely on hearsay or conclusory allegations that slanderous comments were made");
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In defamation cases, this type of inadmissible hearsay testimony, sometimes
referred to as "double or multiple hearsay," is inherently unreliable in contrast to the
testimony of a first-hand witness who directly hears publication of an allegedly
defamatory statement. See Martinez v. U-Haul Co. of Illinois, 2001 WL 648637, 17
(N.D. 111. 2001) (recognizing potential admissibility of witness' own first-hand testimony
if such evidence had been presented; but defamation claim could not survive summary
judgment because only evidence presented was "double hearsay"); Molenda, 60 F. Supp.
2d at 1303 (same).
In the Molenda case, which is strikingly similar to the case at bar, the court
granted summary judgment on a defamation claim brought by a former sales employee.
The court held:
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence, other
than his own deposition testimony, that the alleged
defamatory statements were in fact made. As to all of the
alleged statements, however. Plaintiff concedes that he has
no personal knowledge as to the statements—he only
learned of the comments from others. Clearly, Plaintiff's
testimony constitutes double-hearsay and, as such, cannot be
used to defeat summary judgment."

Snyder v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 252 A.D.2d 294, 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (finding
summary required where plaintiff relied on inadmissible hearsay testimony that
slanderous comments were made); Schwartz v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 232 A.D.2d.
212, 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (defamation claim dismissed summarily; evidence
constitutes inadmissible hearsay); Davis v. Household Int'l, 1991 WL 110042, *2 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1991) (affirming summary judgment where witnesses' statements relied upon by
plaintiff were no more than inadmissible double hearsay that related what another
individual allegedly heard from defendant); McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 158385 (11th Cir. 1996), ajfd 520 U.S. 781, 117 S. Ct. 1734, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1997)
(deposition testimony constituting double hearsay cannot defeat summary judgment);
Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir.
1995) (affirming summary judgment against defamation claim where only evidence that
defamatory statements were made was inadmissible hearsay).
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Id. at 1303 (emphasis added). Similarly, as one court explained, a description of another
person's testimony "is not suitable grist for the summary judgment mill." Gross v.
Burgraff Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal cites omitted).
C.

It Is Undisputed That Plaintiff Failed to Produce A Single Witness That
Heard Jon Fischer Make Any of the Challenged Statements.

In the instant case, Plaintiff has failed to produce any admissible evidence that
Defendant Fischer uttered any of the three claimed defamatory statements. These alleged
statements were that Plaintiff was terminated because: (a) "She was taking money from
the Huntsman Cancer Institute;" (b) "Was in bed with the Institute"; and (c)"Had used
her reporting contacts to try to set up a foundation for her benefit." (R. 228 at f 48.)
Plaintiff, herself, admits she never heard any defamatory statements made by Mr.
Fischer. (See Sup. R. 557 line 7 through 559 line 5.)15 Moreover, of the seventeen
witnesses Plaintiff deposed in this case, not a single one personally heard any defamatory
statements uttered by Mr. Fischer. (R. 245.) Plaintiff argues on page 23-24 in her
Opening Brief that several statements from various individuals (including Ms. Degering,
Ms. McKane, Ms. Miller and Mr. Hertzke) are proof of Fischer's culpability. (Br. of
Appellant at 23-24.) However, these statements are all merely re-statements of "rumors"
overheard by these witnesses who, during their depositions, could not remember or
identify either the persons from whom they heard the rumor or to whom the source(s) of
the rumor was attributed. (See e.g., Degering Depo.; Sup. R. 551 lines 7-9.) More

15

Plaintiffs own testimony provides no support for her claim. In her deposition, she
initially identifies seven individuals who reported to her hearing defamatory statements
from "the Defendants." (Sup. R. 559 at lines 21-25.) On its face, such testimony
constitutes inadmissible "double hearsay." Moreover, after an examination regarding
each of the seven individuals, Plaintiff admits that none of them actually heard Mr.
Fischer make a single defamatory comment. (As evidenced by her crossing out the
initials "JF" next to each purported witness; see Sup. R. 560 lines 1-9 and Sup. R. 562.)
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importantly, every one of these witnesses testified definitively in their depositions that
they never heard Jon Fisher make any of the allegedly defamatory remarks.16 In the
absence of any direct evidence linking Fischer to the challenged statements, Plaintiff
attempts to meet her burden based on three impermissible sources.
1.

Plaintiff Relies on Improperly Vague Testimony.

Plaintiff first attempts to rely on improperly vague testimony. In her opening
brief, she cites statements from KTVX employee Jeremy Castellano17 who states, "They
made up the story about how she was receiving money and how she was unethical when
it wasn't true," and "A lot of management pushed the story she was taking money from
Huntsman. . . Like Pat Benedict." (Br. of Appellant at 18 ) 18 Likewise, at summary
judgment, Plaintiff cited former employee Christina Flores-McKane as saying,
"Everybody was talking about it." (R. 318.)
Even assuming these statements were intended to refer to Fischer, they are
insufficient on their face to establish that he published them. Testimony attributing
challenged statements to unspecified persons or groups is inadmissible. See e.g., Glenn
v. Scott Paper Co., 1993 WL 431161, 10 (D.N.J. 1993) ("where declarants are identified
as 'they' and 'several people' the Court is simply not satisfied that the trustworthiness

16

See (Hunsaker Depo. at Sup. R. 546 line 6 through 547 line 11); (Degering Depo. at
Sup. R. 552 line 3 through 553 line 4); (Flores-McKane Depo. at Sup. R. 543 lines 1425); (Rodriguez Depo. at Sup. R. 540 lines 16-23); (Miller Depo. at Sup. R. 537 lines 310); (Castellano Depo. at Sup. R. 534 lines 1-7); (Smith Depo. at Sup. R. 531 lines 3-7).
17

Mr. Castellano, aside from being a close friend of Plaintiff, is a disgruntled employee
who quit employment at KTVX, a Clear Channel television station, on his own and due
to unsatisfactory working conditions.
This occurred sometime after Plaintiff's
termination.
18
Plaintiff tries to improperly bootstrap the testimony of Clear Channel Executive Steve
Minium who, in a totally different context, defined management as including Fischer and
Benedict. (Br. of Appellant at 22, 23.)
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requirements are being met); see also Etzel v. The Musicland Group, 1993 WL 23741, 10
(D. Kan. 1993) (summarily dismissing defamation claims because allegations do not
"state with specificity which agents made what statements to whom").
2.

Plaintiff Relies on Improper Double Hearsay Testimony.

Plaintiff also tries to establish publication by Fischer through inadmissible double
hearsay testimony. For instance, Plaintiff offers the testimony of KTVX employee Adam
Rodriguez who testified that Jon Fischer's secretary, Melissa Holt, purportedly told him
that Fischer allegedly communicated one of the defamatory remarks to her. As set forth
above, this statement by Mr. Rodriguez violates fundamental hearsay rules because his
testimony is being offered for the truth of the matter asserted (specifically, that Ms. Holt
heard Jon Fischer make the purported statement).
Plaintiff tries to justify Rodriguez's testimony by embarking on a lengthy
summary of hearsay law. (Br. of Appellants at 18, 19, 23-25.) While Plaintiff fairly
accurately sets forth general hearsay principles, she misconstrues their application to this
case. Ultimately, her recitation of hearsay cases and authorities is to no avail. All the
supporting authorities she cites recognize simply that testimony is admissible where a
person witnesses, by first hand knowledge, an allegedly defamatory utterance even if that
testimony is hearsay. (See, Id.) In other words, had Adam Rodriguez overheard Jon
Fischer, first hand, make a defamatory comment, Mr. Rodriguez's testimony of that fact
could be admissible (in contrast to his double hearsay testimony of what Ms. Holt
allegedly overheard Fischer say). However, Rodriguez admits that he did not hear
Fischer make any of the claimed defamatory statements (Sup. R. 540 at lines 16-23.)
The only statement offered by Plaintiff that is made with first hand knowledge is
that of Barbara Smith, a co-worker of Plaintiff's at KTVX. Ms. Smith testified that,
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when she inquired of Jon Fischer why Plaintiff was gone, Mr. Fischer told her it was due
to a "conflict of interest."19 (R. 399 at p. 20 lines 8-12.) This statement, although
admissible by hearsay standards, fails to establish publication of any of the disputed
statements. In fact, this statement is entirely consistent with the very reason Fischer told
Plaintiff she was being terminated—for a conflict of interest.

Thus, none of the

statements, including Ms. Smith's, are admissible for establishing publication of the
claimed defamatory statements.
3,

Plaintiff Relies on Improper and Insufficient
Evidence.

Circumstantial

Plaintiff also tries to use insufficient circumstantial evidence to prove defamation
against Fischer.

For example, Plaintiff cites as circumstantial evidence of Fischer's

defamation, the testimony of Adam Rodriguez and his accusation that Ms. Holt attributed
her knowledge of Plaintiff's termination to Jon Fischer. Plaintiff also uses a quote from
Jeremy Castellano to create the perception that Ms. Holt made similar remarks to others,
"If Jon Fischer the News Director's Secretary is going around telling people that Holly
was receiving a salary. . .she obviously knows." (Br. of Appellant at 22.) Plaintiff goes
on to argue that this statement, along with Rodriguez's creates sufficient circumstantial
evidence of defamation by Fischer. (Br. of Appellant at 21-22.) 20
However, what Plaintiff fails to explain is that Castellano, himself, never heard
Fischer or Holt make any such statements. In fact, Castellano based his whole statement
about Ms. Holt on what Rodriguez had told him.

19

(R. 341.)

In any case, neither

Smith also testified that despite her inquiries, Fischer would not give her any details
about the termination out of respect to Plaintiff. If Fischer were being vindictive, he
could easily have cast aspersions at Ms. Wayment during this dialogue.
20
Holt testified that Fisher told her Plaintiff's departure was due to a "conflict of interest"
and not due to any of the allegedly defamatory statements. (Sup. R. 524 at lines 1-16.)
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Rodriguez's statement nor Castellano's, as only the most attenuated circumstantial
evidence, can impute liability to Fischer. Without a single person who directly heard Jon
Fischer make any of the disputed statements, Plaintiff's circumstantial evidence (that
Fischer failed to stop rumors and that his secretary purportedly published a defamatory
comment) amounts to no more than conjecture and speculation which cannot defeat
summary judgment. See e^g., Corum v. Farm Credit Services, 628 F. Supp. 707, 717 (D.
Minn. 1986) (without direct evidence, a discharged employee's mere suspicions and
conjectural assertions are not sufficient to withstand summary judgment on his
defamation claim).21
Thus, under Utah law and the great weight of persuasive authority cited above,
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Mr. Fischer made any of the allegedly defamatory
statements. Based on this factor alone, this court should affirm summary judgment as to
Defendant Jon Fischer.
D.

In the Absence of Direct Evidence, Plaintiff Cannot Link the Challenged
Statements to Jon Fischer by Characterizing Fischer's Silence as an
"Adoptive Admission."

Plaintiff alleges that Fischer's failure to quell the rumors about Plaintiff's
termination, in addition to providing circumstantial evidence of defamation, constitutes
an admissible admission that he made the defamatory statements. There is no dispute
that gossip circulated in the newsroom after Plaintiff's termination.
21

Perhaps Mr.

See also Dunlap v. Wayne, 716 P.2d 842, 847 (Wash. 1986) (suggested inferences do
not qualify as evidence. "A party must provide affirmative factual evidence to oppose
summary judgment on defamation claim"); Jackson v. Boeing Co., 1992 WL 42913, *7
(D. Kan. 1992) (summary judgment must be granted where plaintiff, a terminated
employee of the defendant, failed to produce admissible direct evidence of defamation by
defendant); Cf Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1270 (Utah 1998)
(upholding summary judgment because, without direct evidence that defendant
communicated disputed information, conclusions of pure speculation and conjecture are
not sufficient).
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Fischer's decision to honor Plaintiff's request for silence may not have been the best
policy from a standpoint of employee morale.22 However, it is by no means a sufficient
basis for a defamation claim. In support of her adoptive admission argument, Plaintiff
cites a single Utah case taken woefully out of context. Utah v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512
(Utah 1981)
In Carlsen, the defendant was accused of threatening, out of court, a witness who
was going to testify against him. Id. at 513-514. While at a shopping mall, a defendant
in a criminal trial and his accomplice crossed paths with the witness. Id. Urged by the
defendant to call the witness offensive names and threaten him if he showed for court, the
accomplice verbally threatened the witness that if testified the next day, "We'll kill you."
Id. at 514. While the threats were being made, the defendant stood silently next to his
accomplice. Id At trial, on a charge of tampering with a witness, the judge allowed the
witness to testify as to what the accomplice said as evidence against the defendant. Id.
Carlsen is completely distinguishable form the instant case. First, it is a criminal
case and not a civil defamation case. More importantly, the Carlsen court allowed the
limited hearsay testimony, in large part because there was clear evidence that in warning
the witness not to testify, the accomplice was carrying out defendant's instructions. IdL at
514. In this case, there is no similar evidence that people were spreading rumors at
KTVX or anywhere else at the behest of Jon Fischer.
Another reason the Carlsen court allowed the hearsay testimony was that the
defendant was present at the time his accomplice purported to speak on behalf of both
22

Fischer asserts that he remained silent at the request of Plaintiff. (R. 271 at f 21.) This
is corroborated by testimony from Barbara Smith, a co-worker of Plaintiff, who explained
that Fischer would not tell her the details surrounding the termination because of his
commitment to Plaintiff. (R. 399 at p. 20 lines 8-12.) In addition, it was station policy
not to talk about the details of such decisions. (R. 271 at f 22.)
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himself and defendant using terms such as "us" and "we." Id In the instant case, there is
no evidence that Fischer was ever present when any potentially defamatory statements
were made, much less that some person, in his presence, made defamatory remarks on
behalf of Fischer impliedly or otherwise.

Finally, applying use of the "adoptive

admission" doctrine in a libel case as Plaintiff has suggested here carries terrible policy
implications. Specifically, all who heard or read defamatory statements (whether in the
form of gossip from another individual or stories in print or broadcast) would potentially
be liable for defamation if they did nothing to stop or correct the statements. While this
doctrine may apply in other contexts, it does not belong in a defamation case such as this.
E.

The Alleged Statement By M'Lissa Holt Is Similarly Not Admissible as
The Basis For Plaintiffs Defamation Claim.

Plaintiff improperly attempts to establish liability against Defendants based on an
alleged statement from M'Lissa Holt, wherein she purportedly told Adam Rodriguez that
Plaintiff "was getting paid by the Huntsman Institute." (Br. of Appellants at 18, 19.)
According to Rodriguez, when he asked Holt who had told her that, she responded "Jon
told me."23 Like the other hearsay statements addressed above, Ms. Holt's alleged
statement to Adam Rodriguez about what Jon Fischer supposedly said is inadmissible
double hearsay.
1.

Ms. Holt's Statement Cannot Be Used to Establish Liability on the
PartofKTVX.

On appeal, and for the first time, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Holt's testimony, itself,
should bind KTVX because she was an employee of the company.

However, this

argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, nowhere in the Second Amended

23

Holt denies making the statement. (Sup. R. 527 line 25 through 528 line 14; Sup. R.
528 lines 18-21.)
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Complaint does Plaintiff allege defamation against KTVX based on the statements of
M'Lissa Holt. Plaintiff had a chance to amend her Complaint after discovery and chose
to limit the basis of her defamation claim to the purported statements of Defendants
Fischer and Benedict. In fact, it is an undisputed material fact that Plaintiff's defamation
claim is based solely on the purported statements by Defendants Fischer and Benedict.
(R. 228 at ^[45, 48.) This fact alone is dispositive of this issue.
Second, Plaintiff failed to even raise this argument at the trial court. The only
reference to M'Lissa Holt in the summary judgment briefs was in the context of trying to
establish what Jon Fischer said by way of double hearsay (what others claimed Ms. Holt
told them that Jon Fischer said). Plaintiff cannot now, on appeal, raise new arguments
that were never preserved at the District Court level. Smith v. Four Corners Mental
Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, f 19, 70 P.3d 904, 911 (Utah 2003) (Supreme Court will
not address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal").
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO LINK DEFENDANT PAT BENEDICT TO THE
STATEMENTS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT.
The District Court correctly determined that Plaintiff failed to link Defendant Pat

Benedict to the statements alleged in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint.

As a

threshold matter, since the actual malice standard applies in this case, the Court already
has a sufficient basis for upholding dismissal of the case and need not consider this issue.
Nonetheless, this issue is similarly dispositive because Plaintiff failed to link Pat
Benedict to the three statements alleged in her Second Amended Complaint.
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A.

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint Lacks the Requisite Specificity for
A Defamation Claim Against Benedict.

On its face, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint lacks the requisite specificity
as to pleading a claim against Benedict. For example, the Complaint does not specify
when, where or to whom any defamatory statements were allegedly made by Benedict.
See Boisioly v. Morton Thiokol 706 F. Supp. 795, 800 (D. Utah 1988) (finding portions
of defamation complaint insufficient for lack of specific details). Indeed, the Complaint
does not properly distinguish with particularity between Fischer or Benedict as the source
of any of the alleged defamatory statements. See Herbert v. Lando, 603 F. Supp. 983,
991 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (when a public figure Plaintiff sues the media for libel, he must
allege the actionable words with precision or be non-suited).
B.

The Allegedly Defamatory Statements Set Forth in Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint Do Not Match What Mr. Castellano Allegedly Heard
Pat Benedict Say.

The statements alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint do not match what Mr. Castellano
allegedly heard Pat Benedict say. The Second Amended Complaint states that Fischer
and Benedict "made false accusations that (a) she was terminated because she was taking
money from the Huntsman Cancer Institute, (b) was in bed with the institute, and (c) had
used her reporting contacts to try and set up a foundation for her benefit."
It is undisputed that there is only one witness, Jeremy Castellano, who purports to
have heard Pat Benedict make any of the challenged statements. Taken from the Brief of
Appellant, Benedict purportedly made the following statements to Castellano about
Plaintiff: (1) that she abused her contacts as a reporter to start the foundation; (2) that she
was in charge of a large sum of money; (3) that it is unethical; (4) That Holly was
receiving money from Huntsman and that she was on their payroll; (5) that she was
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receiving a salary; (6) she was unethical; and (7) that she abused her contacts." (Id. at
17-18.)
There is no allegation in the Complaint about Plaintiff being "unethical," "abusing
her contacts" or being in charge of a large sum of money. Thus, statements 1, 2, 3, 6 and
7 cannot be the basis for Plaintiff's defamation claim. As to statements, 4 and 5, while
they are closer to the allegations contained in the Complaint, they are not exactly what is
pled in the Complaint. While Plaintiff argues that the "words or words to that effect"
language of Dennett v. Smith, 445 P.2d 983, 984 (Utah 1968) and Williams v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) applies here, a more careful reading reveals that
such language only applies to the adequacy of pleading the Complaint. It does not
prevent a finding that the words, though adequately plead in the Complaint, do not match
the testimony upon which Plaintiff bases her defamation claim.
V.

AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT'S
DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION IS PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO
PRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANTS ACTED WITH COMMON
LAW MALICE SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE PROTECTION FOR
EMPLOYER-TO-EMPLOYEE COMMUNICATIONS.
Plaintiff's failure to produce evidence that defendants acted with the "common

law malice" required to overcome the privilege protecting employer-to-employee
communications is a separate and independent basis for affirming summary judgment.
Although this issue was briefed below, it was not addressed in the District Court's
Memorandum Decision (ostensibly, because the court found the other reasons for
dismissal sufficient). Nevertheless, this Court may affirm the District Court's summary
judgment order on any ground appearing in the record, whether relied on by the District
Court or not. Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1996).
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A.

Any of the Alleged Defamatory Statements, Even If Made By Fischer or
Benedict, Are Protected By the Qualified Privilege Attached to Employer
to Employee Communications And Plaintiff Must Show Common Law
Malice on the Part of Defendants to Avoid Dismissal of Her Defamation
Claim.

All of the challenged statements, even if made by defendants, are protected as
privileged employer-to-employee communications. Consequently, the alleged statements
are non-actionable unless Plaintiff provides some evidence of "common-law malice" on
the part of Defendants.
Under Utah law, a "qualified" or "conditional" privilege attaches to a
communication between an employer and employee. Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d
49, 58 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).24

This is especially true when, as in this case, the

communication relates to the reasons for termination of the Plaintiff. See Id. at 58, 59;
Dubois v. Grand Central 872 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing
privilege for employer to employee communication regarding reasons for Plaintiff's
termination); Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272 (Utah 1951) (same).
To overcome this common law, qualified privilege, a defamation Plaintiff must
demonstrate that a defendant was motivated to make the allegedly defamatory statement
by common law "malice" toward the Plaintiff. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 59; Dubois, 872
P.2d at 1079. "Common law malice" (as distinct from constitutional or "actual malice")
is defined as "ill-will" or hostility" toward a person. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 59; Cox, 761
P.2dat559n. 1.
The recent Utah case of Dubois is instructive on this issue. 872 P.2d 1073. In
Dubois, the defamation Plaintiff sued her former employer, a Fred Meyer department
store, based on remarks the store manager made to two of Plaintiff's non-supervisory co24

This common law privilege has also been codified in Utah Code Ann.§ 45-2-3(3).

5865461

45

workers regarding the reasons for her termination. The court found a qualified privilege
existed as to these statements and cited the Utah Supreme Court pronouncement that:
This qualified privilege protects
an
employer's
communication to employees and to other interested parties
concerning the reasons for an employee's discharge...This
privilege is recognized at common law and applies generally
in defamation cases.
872 P.2d at 1079 (quoting Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58) (emphasis added).25
In assessing whether the Plaintiff created a disputed factual issue regarding the
existence of malice, the Dubois court held Plaintiff's allegations that Fred Meyer acted
hastily and on incorrect information in terminating her did not demonstrate the hostility
or ill-will required to overcome the qualified privilege. IdL at 1079. Consequently, the
court upheld dismissal of her defamation claim. IdL
In the instant case, the circumstances surrounding Mr. Benedict's alleged
statements to Jeremy Castellano are nearly identical to those involving the manager in
Dubois. Both situations involved Plaintiffs who had not followed company procedures
and who were terminated for exercising poor judgment. As the assistant news director of
KTVX, any statements Benedict made to Castellano, an employee of KTVX, regarding
the reasons for Plaintiff's termination would be covered by the privilege. Moreover, at
summary judgment, the Plaintiff did not dispute that the common law privilege applies to

25

The law also recognizes a statement to be privileged if made to: (a) protect a legitimate
interest of the publisher, (b) protect a legitimate interest of the recipient or a third party,
or (c) to advance a legitimate common interest between the speaker and recipient.
Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58. Plaintiff has intimated that Defendants made defamatory
statements to others outside KTVX. Tellingly, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint
has not specifically alleged any such conduct and Plaintiff has produced no evidence
supporting that notion. However, even if statements were made to persons outside
KTVX, the statements are protected under the qualified privilege as long as they were
made to protect the legitimate interests of KTVX, the third party, or a mutual interest.
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this case.26 Because it applies, Plaintiff was required to provide some evidence of "ill
will" or "hostility" on the part of Defendants in order to avoid summary judgment.
B.

Plaintiff Failed to Produce Evidence of Any "111-Will or Hostility" That
Would Constitute Common Law Malice.

Ms. Wayment failed to provide evidence that Defendants made any of the
challenged statements about her with "ill-will or hostility." At the trial court, Plaintiff
argued that she established the requisite malice to go forward on her claim. (Opposition
at p. 22.) However, Plaintiff based her conclusion on an erroneous definition of malice
that was not sufficient to overcome the qualified privilege in this case. Specifically,
Plaintiff argues that the malice she was required to demonstrate "consists of the same
proof that Defendants knew the utterances were false."27 (Id.) This definition is close to
the definition of constitutional actual malice, but has absolutely nothing to do with
common law malice or ill-will.
Plaintiff confuses the definitions of "common law malice," and "constitutional or
actual malice." Common law malice is the type of malice required to overcome the
26

Citing a single, out-of-state case, plaintiff implies that this qualified privilege should
only extend to persons on a "need to know" basis. (R. 326-27.) However, this is not
consistent with Utah law. For example, in Dubois v. Grand Central, the court recognized,
without interjecting any "need to know" requirement, a blanket privilege protecting
employer-employee communications concerning the reasons for an employee's
discharge. 872 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Brehany v. Nordstrom,
812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (also recognizing qualified privilege for employeremployee communications without additional "need to know" requirement). In fact, in
Dubois, the two employees to whom the disputed statements were made, were nonsupervisory co-workers of the plaintiff who were most likely not on a "need to know"
basis. 872 P.2d at 1079. In any case, Plaintiff ultimately retreats from her suggestion of
a "need to know" requirement, relying instead on her assertions that the allegedly
defamatory statements were made with malice. (R. 326-27.)
27

Here Plaintiff erroneously argues that the same alleged proof that defendants knew the
utterances were false (for the actual malice standard) overcomes the common law malice
standard. However, the cases to which she cites do not stand for that proposition. See
Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272, 276-77 (Utah 1951); Johnson v.
Cmty. Nursing Serv., 985 R Supp. 1321 (D. Utah 1997).
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employer-employee privilege in this case. Dubois, 872 P.2d at 1079, Brehany, 812 P.2d
at 59. It is defined as "ill-will or hostility" toward a person. Brehany, 812 P.2d at 59;
Cox, 761 P.2d at 559 n. 1. Common law malice is distinct from actual malice, discussed
in Section II above, and not subject to the same analysis as actual malice. Id, Suspicion,
surmise and accusation are not enough to establish common law malice. See e^g, Harris
v. Mean, 91 A.D.2d 830, 831 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). Thus, under cases like Harris Ms.
Wayment fails to overcome the employer-employee privilege if she "has not
demonstrated that a history of hostility existed which would have precipitated a decision
by the defendant to fabricate an excuse to terminate [her] employment... "Id at 831.
In an effort to establish some factual basis for a showing of malice (albeit the
wrong type), Plaintiff emphasized only two points to the trial court. First, she alleged
that Jon Fischer told Plaintiff he was going to bat for her with "corporate" regarding her
job even though he had purportedly made up his own decision to fire her. (R. 327.) Even
if true (though Fischer denies he offered to intervene), this demonstrates, at most, that
Fischer did not want to be perceived as a "bad guy" by Plaintiff. Clearly though, no "ill
will or hostility" toward Plaintiff is evidenced by such conduct and Plaintiff made no
argument to that effect beyond simply concluding that malice existed.
Second, Plaintiff alleged that Fischer did not take an active role in quashing the
speculation and newsroom rumors about her departure. (R. 327.) Here, Plaintiff attempt
to decry Fischer's silence as sinister simply because she had no direct evidence that he
published any defamatory statements about her. The fact that Fischer followed company
policy not to discuss personnel matters and honored his separate promise to Plaintiff that
he would not discuss the reasons for her departure is insufficient evidence to establish
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any type of malice, much less the "history or hostility" required here to overcome the
conditional privilege.28
Because Plaintiff has provided no facts from which a reasonable person could
conclude that either Fischer or Benedict acted with ill will or hostility toward her, she
cannot overcome the qualified privilege that protects their purported statements. As such,
the qualified privilege protecting employer to employee communications is a separate
and independent basis for this Court to affirm the District Court's decision.29
CONCLUSION
The district court properly dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety because
Plaintiff is a public figure who failed to demonstrate a material issue of fact that would
show by clear and convincing evidence Defendants acted with actual malice. The district
court's dismissal order was also correct because: (a) Plaintiff failed to put forth
admissible evidence that Jon Fischer made any of the allegedly defamatory statements
and (b) the statements Jeremy Castellano allegedly heard Patrick Benedict make do not
match those alleged in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.

Finally, the district

court's decision was correct because Plaintiff offered no evidence to prove that the
Defendants, even if they made the allegedly defamatory statements, did so with the
common law malice required to overcome privileged communications between employer
28

Tellingly, in purporting to set forth the definitive facts establishing malice, Plaintiff
cites no facts and makes no legal arguments regarding Patrick Benedict in her opposition
to summary judgment. (See R. 327.) Except for one conclusory statement that
"Defendants knew the utterances were false," Plaintiff apparently concedes that Benedict
did not possess the requisite "ill-will or hostility" to constitute common law malice. To
the contrary, Benedict, who had worked with plaintiff less than two weeks before her
termination, believed she was a competent employee, had a pleasant working relationship
with her and harbored no ill-will or animosity towards her. (R. 275 at f 4.)
29

The qualified privilege protecting employer-to-employee communications would also
protect any communications made by Jon Fischer, although there is no evidence any such
communications occurred.
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and employees (or interested third parties). Each of these grounds, standing alone, is
sufficient to require affirmance and this Court should affinn the judgment below in all
respects.

RANDYCLJDRYER
SEAN D. REYES
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United States District Court, D Kansas
E l s a n c h o E u g e n e JACKSON, Plaintiff,
v.
The BOEING COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation; and R e x Hessee,
Defendants.
No. 90-1448-K.
Feb 10,1992
William L Fry, Wichita, Kan , for plaintiff
Mary Kathleen Babcock & Mikel L Stout,
Foulston
& Siefkm,
Wichita, K a n , for
defendants
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
PATRICK F KELLY, District Judge
*1 This matter is before the court on
defendants' motion for summary judgment
In this employment discrimination case, the
plaintiff, Elsancho Jackson, asserts claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U S C
§ 2000e et seq, against the
defendant, The Boeing Company (Boeing),
alleging
racial
discrimination
and
harassment,
wrongful
discharge
and
retaliation
In addition, plaintiff asserts a
breach of contract claim against Boeing and a
claim against the defendant, Rex Hessee, for
tortious interference with his employment
contract
Plaintiff further asserts violations
of 42 U S C ^ 1985(3) by both defendants for
conspnacy to mterfeie with his civil rights,
and against Boeing for failure to prevent such
a conspiracy in violation of 42 U S C § 1986
Plaintiff alleges Boeing violated 42 U S C §
1981 in failing to rehire him when he
reapplied for employment with Boeing in
1990
Finally, plaintiff asserts a claim
against both defendants for defamation

Copr © West 2004 No Claim
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Summary judgment is proper where the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, if any, show there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law Fed R Civ P 56(c)
In
considering a motion for summary judgment,
the court must resolve all disputed facts in
favor of the party resisting summary
judgment White v General Motois Cotp , Inc
908 F 2d 669, 670 (10th Cir 1990), cert denied
59 U S L W 3441 (1991) Summary judgment
shall be denied if the moving party fails to
demonstrate
its entitlement
beyond
a
reasonable doubt Norton v Liddel, 620 F 2d
1375, 1381 (10th Cir 1980)
The moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law when the nonmoving party fails
to make a sufficient showing of an essential
element of the case to which the nonmoving
party has the burden of proof Celotex Corp v
Cattett, 411 U S 317, 322 (1986), cert denied
484 U S 1066 (1988)
In resisting a motion
for summary judgment, the nonmoving party
may not rely upon mere allegations, or
denials, contained in its pleadings or briefs
Rather, the party must come forward with
specific facts showing the presence of a
genuine issue for trial Abeicrombie v Cit\ of
Catoosa, 896 F 2d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir 1990)
One of the principal purposes of summary
judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule
should be interpreted in a way that allows it
to accomplish this purpose
Celotex, All U S
at 323 24
Plaintiff is a black male who began working
for Boeing in March, 1987, as a sheet metal
worker in the door shop
On May 27, 1989,
defendant Hessee, manager of the door shop,
informed plaintiff that he was discharged for
excessive absenteeism
Plaintiff does not
dispute the dates and times of his absences but
contends the absences were excusable for
medical reasons
He alleges that during his
employment with Boeing his supervisor,
Orig U S Govt Works
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Hessee, treated him differently than other
employees and was prejudice against plaintiff
because he was black and living with a
Caucasian woman.
Plaintiff claims he was
wrongfully discharged as a result of racial
discrimination.
In addition, plaintiff claims
the alleged racial discrimination of Hessee
constituted a tortious interference with his
employment contract with Boeing and caused
a breach of that employment contract by
Boeing. Hessee's alleged racial prejudices are
the basis for plaintiffs claims of violations of
42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1985(3), and § 1986.
Finally, plaintiff claims he can not obtain
satisfactory employment since his discharge at
Boeing because the defendants have made
defamatory
remarks
regarding
his
employment.
Title VII Claims
*2 Plaintiffs first claim under Title VII is
that he was wrongfully discharged for
discriminatory reasons. Title VII prohibits
discrimination by an employer "against any
individual with respect to his compensation,
terms,
conditions,
or
privileges
of
employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin...." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(aXl) (1982).
In order to establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory discharge, the plaintiff must
produce evidence of the following elements:
1) plaintiff is a member of a racial minority;
2) plaintiff is qualified for the job he was
performing;
3) despite plaintiffs qualifications he was
discharged; and
4) after his discharge the position remained
available and the employer sought people with
plaintiffs qualifications to fill the job.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973); Pitre v. Wester Elec. Co., Inc.,
843 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (10th Cir.1988);
Friends v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 37 FEP Cases
1153, 1159 (D.Kan.1983). Once the plaintiff
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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establishes a prima facie case of discrimination,
the burden shifts to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's termination.
Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981). If the employer sustains this burden,
the plaintiff may prevail only if he can show
the reasons offered by the employer were not
the real reasons for his discharge, but were a
pretext for discrimination. Id.;
McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
In the instant case, plaintiff was discharged
for excessive absenteeism.
As a member of
the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers (IAM) plaintiffs
employment was governed by the collective
bargaining agreement between IAM and
Boeing.
Under the collective bargaining
agreement, employees were paid for absences
charged to their accumulated sick leave and
were not penalized for such absences as long
as they were reported to Boeing. Once an
employee used all of his sick leave, Boeing's
attendance policy allowed absences without
penalty for verifiable medical reasons as long
as the employee presented a note from the
treating physician upon his return to work.
Plaintiff does not dispute he had an
attendance problem, but argues that the
absences attributed to him were caused by
medical reasons and therefore were excusable.
The facts reveal that when plaintiff provided
notes from his physicians to his supervisors,
his absences were excused. However, on July
22, 1987, plaintiff was orally warned that his
attendance record was unacceptable and that
further action would be taken if his
attendance did not improve immediately.
During the first half of 1988, plaintiff accrued
25 unexcused absences, was issued two
corrective action memos, and was required to
attend counseling sessions on ways to improve
his attendance problem.
In July, 1988,
plaintiff received written notice that further
occurrences of unexcused absence would result
in his termination.
During the final six
months of 1988, plaintiff accrued an additional
20 unexcused
absences and
numerous
unexcused absences in the first five months of
1989. Finally, on May 10, 1989, Boeing told
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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plaintiff he would be terminated if he did not
produce, by May 12, physician notes for his
absences on March 24, April 21 and April 27.
Plaintiff failed to meet the May 12 deadline
and was terminated for excessive absenteeism
on May 27, 1989.
*3 In order to establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory discharge, the plaintiff must
show he was qualified for the job he was
performing when discharged.
In Mitchell v.
Safeway Stores, Inc.,
624 F.Supp.
932
(D.Kan. 1985), the court recognized that
excessive
absenteeism
may render
an
employee unqualified for the purpose of
establishing
a
prima
facie
case
of
discrimination.
Thus, the court concluded
that plaintiff's excessive absenteeism, as
defined by the employment manual, prevented
her from showing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination and her claim was dismissed.
Id. at 935.
Likewise, in this case, there is some doubt
plaintiff has shown he was qualified for the
position from which he was terminated based
upon his undisputed numerous absences.
Nevertheless, assuming plaintiff has met his
burden of establishing a prima facie case, the
court finds that Boeing has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
plaintiffs discharge. Plaintiff was repeatedly
warned that his poor attendance would cost
him his job and he was required to attend
counseling for the problem on several
occasions. Boeing's attendance policy allowed
for absences in excess of an employee's sick
leave if an absence was due to a medical
reason and the employee presented a
physician's verification to his supervisor.
Whether Boeing's policy is good or bad, Title
VII does not prohibit employment decisions
based on that policy, provided the policy is
applied equally to all employees. Gilchrist v.
Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir.1984).
Since Boeing has presented a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating
plaintiff, plaintiff can prevail on his Title VII
claim only if he shows the reason articulated
is a pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff has
produced no evidence to show Boeing's
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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attendance policy was applied differently to
other employees. Thus, no genuine issue of
fact remains for trial and summary judgment
of this claim is appropriate.
Plaintiff also claims he was racially harassed
by his supervisor, Hessee, in violation of Title
VII. Plaintiff contends Hessee yelled at him,
spoke to him in a demeaning fashion, caused
him embarrassment and humiliation by such
treatment, called him "boy", and generally
showed less respect for plaintiff than shown
the white employees working in the same
area.
Plaintiff asserts he was treated
differently by Hessee because he was black
and lived with a white woman.
It is well established that a black employee
forced to work in an environment dominated
by racial hostility and harassment has a valid
claim for a Title VII violation. Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1412 (10th
Cir.1987); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, Arkansas,
722 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir.1983), cert,
denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984). To establish a
racially hostile work environment, however,
the plaintiff must prove that more than a few
isolated incidents of harassment occurred.
Moore v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 731
F.Supp. 1015, 1020 (D.Kan.1990).
Casual
comments
or
accidental
or
sporadic
conversation will not trigger equitable relief
pursuant to the statute. Snell v. Suffolk Co.,
782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir.1986). Instead,
there must be excessive and opprobrious racial
comment. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1412.
Thus,
Title VII is violated only where the work
environment is so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to destroy the emotional and
psychological stability of the
minority
employee. Id. at 1413.
*4 In this case, plaintiff has related several
incidents wherein Hessee yelled at him and
called him "boy". However, plaintiff has not
offered any evidence to show Hessee's
comments were made with racial animus.
Nor does the evidence show that plaintiff
suffered psychological problems from racial
harassment. Since the record is devoid of any
evidence to demonstrate the alleged incidents
of harassment were racially motivated, the
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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court must find plaintiffs claim is insufficient
to withstand defendants' motion for summary
judgment.

requires interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement, it is preempted by §
301.

Finally, plaintiff contends he was denied a
transfer out of Hessee's department because of
the supervisor's racial prejudices. In order to
establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment as a result of an employer's failure
to transfer an employee, the plaintiff must
show (1) that he applied for an available
position; (2) that he was qualified for an
available position;
and (3) that he was
rejected under circumstances which gave rise
to an inference of unlawful discrimination in
that his failure to be transferred or promoted
was more likely than not based on
considerations of impermissible factors. Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdiney 450 U.S.
248, 253 (1981); Payne v. General Motors Corp.,
731 F.Supp. 1465, 1470 (D.Kan.1990).

Subsequent to his discharge, plaintiff filed a
grievance with the IAM according to the
exclusive grievance procedure of the collective
bargaining agreement. The IAM investigated
plaintiffs grievance and asked that he be
reinstated.
Boeing refused to reinstate
plaintiff and the IAM notified plaintiff of that
decision on June 30, 1989. At the same time,
the IAM informed plaintiff that it would not
pursue his grievance further.

Here, the evidence unequivocally shows
plaintiff did not apply for an available
position. Boeing has no record of a transfer
request by plaintiff and plaintiff admits he
never submitted such a request.
Plaintiff
asserts he did not officially request a transfer
because it would not have done any good. This
argument is mere speculation.
Plaintiff
cannot claim he was denied a transfer for
racially motivated reasons when he never
requested a transfer or gave Boeing a chance
to consider the request.
Accordingly,
summary judgment on this issue is granted.
Breach of Employment Contract
In his second cause of action, plaintiff
contends Boeing breached its employment
contract with him by discharging him for
racially discriminatory reasons.
Plaintiffs
claim fails for the following reasons.
Plaintiffs claim for breach of his employment
contract is preempted by § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(3)
The collective bargaining agreement
between Boeing and plaintiffs union, the
I AM, defines the terms of
plaintiffs
employment and his employment contract
Since plaintiffs claim for breach of contract
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

*5 In general, an employee is bound by the
result of a grievance procedure according to
the finality provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement.
DelCostello v.
International Broth, of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,
164 (1983). This is because the employee's
rights are protected by the union's duty of fair
representation. United Food & Com. Workers
Local No. 7R v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d
940, 944 (10th Cir.1989). However, when the
union has breached its duty of fair
representation
by
acting
arbitrarily,
discriminatorily, or in bad faith, the employee
can bring a suit against the employer and the
union, notwithstanding the outcome or
finality
of
the
grievance
procedure.
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164.
In this case, plaintiff claims the IAM
breached its duty of fair representation
because its representative gave him the "run
around" and didn't pursue his grievance after
Boeing refused to reinstate him. Plaintiff has
failed, however, to produce any evidence to
support his allegations of bad faith. Although
the IAM was not successful in getting plaintiff
reinstated at Boeing, the facts show that it did
assist plaintiff in recovering unemployment
benefits when Boeing opposed the action. The
facts of this case reveal an ordinary situation
wherein the union abandons or rejects an
aggrieved employee's claim.
Thus, without
more, plaintiffs claim against the IAM for
breach of the duty of fair representation must
fail. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim for breach
of his employment contract is barred.
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Tortious Interference with Employment Contract
PlaintifFs third claim is that his former
supervisor, Hessee, intentionally, negligently
and wrongfully interfered with plaintiffs
employment contract with Boeing.
This
claim is preempted by federal law and,
alternatively, fails under state law.
Whether or not Hessee, an agent of Boeing,
improperly
interfered
with
plaintiffs
employment contract requires an examination
of the rights of the parties under the collective
bargaining agreement. Magerer v. John Sexton
& Co., 912 F.2d 525, 530 (1st Cir.1990). As
the court noted above, any interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement is
preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 42 U.S.C. § 185(3).
Claims
which arise under § 301 are subject to the
requirement of exhaustion of the grievance
procedure as provided in the collective
bargaining agreement. Allis- Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219 (1985). In the case at
hand, there is no evidence that plaintiff
submitted his claim against Hessee for
tortious interference to any grievance or
arbitration procedure, and therefore he is
barred from raising the claim for the first time
here. Mergerer, 912 F. 2d at 531.
In addition, the court notes that plaintiffs
claim fails substantively.
An essential
element to any claim for tortious interference
with a contract is interference by the
defendant, who must be an outsider to the
contract. Dow Chemical Corp. v. Weevil-Cide
Co., Inc., 897 F.2d 481, 488-89 (10th Cir.1990);
Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 528
F.Supp. 391, 403 (D.Kan. 1981). Hessee, as an
agent for plaintifFs employer, was a party to
plaintifFs employment contract and could not
interfere with the employment contract.
Thus, because it was legally impossible for
Hessee
to
interfere
with
plaintiffs
employment
contract,
the
claim
fails
substantively.
Conspiracy Claims
*6 PlaintifFs fourth cause of action alleges
that Hessee, the union, and employees in the
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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decision-making chain of command at Boeing
conspired to deprive him of his civil rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and that
Boeing's failure to prevent the conspiracy
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
He contends
Boeing employees, in cooperation with the
union, conspired to prevent plaintiffs transfer,
to have him discharged, and in such a manner
also retaliated against him for complaining
about the alleged discriminatory conduct.
To successfully state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3), the plaintiff must allege and prove
that the defendants (1) conspired;
(2) to
deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; and (3) acted in furtherance of
the conspiracy;
(4) whereby another was
injured or deprived of having and exercising
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States. Griffin v. Brechenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102
(1971).
In Great American Sav. & Loan Ass 'n. v. Novotny,
442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979), the United States
Supreme Court determined that § 1985(3)
created no substantive rights, but provided a
remedy only for the violation of rights it
designated. The Court further found that a
claim for Title VII violations asserted through
§ 1985(3) bypassed the
administrative
processes crucial to the scheme of Title VII.
Id. at 375.
Thus, in order to protect the
overall scheme of Title VII, the Court ruled
that § 1985(3) could not be invoked to redress
violations of Title VII. Id. at 378.
Pursuant to the ruling in Novotny, the court in
Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156
(10th Cir.1991), held that plaintiffs request
for relief under § 1985(3) and § 1986 was not
independent of his Title VII claims for racial
discrimination,
and
therefore
failed.
Similarly, in the present case plaintifFs claim
for request under § 1985(3) and § 1986 is
based upon the identical facts he asserts as a
basis for alleged Title VII violations.
Plaintiffs
claims
that
the
defendants
conspired to have him wrongfully discharged
and prevented his transfer to another
department are precisely the claims he raised
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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in his Title VII cause of action. Furthermore,
claims for retaliation are not actionable under
§ 1985(3). Long v. Laramie County Community
College District, 840 F.2d 743, 752 (10th Cir.),
cert, denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988).
Plaintiff has failed to show that his claim of
conspiracy under § 1985(3) is sufficiently
independent of his Title VII claims and
therefore is barred. In addition, since
plaintiffs § 1985(3) claim fails, his claim
under § 1986 is also barred. Drake, 927 F.2d
at 1163.
Refusal to Contract Claim
In plaintiffs fifth cause of action, he alleges
Boeing violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in failing to
rehire him upon his application in December,
1990.
42
U.S.C.
§
1981
prohibits
racial
discrimination in the making and enforcement
of contracts. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989); Trujillo v. Grand
Junction Regional Center, 928 F.2d 973, 975
(10th Cir. 1991).
Section 1981, however,
cannot to be construed as a general
proscription of racial discrimination in all
aspects of contract relations, for it expressly
forbids discrimination only in the making and
enforcement of contracts. Patterson, 491 U.S.
at 176. Thus, the statute does not apply to
conduct which occurs after the formation of a
contract and which does not interfere with the
right
to
enforce
established
contract
obligations. Id. at 171. Failure to renew an
employment contract or failure to rehire an
employee in the same position from which he
was vacated does not violate § 1981 where a
new and distinct employment relation is not
created. Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Bd. of Educ.,
926 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.) cert, denied, 111
S.Ct. 2917 (1991); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant
Hosp., 765 F.Supp. 461, 470 (N.D.I11.1991);
Eklof v. Bramalea Ltd., 733 F.Supp. 935, 937
(E.D.Pa.1989).
*7 After his discharge, plaintiff reapplied at
Boeing for the same position from which he
had been terminated.
Plaintiff exchanged
correspondence with the personnel department
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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at Boeing but was not hired. He asserts that
Boeing refused to rehire him because of his
race. Plaintiff, however, provides no factual
support for his claim. Instead, the evidence
shows that Boeing did not hire any new
employees in its sheet metal department after
plaintiffs discharge, although it did recall
certain employees previously laid off.
Plaintiffs claim under § 1981 must fail as a
matter of law. Plaintiff seeks reemployment
with Boeing in the same position from which
he was discharged with the same rights,
duties, and obligations as under the old
employment contract.
Reinstatement of the
identical employment relationship is not a
new contract, and therefore is not actionable
under §1981.
Defamation Claim
Plaintiffs final claim is for defamation. He
contends direct evidence of defamation is
contained in Boeing's termination documents
and in the records from his unemployment
compensation proceedings.
He alleges
circumstantial evidence of defamation in his
inability to get a job when Boeing is listed as
a reference.
In order to successfully assert a claim for
defamation the plaintiff must prove (1) false
and defamatory words; (2) communicated to a
third person; and (3) which resulted in harm to
the reputation of the person defamed. Gobin
v. Globe Pub. Co., 232 Kan. 1, 6, 649 P.2d 1239
(1982). Publication of the defamatory words
must be proven by direct, and not
circumstantial, evidence. Hall v. Hercules, Inc.,
494 F.2d 420, 434 (10th Cir. 1974).
Clearly, plaintiffs claim of defamation based
upon alleged blacklisting by Boeing and
Hessee is mere speculation.
Furthermore,
plaintiffs
claim
which
relies
upon
circumstantial evidence for support fails as a
matter of law. Id.
Plaintiff has also failed to produce admissible
direct evidence to support his claim of
defamation.
First, plaintiff relies upon a
referee's written decision in
plaintiffs
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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unemployment
compensation hearing
to
demonstrate defamation. In the opinion, the
referee determined there was no misconduct
by plaintiff and held that plaintiff was
entitled to the compensation.
Plaintiff
alleges
the
reference
to
misconduct
demonstrates that Boeing falsely accused him
of misconduct.
The statements which plaintiff attribute to
Boeing cannot be relied upon by him as
evidence of defamation because they are
privileged. Statements given in the course of
litigation which otherwise might serve as a
basis for action in slander or libel are
privileged communications. Clear Water Truck
Co., Inc. v. M. Bruenger Co., Inc., 21A Kan. 139
Syl. 1,519 P. 2d 682 (1974).
Further,
communications
between
managerial employees about the reasons for
an employee's discharge are also privileged.
Turner v. Halliburton Co., 240 Kan. 1, 8-10, 722
P.2d 1106 (1986). Thus, statements made or
documents generated internally at Boeing for
management's
use
are privileged
and
inadmissible evidence.
Accordingly, since
plaintiffs
claim of defamation is not
sufficiently supported by fact, the cause of
action is subject to summary judgment.
*8 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED this 10
day of February, 1992, that defendants'
motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 20)
on each and every claim raised herein by
plaintiff is granted.
1992 WL 42913, 1992 WL 42913 (D.Kan.)
END OF DOCUMENT
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United States District Court, N.D. Illinois,
Eastern Division.
Candida MARTINEZ, Plaintiff,
v.
U-HAUL COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, INC.
an Illinois corporation and Arlester
Webster
Defendants.

1

FN1 Plaintiffs complaint also contained a count ot
intentional infliction of emotional distress against
both Defendants and an assault and battery count
directly against Webstei This court dismissed
Plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distiess
claim against U-Haul on May 18, 2000 and against
Webster on January 9, 2001 Because Webstei has
not moved tor summary judgment on the assault and
battery claim, that claim will not be addiessed in this
opinion
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff's Employment at U-Haul

No. 99 C 8066.
June 6, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
PALLMEYER, J.
*1 Plaintiff Candida Martinez brings this
action
against
her
former
employer,
Defendant U Haul Company of Illinois, Inc.
("U Haul") and her former
supervisor,
Defendant Arlester Webster ("Webster"),
alleging that Webster sexually harassed her
and, after
she complained about
the
harassment,
retaliated
against
her
in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Additionally, Plaintiff brings a state law
claim for defamation against both Defendants,
contending that after she left U-Haul, Webster
falsely told several prospective employers that
Plaintiff was a thief. [FN1] Defendant U- Haul
now moves for summary judgment, contending
Plaintiff has not established that she suffered
severe and pervasive harassment, nor has she
established a prima facie case of retaliation.
In addition, both Defendant U Haul and
Defendant Webster seek summary judgment
on Plaintiffs defamation claim, arguing that
Plaintiff has not proffered any admissible
evidence to sustain this count. For the
following reasons, Defendant U Haul's motion
for summary judgment is denied in part and
granted in part, and Defendant Webster's
motion for summary judgment is granted.

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

Plaintiff was employed at the U-Haul moving
center in Park Forest, Illinois, as a customer
service representative from late 1997 until
January 1998 and then again from August
1998 until she quit her job in May 1999. (U
Haul Co. of Illinois' Rule 56.1 Statement of
Uncontested Facts (hereinafter "Def.'s 56.1
Statement") fl 1, 30.) From August 1998 until
May 1999, Defendant Arlester Webster was
Plaintiffs supervisor. (Id. 1 3.)
Plaintiffs job duties as customer service
representative included: (1) assisting with
retail, taking reservations, and selling items
out of the store; (2) light cleanup, including
mopping and sweeping the storage area; (3)
"trailer hookup" -consisting of hooking dollies
up to the cars or trucks; and (4) displaying
storage areas to customers. (PL's Dep., at 3537.) From early 1999 until she left U-Haul,
Plaintiff was the only full-time customer
service representative at the Park Forest
facility. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 36.)
On the day Plaintiff was hired at the Park
Forest facility, she received a publication
entitled "Welcome Aboard" which, among
other things, describes U- Haul's sexual
harassment policy. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement fl
10, 12.) That publication instructs employees
who feel they have been sexually harassed to
report these incidents and identifies a variety
of avenues for reporting any perceived
harassment. (Id. ] 11.) Additionally, to educate
employees about this policy, U Haul provides
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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its managers with a policy bulletin that
contains more written information concerning
sexual harassment. (Id. \ 17.) That bulletin
includes such information as a definition of
sexual harassment, a set of procedures for
responding to and investigating complaints of
sexual harassment, suggested
corrective
actions that may be taken in response to such
complaints,
and
other
guidelines
for
conducting investigations. (Id. % 18.) The
bulletin also notes that the EEO and Human
Resources staff at U Haul are available to
provide
guidance
regarding
sexual
harassment. {Id. ^ 19.) Attached to that
bulletin is another internal publication of UH a u f s Policy prohibiting sexual harassment. (
Id. 1 21.) According to U-Haul, a copy of this
policy is posted at every U-Haul moving
center, and identifies the person(s) to whom an
employee is to report any incidents of
harassment. {Id. fl 13, 14.) Plaintiff denies
that any such policy was posted at the moving
center where she worked, but she admits that
she herself had a copy of the policy and,
further, admits that she had the toll free
number to call to report incidents of sexual
harassment. (Plaintiffs Response to U-Haul
Co. of Illinois Rule 56.1 Statement of
Uncontested Facts (hereinafter "PL's 56.1
Response") fl 13, 16,41.)
B. Alleged Incidents of Sexual Harassment
*2 Plaintiff testified that while Webster was
her supervisor, he asked her out on dates "just
about every day." (PL's Dep., at 80, 95.) She
also claims that other employees, including
Donald Williams, Torino Terry, Vivian
Shegog, and Greg Flores, witnessed Webster
acting flirtatiously with her. {Id. at 160-162.)
Plaintiff contends that Webster did not treat
other employees this way. (Id.) She admits,
however, that she did not complain to U-Haul
about Webster acting flirtatiously towards her
and also admits that his flirtatious behavior
bothered her only "sometimes." (Id. at 162.)
Additionally, she testified that she did not
consider Webster's requests for dates to be
sexual harassment, nor did those requests
bother her. (Id. at 80, 95.)
Along with the requests for dates and the
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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flirtatious behavior, Plaintiff alleges that
Webster improperly touched her at work on
two separate occasions. The first such incident
occurred in late January 1999 at a time when
Plaintiff and Webster were alone in the store.
(PL's Dep., at 67-68, 72.) According to
Plaintiff, she was standing at the store
counter counting her receipts when Webster
came up behind her and put his hands on her
upper thighs, a little below the waist line, and
rubbed there, above the clothing, for about 30
seconds. (Id. at 67-69, 70.) Because he came up
from behind her, she did not know at first that
it was Webster who was touching her. (Id. at
70.) When Plaintiff turned her head and saw
that it was Webster, she told him, "Don't
touch m e / ' and he walked away. (Id . at 69-71.)
Plaintiff went home immediately after the
incident. (Id. at 73.)
The second such incident occurred a month or
so later, sometime in late February 1999. (Id.
at 75.) Again, Plaintiff was at the counter
counting her receipts when Webster came up
behind her and put his hands in her front
pockets and began to rub her thighs for about
five seconds, until Plaintiff hit him in the
stomach and he walked away. (Id. at 75-77.) As
with the first such incident, there were no
other workers or customers in the store at the
time. (Id. at 77.) Plaintiff contends that she
went home directly after the incident and told
her mother what happened. (Id. at 78-79.)
Defendant tells a very different version of his
treatment of Plaintiff and of the two alleged
incidents of touching. According to Webster,
he never rubbed Plaintiffs thighs in either
incident, but merely removed a set of keys
from her back pocket on two occasions.
(Webster Dep., at 69.) As he explained it, the
first time this occurred, he asked Plaintiff for
the cash drawer keys so he could ring up a
customer and give him his change. (Id. at 72.)
Plaintiff was eating lunch at the time and she
turned to indicate he should just take the key
from her back pocket. (Id. at 104.) He then
grabbed the portion of the key ring that was
sticking out of her pocket and, therefore, never
had to reach into her pocket or touch her
person. (Id. at 74-75.) According to Webster,
the second incident occurred in much the same
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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way; Plaintiff gave him permission to take the
keys out of her pocket and he took them out
without touching her body. (Def.'s 56.1
Statement 1 57.)
*3 On March 11, 1999, Webster was arrested
for the second touching incident after
Plaintiffs uncle, Andre Martinez, called the
police about the matter. (PL's Dep., at 145.)
[FN2] Plaintiff points out that, at this time,
Webster signed a written statement in which
he stated, in relevant part, "I put my hand in
[Plaintiffs] pocket just as a joke, she got mad,
I pulled it out and left her alone." (PL's 56.1
Additional Facts % 17.) Webster asserts,
however, that he did not read over the
statement before he signed it and specifically
denies that he told the police he put his hands
in Plaintiffs pockets. (Webster Dep., at 14245.)
FN2 Plaintitt testified that she did not know whether
Webstei was eventually chaiged with any criminal
conduct (PI 's Dep , at 149 )
Plaintiff herself did not testify to any other
incidents of touching or any other harassing
behavior by Webster. Plaintiffs cousin, Vivian
Shegog, however, who worked with Plaintiff
and Webster at the same U-Haul moving
center, testified to a number of incidents in
which she claims to have observed Webster
harassing Plaintiff. (Plaintiffs Rule 56.1(b)
Additional Statement of Contested Facts
(hereinafter "PL's 56.1 Additional Facts") fl
6-14.) For example, Shegog testified that on
several occasions, she witnessed Webster
attempt to reach around Plaintiff and, while
reaching, he would "[pat] her up." (Shegog
Dep., at 22; PL's 56.1 Additional Facts 1 6.)
She also saw Webster go out of his way on a
daily basis to brush up against Plaintiff.
(Shegog Dep., at 43; PL's 56.1 Additional
Facts 1 7.) She named several additional
occasions, apart from the two incidents
Plaintiff related, where Webster touched
Plaintiff. (Id. H 10.) She also testified that she
saw Webster stare at Plaintiff, and if Plaintiff
bent over, heard him make comments about
her. (Id % 12.) On several of the occasions
when Webster touched Plaintiff or moved close
to her, Shegog witnessed Plaintiff push
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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Webster away, kick him, make facial
expressions at him and ask him directly,
"what are you looking for?" (Id. fl 25-28, 31.)
Shegog testified that Plaintiff told her that
this behavior bothered her and Shegog
recalled that, at one point, Plaintiff was on the
brink of tears as a result of these incidents.
(Shegog Dep., at 78.)
Defendant U-Haul points out, however, that
Plaintiff herself admitted that there were only
two instances of physical contact with
Webster. (Def.'s 56.1 Response % 6.) In
addition, Plaintiff did not testify to any of the
events that Shegog related and, in fact,
testified that Webster never made any
comments about her anatomy. (Id. 1 12; PL's
Dep. at 213.)
C. U-Haufs
Complaint

Investigation

of

Plaintiffs

On February 23, 1999, shortly after the
second incident of touching had occurred,
Plaintiff called the 800 number listed in her
"Welcome Aboard" book to report the
perceived sexual harassment and spoke to Jim
Cody at U-Haul International's Human
Resources Department in Phoenix. (Def.'s 56.1
Statement 1 45; PL's Dep. at 64, 96.) [FN3]
She told Cody that on two separate occasions
Webster had come up behind her and touched
her thighs with his hands. (Id. at 65 67.) She
also told him that Webster continually asked
her out on dates. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement ^ 46.)
After her call, U-Haul International's Human
Resources Department informed
U-Haul
Marketing
Company
President
Chris
McDermott of Plaintiffs complaint. (Id. 1 48.)
Two days later, on February 25, 1999,
McDermott went to the Park Forest facility to
investigate. (Id. 5 49.)
FN3 Plaintiff actually says that she first called the
800 number during the fust week ot Match 1999
(PI 's Dep , at 63.) Because Defendant itself claims
she called the number even eaihei (and, therefore,
closer to the incident of haiassment), for the sake ol
this motion the court will assume Plaintiff made the
call on February 23, 1999
*4 Plaintiff and Defendant dispute whether
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McDermott followed U-HauFs guidelines for
conducting a proper sexual harassment
investigation. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 50;
PL's Response 1 50.) According to Defendant,
McDermott began his investigation by
interviewing Plaintiff to determine the details
of her complaint, at which point Plaintiff
reiterated what she had reported in her call to
the 800 number: that Webster had asked her
out on dates and had, on two occasions,
touched her. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement 11 51, 52.)
According to McDermott, Plaintiff said
Webster had been taking keys from her back
pocket on those occasions and Webster
admitted that he had in fact removed keys
from her back pocket on two occasions, but
said he had done so only with Plaintiffs
permission and without touching her body. (Id.
11 52, 57.)
McDermott said he interviewed everyone on
the active payroll at the Park Forest facility
during the relevant time frame. (Def.'s 56.1
Statement 1 54.) This included Webster and a
number of Plaintiffs co-workers: Julie Solis,
Jovan Blount, Darney Rife and Torino Terry
(who is Plaintiffs boyfriend). (Id. 1 54.)
McDermott did not interview Plaintiffs cousin
Vivian Shegog because she was on a short
medical leave of absence during the time of
the incidents of touching. (Def.'s 56.1
Response 1 101.) McDermott determined that
none of Plaintiffs co-workers had seen the
incidents of touching of which Plaintiff
complained. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 56.)
Plaintiff denied that McDermott began his
investigation by interviewing her.
(PL's
Response 1 51.) Instead, she claims that he
started the investigation by interviewing her
co-workers Jovan Blount, Julie Solis, and
Darney Rife. (Id.) She also contends that
McDermott never interviewed Torino Terry
and that, though Shegog was on a leave of
absence, there was no reason not to interview
her. (Id. 11 50, 55.) Additionally, Plaintiff
points out that no one was present for the two
incidents of touching that she complained of,
so none of the witnesses would have seen these
contacts. (Id. 1 56.)
McDermott concluded his investigation on
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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March 4, 1999. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 60.)
He concluded that Webster had removed keys
from Plaintiffs pocket by taking the key ring
and not by touching her thighs. (Id. 1 61.)
McDermott then met with Plaintiff and
Webster. (Id. 1 63.) According to McDermott,
Plaintiff admitted at that meeting that
Webster had asked for the key and she had
turned her hip and back pocket toward
Webster and indicated that he should take the
key because she was eating lunch and her
hands had food on them. (Id.) McDermott also
said that he found no corroboration for
Plaintiffs claim that Webster had asked her
out on a date. (Id. 1 64.) Finally, McDermott
explained that he asked Plaintiff whether she
wanted him to transfer Webster or herself but
she did not request that either be transferred.
(Id. 1 66.) Plaintiff testified that she felt
Webster should be terminated from his
employment at U-Haul, but admits that she
did not request that either she or Webster be
transferred. (PL's Dep., at 91.)
*5 Based on McDermott's investigation, UHaul issued a written warning notice to
Webster on March 4, 1999, informing him that
any future inappropriate comments or actions
would subject him to immediate termination.
(Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 67.) Webster reviewed
and signed the notice. (Id. 1 68.) It is
undisputed that after this incident, Webster
never again touched Plaintiff, asked her for
dates, or acted flirtatiously toward her. (Id. 1
72.) Plaintiff, however, felt that a written
reprimand was not sufficient, and so in March
of 1999 she once again called U-Haul's 800
number and spoke to an employee in Phoenix
named Cary Kirkland. (PL's Dep., at 90-91.)
[FN4] Kirkland failed to get back in touch
with Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed a
charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission on
April 9, 1999. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 85.)
FN4. Plaintiff was unsure as to Kirkland's official
job title. (PL's Dep., at 91.)
D. Plaintiffs Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff admits that Webster did not touch
her again once she complained about the
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harassment, but she claims that Webster
retaliated against her in a number of ways for
complaining about him. To begin with,
Plaintiff testified that from the moment she
called Jim Cody, Webster imposed harsher job
duties on her than he imposed on other
similarly situated employees. (Pl/s Dep., at
43, 86.) [FN5] As she explained, Webster
made her job harder by "pilfing] on more
work" and changing her daily tasks. (Id. at 62,
85.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that she was
required to change oil in the trucks, do many
more trailer hook-ups, and clean out the
storage area more often than she had in the
past. (Id. at 85.) According to Plaintiff "all the
work the other employees did" was now
assigned to her. (Id. at 86.) Additionally,
Plaintiff testified that Webster changed her
hours, scheduled her for longer days, was
reluctant to give her days off that she
requested, and insisted that she open and close
the store for him when he wasn't there. (Id. at
62, 99.) Plaintiff estimated that she was
assigned five or six more hours of work per
week, though she admitted she was paid
overtime for those hours. (Id. at 99.) She also
claimed that she was left doing Webster's job
and that he came to work less often. (Id. at
100.)
FN5. Plaintiff testified that the day aftei she called
Cody "eveiybody" at work knew that she had called
him and eveiyone was talking about it (Id at 86 )
Because she did not tell anyone about the phone call,
she assumed that Cody told someone in the company
about it, who then called Webstei (Id. at 87 )
Plaintiffs
cousin,
Vivian
Shegog,
corroborated Plaintiffs assertion that she was
given different tasks, but Shegog testified that
she also was made to do some of those tasks
along with Plaintiff. (Shegog Dep., at 119.)
[FN6] For example, Shegog recalled that after
a conversation in which McDermott told
Webster about Plaintiffs complaint, Webster
required both Plaintiff and Shegog to hand
wash trucks and vans and clean out storage
areas. (PL's 56.1 Additional Facts 1 58;
Shegog Dep., at 119.) According to Shegog, she
and Plaintiff had not previously been called on
to wash the trucks because U Haul had other
people to do this work. (Shegog Dep., at 60.)
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Shegog also claimed that after Plaintiff made
the last phone call and Chris McDermott came
to speak to Webster, Webster directed Shegog
and Plaintiff to drive the bigger trucks, sweep
out the storage areas, and restock the back
room, even though he had not previously
asked them to do those things. (Id. at 60 61.)
Instead, he generally made the male
employees do such tasks as cleaning out the
storage areas. (Id at 118.)
FN6 Both parties agiee that Shegog was on a shoit
medical leave ot absence during the time of the
incidents of touching, but, because she provides fust
hand accounts of what occurred after Plaintiff
complained of the harassment, the court assumes that
she was once again back at U-Haul the same week
that Plaintiff called Jim Cody to complain
*6 U-Haul points out, however, that none of
the tasks Plaintiff or Shegog described were
outside of Plaintiffs job description as a
customer service representative. (Def.'s 56.1
Statement ^ 76.) Webster contends that the
real reason for assigning Plaintiff additional
job duties was the fact that she was no longer
pregnant, not the fact of her complaints.
(Webster Dep., at 272.) As he explains it, from
August 1998, when Plaintiff was nine months
pregnant, until three months after childbirth,
she was not required to do any heavy lifting or
to pick up hitches. (Id. at 272.) He explained,
however, that by October or November of
1998, her duties were once again the same as
any
other
U-Haul
customer
service
representative, including assisting with the
cash register, light cleanup, trailer hookup,
and storage. (Id. at 272-73.) Thus, Webster
argues that Plaintiffs job duties changed
before she ever complained of harassment. (Id.)
Besides giving her additional tasks to
perform, Plaintiff contends that Webster
began verbally abusing her, threatening her
in front of customers, yelling at her at work
and "just being downright rude" to her. (PL's
Dep., at 152.) He also used profanity when
talking to her, including calling her "all types
of names." (Id. at 202.) Plaintiff explained that
he mostly used the "A word" but also called
her "[ejvery other word in the book" including
"Stupid B. You slow MF. You look like S." (Id
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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at 207.) According to Plaintiff, such incidents
happened frequently after she made her
complaint and had not happened before she
complained. (PL's Dep., at 158.) She also
testified that she did not see him direct these
words at anyone else at U-Haul. (Id. at 207.)
Shegog, however, claimed that Webster called
both Plaintiff and Shegog "dumb asses, stupid
bitches, fucking whores," though neither party
has clarified whether Webster made these
statements only after Plaintiff made her
complaint or the entire time that both women
were at U-Haul. (Shegog Dep., at 60.)
Without denying Webster's rude behavior, UHaul points out that such behavior was doled
out to others, as well as Plaintiff. For
example, U-Haul points to Shegog's testimony
that Webster used similar language and
exhibited similar "rude" behavior with other
employees. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement t 78.) In
addition, Torino Terry, Plaintiffs' boyfriend
and
co-worker,
testified
that
Webster
regularly raised his voice to all of the
employees. (Id. 1 78; Terry Dep., at 96-98.)
As additional evidence of retaliation, Plaintiff
points to several written reprimands that she
claims she unfairly received after she
complained about Webster and later filed her
EEOC charge. Plaintiff notes that prior to the
filing, Webster had never given her a written
warning and had, in fact, given her a raise
and a promotion to a full time position. (PL's
56.1 Additional Facts fl 49, 50.) On March 1,
1999, six days after Plaintiff first complained
to U-Haul about Webster, Webster issued a
written warning notice to Plaintiff for failing
to make the closing bank deposit for February
28, 1999. (Def 's 56.1 Statement 1 79; PL's
56.1 Additional Facts 1 46.) On April 6, 1999,
Plaintiff was given four more warning notices,
addressing the following violations that
occurred on April 4, 1999:(1) failure to work to
the end of her scheduled work shift of 5:30 pm,
effectively closing the U-Haul center early
that day; (2) taking a U-Haul vehicle for
personal use without prior authorization and
leaving the U-Haul facility understaffed while
she used the vehicle; (3) using the vehicle
overnight, after hours; and (4) failing to
maintain a business atmosphere by allowing a
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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non-employee onto the premise to disrupt the
facility's operations. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement fl
80, 81.)
*7 Defendant contends that, though Plaintiff
began to receive written reprimands after she
complained of harassment, she herself
admitted that she deserved some of the
reprimands. For example, Plaintiff admitted
that she failed to make the bank deposit. (PL's
Dep., at 128-129.) She explained, however,
that she did not do so because she did not have
a car at the time. (Id.) Plaintiff also explained
that she did not deserve all of the reprimands
because it was Julie Solis, not Plaintiff, who
took the van. (PL's 56.1 Response 1 81.) She
admits that she went with Solis in the van to
get lunch but claims that Solis had permission
to take the van out. (PL's Dep., at 131, 132.)
Plaintiff also denies that she left early or that
she had a visitor on the premises. (PL's 56.1
Response % 81.) She asserts that her visitor,
Torino Terry (who by this time had been
terminated from his employment at U- Haul)
remained outside of the store and only came to
bring her lunch. (Id. at 139.)
Defendant claims, however, that these were
not the first reprimands Plaintiff ever
received. To the contrary, U-Haul contends
that Plaintiff was orally reprimanded by
Webster prior to her complaint for locking a
U-Haul customer in a rental storage area and
for throwing merchandise at a customer in
response to the customer's complaint. (Def.'s
56.1 Statement ^ 82, citing Webster Dep., at
273-76.) Webster admits, however, that he did
not give Plaintiff a written warning notice at
that time. (Id.) Nor was Webster sure whether
or not he contacted U-Haul's Human
Resources
Department
regarding
those
incidents. (Id.) Plaintiff denies that she was
reprimanded for those acts. (PL's 561.
Response f 82; Webster Dep ., 276.)
Plaintiff also alleges that, as part of his
retaliation, Webster accused her of stealing
different items and relayed these accusations
to McLaughlin. (PL's 56.1 Additional Facts f
61.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on April
30, 1999, Webster told McLaughlin that
Plaintiff had stolen furniture from
a
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customer's storage locker, on April 28, 1999,
Webster accused Plaintiff of stealing some
uniforms, and on May 3, 1999, Webster told
McLaughlin that Plaintiff planned to break
into the storage lockers with a former
employee. (Id. 11 61, 62, 113.) Plaintiff also
alleges that, at some point in April 1999,
Webster told a customer named Omateg
Barnes that Plaintiff had stolen something
from Barnes' storage space. (PL's Dep., at
185.) As a result, the police came and placed
Plaintiff in a holding cell for almost three
hours. (Id .) Plaintiff denied that she ever stole
anything from U-Haul besides some ink pens
and paper. (Id. at 194-95.)
For his part, Webster denies that he ever
accused Plaintiff of theft. According to
Webster, one of the storage customers had a
number of pieces of furniture stolen from her
storage space. It was the customer who
suspected Plaintiff was somehow involved in
the theft, (Def.'s 56.1 Response 1 61; Webster
Dep., at 193-199), resulting in Plaintiff's being
detained by the police for that incident. (PL's
56.1 Additional Facts 11 120-121.)
*8 Sometime in April, close in time to when
Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge, she spoke to
Chris McDermott and told him that Webster
was giving her extra jobs, scheduling her more
hours, and treating others more favorably.
(PL's Dep., at 106.) According to Plaintiff,
McDermott did nothing to change that
treatment. (Id. at 107) Plaintiff therefore
decided to leave her job in late May. (PL's 56.1
Statement Additional Facts 1 40; Karen
Martinez Dep., at 57; PL's Dep., at 109-110.)
E. Plaintiff's Defamation Claim
After Plaintiff left U-Haul, she applied for
work at four different places: St. James
Hospital, Rent-A-Center, Ingalls Memorial
Hospital and one other place whose name she
could not recall. (PL's Dep., at 16.) Plaintiff
believes the reason she was not hired was that
Webster did not recommend her to these
employers and told them that she was a thief.
(Id. at 28.) To support her claim that Webster
defamed her to these employers, Plaintiff
testified that her cousin, Vivian Shegog,
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contacted a woman named Maria who had
interviewed Plaintiff for the position at
Ingalls Hospital. (Id. at 27.) [FN7] According
to Plaintiff, Maria told Shegog that she did
not hire Plaintiff because Webster had told
her that Plaintiff was a thief. (Id. at 28.)
Plaintiff claims she never spoke to Maria
herself, but got this information solely from
Shegog. (Id. at 28-29.) In addition, Plaintiff is
certain that Webster told Rent-A-Center she
was a thief because she "pretty much had [a]
foot in the door," but then she wasn't hired. (
Id. at 155-156.)
FN7. Neither Plaintiff nor Shegog could recall
Maria's last name.
Shegog testified, however, that she never
called Ingalls Hospital for Plaintiff. (Def.'s
56.1 Statement % 88; Shegog Dep., at 75.)
Instead, Shegog testified that Plaintiff was the
one who was told by a potential employer that
Webster had called Plaintiff a thief. (Shegog
Dep., at 76.) Webster himself denies that he
ever told any of Plaintiff's prospective
employers that she was a thief and Plaintiff
has offered no testimony from anyone at
Ingalls Memorial Hospital or any other
potential employer. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement %
90.) Finally, though Plaintiff claims that
Webster defamed her to several potential
employers, she admitted that she did not know
whether anyone at St. James Hospital ever
communicated with Webster in connection
with her application, nor could she say
whether anyone at Rent-A-Center had ever
contacted Webster. (PL's Dep., at 18-19.)
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper when "the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S.
317, 322-23 (1986); Wade v. Lerner New York,
243 F.3d 319, 321 (7th Cir.2001). In
determining whether any genuine issue of
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material fact exists, the court must construe
all facts in the light most favorable to the non
moving party and draw all reasonable and
justifiable inferences in favor of that party See
Michas v Health Cost Contwls of Illinois, Inc ,
209 F 3 d 687, 692 (7th Cir 2000Xciting
Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc , 477 U S 242,
255 (1986)) An issue is genuine "if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party " See
Baton v City of Highland Park 195 F 3d 333,
338 (7th Cir 1999Xciting Anderson, All U S at
248)
B Motion For Leave to File Under Seal
*9 As an initial matter, the court must rule
on Defendant U Haul's motion for leave to file
certain documents under seal U Haul has
requested leave to file portions of the
deposition testimony of Defendant Webster,
Christopher
McDermott
and
Patrick
McLaughlin as well as U Haul's memorandum
in support of summary judgment and its 56 1
statement of fact under seal As U Haul
explains, these documents contain information
that is "private to certain employees and
former employees of U Haul, including
information regarding the allegations in this
sexual harassment case, and other private
matters" and also contain "information that is
proprietary, non public business information
of [DJefendant U Haul, including confidential
policy and procedure documents and other
business information " (U Haul's Motion for
Leave to File Certain Summary Judgment
Papers Under Seal Instanter 1 3 ) U Haul
contends that disclosing this information
"would likely have the effect of revealing
otherwise private matters or otherwise
causing substantial harm to U Haul and/or its
current and former employees " (Id )
No doubt every party involved in a sexual
harassment suit would, if given the chance,
prefer to keep many of the details underlying
the suit from the public U Haul has presented
no specific justifications, however, for filing an
entire memorandum and 56 1 statement of
facts under seal, nor does this court see any
justifications for so doing In Illinois, the party
claiming confidential protection of certain
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documents bears the burden of showing (1) a
trade
secret
or
confidential
business
information, and (2) good cause Citizens First
Nat'I Bank of Princeton v Cincinnati Ins Co , 178
F 3d 943, 944 45 (7th Cir 1999), Culinary Foods
Inc v Raychem Corp, 151 F R D 297, 300
(N D 111 1993) It is not enough for U Haul to
insist that current and former employees
would prefer these matters remain private
Such conclusory statements that disclosure
will result in harm is insufficient evidence to
support filing these documents under seal See
Andrew Corp v Rossi 180 F R D 338, 340, 342
(N D 111 1998Xdeterminmg
whether
a
protective order is appropriate requires
balancing
the public interest
in
the
information with the possibility that a party
will be unduly burdened or oppressed by the
information)
Additionally, the court is genuinely puzzled
by U Haul's argument that certain of its
policies and procedures mentioned in this suit
are confidential Because U Haul provides no
specifics about which of its policies are
confidential, the court is left to wonder why U
Haul would be concerned about revealing its
well established (and apparently effective)
sexual harassment policy U Haul's attempt to
keep
its investigation
of the
sexual
harassment policy confidential is also baffling
in light of the evidence that U Haul handled
that investigation with deliberate speed and
thoroughness
Because U Haul has been
unable to provide specific reasons that any
particular information involved in this case
must be kept confidential, its motion for leave
to file certain documents under seal is denied
The court now turns to the merits of
Defendant's summary judgment motion
C Sexual Harassment
1 Defendant Webster's Conduct
*10 Sexual harassment is actionable under
Title VII only if "it is so severe or pervasive as
to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working
environment " Clark County Sch Dist v
Breeden, 121 S Ct 1508, 1509 (2001)(quoting
Faragher v City of Boca Raton, 524 U S 775,
Orig U S Govt Works
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786 (1998Xquotation marks omitted), see also
Hosteller v Quality Dining Inc , 218 F 3d 798,
806 (7th Cir 2000) The test for determining
whether harassment is actionable is both
subjective and objective, the plaintiff must
establish both that a reasonable person would
find the harassment created an abusive
working environment and that she, in fact, did
perceive it to be so Gentry v Export Packaging
Co 238 F 3 d 842 (7th Cir 2001) As the
Supreme Court has explained, in making this
determination, "[wjorkplace conduct is not
measured in isolation, instead, whether an
environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive
must be judged by looking at all the
circumstances, including the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether
it is physically threatening or humiliating, or
a mere offensive utterance, and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance M Clark County, 121 S Ct at
1510 (quoting Harris v Forkhft Sys , Inc , 510
U S 17, 23 (1993Xquotation marks omitted)
To be actionable "the conduct at issue must
'ha[ve] the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering
with
an
individual's
work
performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment" '
Murray v Chicago Transit Auth , No 99 3774,
F 3d
, 2001 WL 493433, at *6 (7th Cir
May 10, 2001), citing Filipovic v K & R Express
Sys , Inc 176 F 3d 390, 397 (7th Cir 1999)
(quoting Saxton v American Tel & Tel, Co , 10
F 3 d 526, 533 (7th Cir 1993) M[S]imple
teasing, offhand comments, and isolated
incidents (unless extremely serious) will not
amount to discriminatory changes in the
terms and conditions of employment " Clark
County, 121 S C t at 1510 (citations and
quotation marks omitted)
In the instant case, Plaintiffs allegations of
harassment center around the two occasions
where Defendant Webster came up behind her
and rubbed her thighs, the first time, outside
of the pockets and for about 30 seconds until
she told him to stop, the second time, reaching
inside of her pockets and rubbing her thighs
for about 5 seconds until she hit him in the
stomach Webster claims that he never
touched Plaintiffs person, but instead, only
took keys out of her pockets after she gave
Copr © West 2004 No Claim
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him permission to do so Taking the facts in
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
however, the court assumes that these touches
were inappropriate and unwelcome Along
with the two incidents of improper touching,
Plaintiff alleges that Webster asked her out on
dates "just about every day" and acted
flirtatiously
towards
her
Additionally,
Plaintiffs cousin, Vivian Shegog, who worked
along side Plaintiff and Webster, testified to a
series of harassing incidents to which Webster
subjected Plaintiff These included moving
close to Plaintiff and "patting her up," going
out of his way to brush up against her, staring
at her, making comments as she bent over,
and touching her
*11 Even taking all of these incidents
together, however, they do not establish
harassment that is severe and pervasive
enough to be actionable The two incidents of
touching may have been inappropriate, but
isolated instances of unwanted
sexual
advances are not enough to create a hostile
work environment See, eg , Saxton v American
Telephone and Telegraph Co , 10 F 3d 526, 534
(7th Cir 1993) In Saxton, Plaintiffs supervisor,
Jerome Richardson, placed his hand on her leg
above the knee several times, rubbed his hand
along her upper thigh and grabbed her and
kissed her for two to three seconds while the
two were out together Id at 528 After
plaintiff told him to stop, he did so, but three
weeks later after the two had lunch together
he came at her from behind some bushes and
attempted to grab her Id The Seventh Circuit
found that "although Richardson's conduct
was undoubtedly inappropriate, it was not so
severe or pervasive as to create an objectively
hostile work environment " Id at 534 The
court recognized that "any employee in
Saxton's position might have experienced
significant discomfort and distress as the
result of her supervisor's uninvited and
unwelcome advances," but explained that the
limited nature of the incidents kept such
behavior from rising to the level of pervasive
harassment, even where there were "two
instances of sexual misconduct rather than
one " Id
Similarly, Webster touched Plaintiff on only
Orig U S Govt Works
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two occasions that Plaintiff could recall and
both incidents were limited in nature In
Plaintiffs own version, the first incident
lasted only about 30 seconds while the second
incident lasted about 5 seconds Webster
stopped touching her the moment she told him
to and never touched her again once he
received a written warning from U Haul
against such behavior Thus, taking PlaintifFs
version of the incidents as true, Webster's
behavior was inappropriate and offensive but
neither severe nor pervasive See, e g Koelsch
v Beltone Electronics Corp , 46 F 3d 705, 708
(7th Cir 1995Xoffensive remarks and two
incidents of physical contact by supervisor
including grabbing plaintiffs buttocks found
to be nonactionable harassment)
Nor does Webster's occasional flirting in the
workplace change the analysis
Plaintiff
explained the flirting only "sometimes"
bothered her In Robinson v Tiuman College,
No 97 C 896, 1999 WL 33887, at *2 (N D 111
J a n 19, 1999), plaintiff claimed that her
supervisor referred to her as 'honey,"
"sweetie,' or "baby", told her he couldn't
believe they hadn't slept together yet and told
her that if he wasn't married he would marry
her, made frequent telephone calls to her for
work related matters but spoke to her in a
romantic tone of voice, and touched her
buttocks on two separate occasions The court
found
that
the
remarks,
"while
unquestionably obnoxious and boorish," were
not "sufficiently severe or pervasive to have
altered
the
conditions
of
Robinson's
employment or to have made her workplace
hellish " Id at *5 The court also found that
the two "seemingly isolated" instances of
touching "occurring approximately one month
apart," though inappropriate, did not rise to
the level of actionable conduct Id, see also
Weiss v Coca Cola Bottling Co , 990 F 2d 333,
337 (7th Cir 1993Xno actionable harassment
where supervisor asked plaintiff out for dates,
called her a "dumb blond," placed his hand on
her shoulder several times, placed "I love you"
signs in her work area and attempted to kiss
her in a bar and in the office)
*12 Finally, PlaintifFs claim that Webster
asked her out on dates on a "daily basis" and
Copr © West 2004 No Claim
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Shegog's testimony about further harassing
acts to which Webster subjected Plaintiff do
not make this claim an actionable one A
supervisor is ill advised to ask his subordinate
out on a daily basis For purposes of Title VII,
however, a Plaintiff must show not only that
"a reasonable plaintiff would find [her
environment] offensive," but also that ' t h e
plaintiff actually perceived it as such " Mosher
v Dollar Tree Stores, Inc , 240 F 3d 662, 668
(7th Cir 2001), Hostetler v Quality Dining Inc ,
218 F 3 d 798, 807 (7th Cir 2000) Plaintiff
testified that, though Defendant Webster
asked her out on dates frequently, these
requests did not bother her and she did not
consider them to be sexual harassment
Because she herself did not find this behavior
offensive, the court need not consider what
others may have thought about such behavior
Similarly, Shegog's testimony concerning all
kinds of offensive conduct that Plaintiff was
allegedly subjected to does not meet the
subjective component of the test Plaintiff
herself testified that the two incidents of
touching and Webster's flirting were the only
acts of harassment she perceived Where
Plaintiff herself was unaware of Webster's
additional alleged misconduct, she cannot be
said to have suffered from its effects Thus,
Plaintiff has not established an actionable
harassment claim and summary judgment is
properly granted to U Haul on this claim
2 Employer's Liability
Even assuming that Plaintiff had established
an actionable harassment claim, Defendant U
Haul could not be held vicariously liable for
Webster's harassment in this case
An
employer is subject to vicarious liability to a
victimized employee for an actionable hostile
environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee Murray v Chicago Transit
Authority, No 99 3774, __ F 3d _ , 2001 WL
493433, at *4 (7th Cir May 10, 2001Xquoting
Faragher v City of Boca Raton 524 U S 775,
807 08 (1998) If the supervisor's harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action,
such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable
reassignment, the employer will always be
vicariously liable for the supervisor's action
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Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at
807-08.
When,
however,
no
tangible
employment action is taken, a defending
employer may raise an affirmative defense to
liability or damages, subject to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. The
employer must then show: (a) that it exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior;
and
(b) that
the
plaintiff
employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of
available preventive or corrective measures.
Id.
Plaintiff has offered evidence that she
suffered some tangible employment action as
a result of her complaint of harassment, as
discussed below. There is no evidence,
however, that she suffered any adverse action
as a result of the alleged harassment. Indeed,
Plaintiff herself admits that during the time
of the alleged harassment, Defendant Webster
gave her a raise and promoted her to a full
time employee. Thus, U-Haul is entitled to
assert an affirmative defense.
*13 It is undisputed that U-Haul had a
detailed sexual harassment policy in place
before Plaintiff began working there. This
policy was included in a publication given to
Plaintiff when she was hired and, in fact, it
was this publication that Plaintiff used to
ultimately find the 800 number she called to
complain about Webster. In response to
Plaintiffs call, U-Haul sent its marketing
company president Chris McDermott to the
Park Forest facility to investigate Plaintiffs
complaint two days later. Plaintiff complains
that
McDermott
did not handle
the
investigation according to company policy and
conducted a poor investigation in a number of
ways, including failing to talk to the Plaintiff
first, talking to a witness without telling the
witness to keep the matter confidential, and
failing to talk to certain witnesses such as
Plaintiffs cousin Vivian Shegog. It is
undisputed,
however,
that
after
the
investigation, McDermott gave Webster a
written warning stating that any future
inappropriate comments or actions would
subject him to immediate termination.
Webster then reviewed and signed that
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warning. It is also undisputed that Webster
never touched Plaintiff again after U-Haul's
actions. Thus, U-Haul has clearly met the first
prong of the affirmative defense.
To support the second prong, U-Haul points
out that Plaintiff did not report that Webster
had touched her until the second touching
incident occurred. U- Haul notes that Plaintiff
waited more than a month after the first
alleged touching, more than a week after the
second alleged touching, and through six
months of Webster asking Plaintiff out before
reporting the incidents. (Def/s 56.1 Statement
^| 44.) The court is hesitant to characterize as
"unreasonable" a plaintiff who tries to resolve
an inappropriate incident herself (by telling
the harasser never to touch her again) and
waits until a repeated incident occurs before
reporting the harassment. Nevertheless, UHaul could not be expected to remedy the first
incident of touching or the alleged flirting
until Plaintiffs phone call at the end of
February. Thus, even if Plaintiff had stated an
actionable harassment claim, U-Haul would
not be vicariously liable for Webster's
behavior.
D. Retaliation
Plaintiff next claims that Webster retaliated
against her for complaining to U-Haul about
him and for filing her EEOC claim. Title VII
makes it unlawful "for an employer to
discriminate against any of [its] employees ...
because he [or she] has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice" by
Title VII. Murray v. Chicago Transit Authority,
2001 WL 493433, at *7 (citing 42 U.S.C.2000e3(a)). To state a prima facie case of retaliation
under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1)
she
engaged
in
statutorily
protected
expression; (2) she suffered an adverse action
by her employer; and (3) there is a causal link
between her protected expression and the
adverse action. Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550,
555 (7th Cir. 1998).
*14 Plaintiff bases her retaliation claim on
the fact that after she complained of the
perceived harassment: (1) she received a
number of written reprimands whereas before
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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this time she had never received any
reprimand; (2) Webster accused her of
stealing; (3) Webster made her work longer
hours and gave her additional tasks that she
had never been asked to perform before; and
(4) Webster became verbally abusive to her.
Defendant U-Haul contends that Plaintiff has
not established a prima facie case of
retaliation because none of these actions
constitute materially adverse employment
action and, even if they were adverse actions,
Plaintiff cannot establish the required causal
link between her protected expression and the
adverse action, nor can she show that
Defendant's proffered reasons for the actions
were a pretext for retaliation.
Adverse job action is not limited "solely to
loss or reduction of pay or monetary benefits"
but can encompass "other forms of adversity
as well." Smart v. Ball State University, 89 F.3d
437, 441 (7th Cir.1996). A materially adverse
change in the terms and conditions of
employment,
however,
must
be
more
disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an
alteration of job responsibilities. Crady v.
Liberty National Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d
132, 135 (7th Cir.1993). Such a change might
be indicated "by a termination of employment,
a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or
salary, a less distinguished title, a material
loss of benefits, significantly diminished
material responsibilities, or other indices that
might be unique to a particular situation." Id,;
Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir.2000).
Plaintiff contends that she received a number
of written reprimands shortly after she
complained
about
Webster's
harassing
treatment, but she admits that those
reprimands did not lead to any demotions,
reduced pay or other tangible consequences.
The Seventh Circuit has already concluded
that
"negative performance
evaluations,
standing alone, cannot constitute an adverse
employment action," where those evaluations
were not linked to any tangible job
consequences. Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550,
556 (7th Cir.l998Xciting Smart v. Ball State
University, 89 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir.1996)
("There is little support for the argument that
negative performance evaluations alone can
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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constitute an adverse employment action."). In
addition, even if such actions could be seen as
adverse, Plaintiff cannot show that U-Haul's
proffered reasons for giving the reprimands
were pretext for retaliation. In fact, Plaintiff
admits that some of the reprimands were to a
degree accurate: she admits she did not make
a bank deposit when she was supposed to, she
had a visitor come to the store, and she went
out in a company van. Plaintiff has reasonable
explanations for all of her actions, but such
explanations are not relevant to the inquiry at
hand: whether the employer's reasons for a
decision were honest, not whether they were
correct. Sweeney, 149 F.3d at 557. Nor has
Plaintiff offered evidence that other workers
guilty of similar misconduct were not subject
to discipline. Thus, the written reprimands do
not support Plaintiffs retaliation claim.
*15 Plaintiff also complains that Webster
accused her of theft and let U- Haul
management know about these accusations.
As with the written reprimands, however,
Plaintiff does not allege that she suffered any
adverse employment actions due to these
accusations. Webster never attempted to fire
Plaintiff for theft nor did U-Haul, she was
never suspended pending any investigation,
and she never lost any pay with regard to
these accusations. Even assuming Webster
made such accusations, therefore, they do not
constitute adverse employment action.
Finally, Plaintiff complains that she was
assigned additional tasks immediately after
she complained about Webster's harassment
and, during this time, Webster became
verbally abusive to her. U-Haul argues that,
even if Plaintiffs testimony is believed,
Webster was merely requiring Plaintiff to
perform tasks already in her job description.
Defendants note, further, that Plaintiff had
greater responsibility than her co-workers
because she was the only full time employee
at the time and was second in command to
Webster. (Def.'s 56.1 Statement f{ 36, 76.)
Plaintiff admits that the additional tasks she
was assigned were always part of the customer
service representative's job description, and
that she received overtime pay for the extra
hours she worked. She insists, however, that
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

^ ^

WMlaw

Page

2001 WL 648637
(Cite a s : 2001 WL 648637, *15 (N.D.IH.))
Webster did not assign her those undesirable
tasks until after she voiced a complaint.
(Def.'s 56.1 Statement 1 77; PL's 56.1
Response f 76.)
The Seventh Circuit has found that a change
in an employee's assigned work tasks may
constitute material adverse
employment
action even when those tasks are still within
the scope of her job description. For example,
in Dahm v. Flynn, 60 F.3d 253, 254 (7th
Cir.1995), plaintiff, a former employee of the
Wisconsin State Lottery, claimed that her
employer retaliated against her after she
testified about problems in her department in
front of the Joint Audit Committee of the
Wisconsin legislature. According to Dahm,
after she gave this testimony, her job duties
began to change in a way that she perceived
as a "de- skilling" of her position. Id. at 255.
Such changes included, among other things:
(1) certain tasks that formerly were within her
purview were delegated to her assistants; (2)
she was given increased responsibility for
processing requests, a less skilled job than she
usually performed; and (3) she was required to
begin documenting her daily telephone calls
and her meetings with employees. Id. Despite
evidence that these shifting responsibilities
were "within the confines of her job
description," the Seventh Circuit rejected the
notion that such changes could not therefore
be considered a materially adverse change in
the terms and conditions of employment. Id. at
257. Instead, the court found that such change
in
responsibilities
from
intellectually
stimulating activities to routine work could
rise to the level of an adverse employment
action, "even if the time required to perform
the duties remains constant." Id.
*16 Plaintiff claims that after she complained
of the harassing behavior, she was not only
given additional work, but also made to
perform more unpleasant tasks that she had
not previously been required to perform,
certain of which were normally left to the
male employees. For obvious reasons, U-Haul
insists that everyone, male and female,
performed all of the tasks as a customer
service representative. Plaintiff has, however,
presented enough evidence to call this practice
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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into question. If a trier of fact were to believe
Plaintiff and her cousin Shegog that there
were certain, more menial tasks that she was
not required to perform until after she
complained about Webster's harassment, this
change in job assignments would be enough
for Plaintiff to establish her claim of
retaliation. See, e.g., Gaser v. Levitt, No. 98 C
210, 1998 WL 684207, at *4 (N.D.IH. Sept. 23,
1998Xwhere
plaintiff
alleged
that
his
employer "significantly decreased the quality,
if not the quantity, of his work assignments,"
by, among other things, assigning him "only
routine tasks," the alleged change in
plaintiffs job responsibilities constituted an
adverse employment action); see also Johnson v.
Chicago Bd. of Ed., No. 00 C 1800, 2000 WL
1785311, at *5 (N.D.Ill.Dec. 5, 2000Xplaintiff
had alleged sufficient facts to show an adverse
employment action where she was transferred
to another shift that she did not want and was
allegedly given an increased work load).
Nor is the court convinced of U-Haufs
assertion that Plaintiffs tasks changed after
the birth of her child, not as a result of her
complaint. Plaintiff admits that from the time
she was nine months pregnant, in August of
1998, until six weeks after giving birth, she
was not required to do certain tasks at U
Haul, but both Webster and Plaintiff say she
was already performing all of her tasks by the
end of 1998. Thus, by testifying that she did
not have to do some of these assignments and
did not suffer verbal abuse until after she filed
her complaint, Plaintiff establishes a dispute
concerning the requisite causal connection
between the adverse action and
the
retaliation. See, e.g., Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d
550, 557 (7th Cir.1998) (A "telling temporal
sequence" can establish the required nexus
between an employee's protected expression
and any adverse employment action, as long
as the action follows soon after the protected
expression: "One day might do it, so too might
one week.")
Although
retaliation
caution is
summary
Plaintiffs

the court concluded that Plaintiffs
claim may go forward, a note of
in order. The court has granted
judgment on the remainder of
claims, and she has not alleged
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constructive discharge. Thus, any damages
Plaintiff might receive would be limited to
compensation for the harm she suffered during
the short period of time (from the end of
February 1999 until the end of May 1999)
during which Plaintiff allegedly experienced
retaliation.
E. Defamation
*17 Defamation is "the publication of
anything injurious to the good name or
reputation of another, or which tends to bring
him into disrepute." Howse v. Northwestern
Memorial Hospital, No. 98 C 4488, 2000 WL
764952, at *8 (N.D.I11.2000). Under Illinois
law, words that impute the commission of a
criminal offense are considered defamatory per
se. Chisolm v. Foothill Capital Corp., 3 F.Supp.2d
925, 938 (N.D.I11.1998Xquoting Beasley v. St.
Mary's Hosp., 200 Ill.App.3d 1024, 1033, 558
N.E.2d 677, 683 (5th Dist.1990)). To prove a
claim of defamation, Plaintiff must establish
that: (1) Defendant made a false statement of
fact concerning her; (2) there was an
unprivileged publication of the defamatory
statement to a third party by Defendant; and
(3) Plaintiff was, in fact, damaged by that
publication. Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 298
Ill.App.3d 419, 424, 698 N.E.2d 674, 678 (1st
Dist.1998); see also Chisolm, 3 F.Supp.2d at
938; Pandya v. Hoerchler, 256 Ill.App.3d 669,
673, 628 N.E.2d 1040, 1043 (1st Dist.1993).
Plaintiff claims that after she left U-Haul,
Webster uttered defamatory statements to
potential employers, including St. James
Hospital, Ingalls Hospital, and Rent-A-Center.
Specifically, Plaintiff claims that when
potential employers called Webster for a
reference, he falsely told them that Plaintiff
was a thief. [FN8] Plaintiff bases her entire
claim of defamation on the following facts:
according to Plaintiff, her cousin, Vivian
Shegog, called a woman, Maria, from Ingalls
Hospital who told Shegog that Plaintiff was
not going to be hired because Webster said
that Plaintiff was a thief. Surprisingly
enough, Shegog actually denies ever having
had such a conversation, and instead testified
that it was Plaintiff who called Maria and
then told Shegog what Maria said. Other than

14

this contradictory evidence, Plaintiff supports
her claim by offering only her own conviction
that, with Rent-A-Center, another potential
employer, she "pretty much had [a] foot in the
door" but was not hired. (PL's Dep., at 155-56.)
[FN9]
FN8. Because Webster denied ever calling Plaintiff a
thief and denied that he believed she stole anything
from U-Haul, truth cannot be a defense to this
defamation claim.
FN9. Shegog also testifies that at one point she
called Webster, pretending be a prospective
employer checking Plaintiffs references. (Shegog
Dep., at 87-88.) According to Shegog, Webster
responded that Plaintiff was a thief and had stolen
money and products from the store and property
from customers. (Id., at 87-88.) Perhaps because she
recognizes that this information is unreliable,
Plaintiff does not mention this incident anywhere in
her brief or in her lengthy statement of facts. In any
event, because Plaintiff could not have been
damaged by Webster's statements to her own cousin,
the testimony, even if true, would not advance
Plaintiffs defamation claim.
Both U-Haul and Webster contend that
Plaintiff has failed to provide any admissible
evidence to support her defamation claim. The
court agrees. Leaving aside the glaring
problem that Plaintiff and Shegog cannot
agree on who allegedly called Ingalls Hospital
and, assuming that Shegog did call the
hospital as Plaintiff states, any information
that Maria provided Shegog about what
Webster said is, nonetheless, inadmissible
hearsay. To be sure, the testimony of a
witness that Webster told him or her that
Plaintiff was a thief would not be hearsay
because it would be offered to prove that
Webster made the statement, not that the
statement was true. See Bularz v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 93 F.3d 372, 377-78 (7th Cir.1996)
(in a defamation case, testimony of a witness
that an individual defamed the plaintiff is
never hearsay where it is not being brought in
for the truth of the matter, but, rather, merely
to prove the statement was made); Chisolm, 3
F.Supp.3d at 939 (same). Thus, Maria could
properly testify that she heard Webster call
Plaintiff a thief. Absent Maria's testimony,
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however, her alleged conversation with
Shegog is inadmissible hearsay, as is Shegog's
conversation reporting the whole incident to
Plaintiff. See, e.g., Bularz, 93 F.3d at 377-78
(where witness testified that a sales manager
told her that another individual told him that
yet a fourth individual defamed the plaintiffs,
such testimony constituted double hearsay).
Because Plaintiff offers no way around this
double hearsay, nor does she offer the
testimony of even one employer who allegedly
heard Webster call Plaintiff a thief, Plaintiffs
defamation claim cannot survive summary
judgment.
*18 Plaintiffs blanket assertion that her
inability to get a position at Rent-A-Center
resulted from defamation is a nonstarter.
There is no evidence that Webster actually
spoke to any individual at Rent-A-Center.
Plaintiff admits that she did not speak to a
single potential employer to determine
whether anyone called Webster for a
recommendation, and Webster denied telling
any potential employer that she was a thief.
To prevail on a claim of defamation, mere
speculation concerning the defendant's words
is simply not enough; Plaintiff
must
affirmatively establish publication of the
defamatory statements. See, e.g. Gibson v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., 292 Ill.App.3d 267, 275,
685 N.E.2d 638, 644 (5th Dist.1997)
(publication is an essential element of a cause
of action for defamation). Because Plaintiff
has failed to present admissible evidence to
establish that any defamation occurred, the
court need not address the problematic
inconsistencies
between
Plaintiffs
and
Shegog's testimony, nor need it address
whether any such information Webster gave
future
employers was protected by a
conditional privilege. Summary judgment is
properly granted to Defendants on this count.
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summary judgment papers under seal (Doc.
Nos.79, 103) is denied. Defendant Arlester
Webster's motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs defamation count (Doc. No. 75) is
also granted. Additionally, because Defendant
Webster has not moved for summary judgment
with respect to Plaintiffs assault and battery
claim against him, that claim survives this
opinion. Because all other federal claims
against Webster are dismissed, however, and
because the state law assault and battery
claim can be severed from
Plaintiffs
retaliation action, that claim is dismissed
without prejudice to proceeding on that claim
in state court.
2001 WL 648637, 2001 WL 648637 (N.D.I11.)
END OF DOCUMENT

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant UHaul's Motion for summary judgment (Doc.
No. 77) is granted as to Plaintiffs sexual
harassment count and defamation count and
denied as to Plaintiffs retaliation claim.
Defendant U- Haul's motion to file certain
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Thomas Nolan. Davis, a real estate developer,
brought this defamation suit alleging that
Nolan, acting in the course and scope of his
employment
with
Household,
made
defamatory statements to Mahmood Wakani,
a New York loan broker. In three points of
error, Davis asserts that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment on his slander
per se claims. We overrule Davis's points of
error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
FACTS
Dalton W. DAVIS, Appellant,
v.
HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
H o u s e h o l d Commercial Financial
Services, Inc.
(a Subsidiary of Household International,
Inc.), H.F.C. Commercial Realty,
Inc.(a Subsidiary of Household
International, Inc. and Household
Commercial
Financial Services, Inc.), Household
Finance Corp., and T h o m a s Nolan,
Appellees.
No. 05-90-01553-CV.

Davis began searching for financing for Quail
Run, a strip shopping center development, in
1986.
He contacted W.C. Laws about
obtaining financing for the project. Laws then
contacted Wakani, a loan broker in New York.
As a result, Wakani sent the loan package to
Household in Atlanta, Georgia.
Thomas
Nolan, who worked for Household, reviewed
the loan package. The record contains a letter
from Nolan to Wakani dated September 5,
1986 which states in its entirety "Enclosed is
the Quail Run package. As we discussed, I
have no interest in this particular borrower."
Davis alleges that Nolan made the following
false statements to Wakani:

June 21, 1991.
On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District
Court Dallas County, Trial Court Cause No.
87-12820.
Before
STEWART,
BURNETT, J J .

KINKEADE

and

OPINION

1) that Davis "screwed" a bank in Dallas out
of over six million dollars;
2) that he [Nolan] knew of a lending
institution which had difficulties in a project
in which Davis was involved;
3) that he [Nolan] "had known the
borroweifDavis] from previous transactions,
and I preferred not to deal with him"; and

BURNETT, Justice.
*1 Dalton W. Davis appeals a summary
judgment entered in favor of Household
International, Inc., Household Commercial
Financial Services, Inc. (a subsidiary of
Household International, Inc.);
H.F.C.
Commercial Realty, Inc. (a subsidiary of
Household International, Inc. and Household
Commercial Financial Services, Inc.), and
Household Finance Corp. (Household), and
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

4) that "there was an administration problem
getting information."
Davis and Laws met with Wakani in New
York in September of 1986. In his deposition,
Laws testified that Wakani repeatedly told
Laws, in telephone conversations prior to that
meeting, that he had information that "Davis
screwed a bank in Dallas out of over six
million dollars." Laws did not learn that
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Nolan was the source of the information until
the September meeting. Wakani denies that
Nolan made the statement to him, and
therefore he could not have repeated it to
Laws and Davis. Wakani admitted that Nolan
told him that another lending institution had
a problem with a project in which Davis was
involved.
Wakani testified by deposition that he ceased
efforts to locate financing for Davis after the
September meeting because Laws requested
that he return the loan package. He stated
that he contacted two other lenders between
his conversation with Nolan and the
September meeting.
Neither lender was
interested in the project. Laws stated that
Wakani returned the loan package and
refused to make further efforts on the project
after his conversation with Nolan.
SLANDER PER SE
In his first point of error, Davis asserts that
the trial court erred in granting Household
and Nolan summary judgment on his slander
per se claim regarding the statement that
Nolan told Wakani that Davis "screwed" a
bank in Dallas out of six million dollars.
Summary judgment may be rendered only if
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits show (1) that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and (2) that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c);
Rodriguez v. Nay lor Indus., Inc., 763 S.W.2d 411,
413 (Tex. 1989). A summary judgment seeks
to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims
and untenable defenses, not to deny a party its
right to a full hearing on the merits of any
real issue of fact. Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex.
412, 416, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952).
Household and Nolan, as movants, must
either (1) disprove at least one element of each
of the plaintiffs theories of recovery or (2)
plead and conclusively establish each essential
element of an affirmative defense, thereby
rebutting the plaintiffs cause of action. City of
Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d
671, 679 (Tex. 1979).
*2

The

elements

of

slander

are

(1)

a
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defamatory statement, (2) which is orally
communicated or published, (3) without legal
justification, and (4) which is actionable per se
or per quod. Glenn v. Gidel, 496 S. W.2d 692, 697
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ). Slander
is actionable per se if the language is so
obviously harmful to the plaintiff that it
requires no proof of its injurious character.
See Arant v. Jajfe, 436 S.W.2d 169, 176 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, no writ) (libel suit).
Slander per quod is actionable only upon a
showing of special damages.
Fields v.
Worsham, 476 S.W.2d 421, 426 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.). Oral words are
actionable without proof of special damages if
they impute the commission of a crime or
affect the plaintiff injuriously
in his
profession, business or occupation. Bayoud v.
Sigler, 555 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1977, writ dism'd).
Publication of a defamatory statement means
to communicate it orally, in writing, or in
print, to some third person capable of
understanding its defamatory import. Houston
Belt & Terminal R. Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d
743, 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1976, writ refd n.r.e.), cert, denied, 434 U.S.
962 (1977).
Davis seeks to establish the
defamatory statement and its publication from
Nolan to Wakani through his and Laws's
testimony of the conversation with Wakani.
This situation presents a double hearsay
problem. The first part is the statement from
Nolan to Wakani, and the second part is the
statement from Wakani to Laws and Davis.
Texas Rules of Civil Evidence 805 provides:
hearsay included within hearsay is not
excluded under the hearsay rules if each part
of the combined statement conforms with an
exception to the hearsay rule provided in
these rules.
Nolan's statement to Wakani would not be
hearsay because it is verbal conduct which
constitutes an operative fact of Davis's cause
of action. See Byrd Int 7, Inc. v. Electronic Data
Systems Corp., 629 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. App.Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.); Scotchcraft Bldg.
Materials, Inc. v. Parker, 618 S.W.2d 835, 83637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1981,
writ refd n.r.e.); Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 801(eX2)
(Admission by Party-Opponent); McCormick,
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Evidence § 249 (3d ed. 1987). Thus, if the
statement were offered by someone who heard
it, such as Wakani, it would be admissible.
See Scotchcraft, 618 S.W.2d at 837. The Wakani
out-of-court statement quoting Nolan, when
offered by Davis and Laws, is obviously
hearsay. Davis offers it for the truth of its
assertion that Nolan published the defamatory
statement to Wakani. The statement does not
fall under any recognized exception to the
hearsay rule. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 803.
The summary judgment evidence shows that
Laws and Davis testified that Nolan made the
statement "that Davis screwed a bank in
Dallas out of six million dollars" to Wakani,
and then Wakani repeated the statement to
them.
Wakani denies ever hearing or
repeating that statement. The testimony of
Laws and Davis is inadmissible hearsay.
Without the testimony of Laws and Davis,
Davis can not establish publication of the
statement. Nolan and Household have shown
that, as a matter of law, Davis cannot
establish an essential element of his cause of
action. We overrule Davis's first point of
error.
DEFAMATION AS A MATTER OF LAW
*3 In his second point of error, Davis asserts
that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment as to his alternative claims because
those claims were not slander per quod
requiring the pleading and proof of special
damages. The alternative claims rest on the
other three statements made by Nolan to
Wakani:
1) that he [Nolan] knew of a lending
institution which had difficulties in a project
in which Davis was involved;
2) that he [Nolan] "had known the
borrowerfDavis] from previous transactions,
and I preferred not to deal with him"; and
3) that "there was an administration problem
getting information."
The threshold question, which is a question of
law for the court to decide, is whether Nolan's
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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words are reasonably capable of a defamatory
meaning.
Musser v. Smith Protective Services,
Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 653 (Tex. 1987) (libel
suit on a letter sent by a company president to
a client discussing a former company
employee). Communication is defamatory if it
tends to harm the reputation of another, to
lower him in the estimation of the community,
or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v.
Hurlbut, 696 S.W.2d 83, 96 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1985), supplemented, 749 S.W.2d 96, rev'd on
other grounds, 749 S.W.2d 762 (1988)
(discussing the differences in the burden of
proof
and
damages
between
personal
defamation and business disparagement);
Restatement(second) of Torts § 559 (1977).
Defamatory
statements,
libelous
or
slanderous, must be construed as a whole in
light of the surrounding circumstances based
upon how a person of ordinary intelligence
would perceive the statement. See Musser, 723
S.W.2d at 655; Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v.
Tucker, 806 S.W.2d 914, 920 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, no writ) (applying libel standard
announced in Musser to slander case). Only
when the court determines the language is
ambiguous or of doubtful import should the
jury then determine the statement's meaning
and the effect the statement's publication has
on an ordinary person.
See Musser, 723
S.W.2d at 655.
In the first statement, Nolan said that a
lending institution had difficulties with a
project that Davis was involved in. [FN1]
Innuendo can only be used to explain, but not
to extend the effect and meaning of a
statement. See Arant, 436 S.W.2d at 176. To
interpret this statement as meaning that a
previous lending institution had problems
with a project because Davis was involved in it
impermissibly expands the meaning of the
statement. In the second statement, Nolan
says that he prefers not to deal with Davis.
That statement does not reflect adversely on
Davis, but rather reflects Nolan's preference
in a business relationship.
In the third
statement, like the first, Nolan says that there
was administration problems on getting
information on Davis. Once again, that does
not reflect adversely on Davis or his business
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dealings.
It does not infer that Davis
prevented the dissemination of information on
himself. We hold, that as a matter of law,
these statements are not reasonably capable of
a defamatory meaning. We overrule Davis's
second point of error.
*4 In his third point of error, Davis asserts
that even if his alternative claims were
slander per quod, Household and Nolan failed
in their summary judgment proof and factual
issues were presented.
Because of our
disposition of Davis's first and second points of
error, we do not reach Davis's third point of
error.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 90
FN1 Notably, this is the only statement of the three
alleged that Wakani admits that Nolan made to him.
It is also the only statement that Davis specifically
refers to in his last two points of error.
1991 WL 110042 (Tex.App.-Dallas)
END OF DOCUMENT
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United States District Court, D. New Jersey.
Daniel M. GLENN, Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT P A P E R COMPANY, Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 92-1873.

1

common law claims of slander.
At oral
argument on this motion, Count Five, Glenn's
common law claim for intentional interference
with prospective business relations, was
dismissed.
Count Two is applicable only
against Schafer, who is no longer a defendant
in the action.
For the reasons set forth below, Scott's
motion for summary judgment will be granted
on all counts.

Oct. 20, 1993.
Richard C. Cooper, Mark D. Lurie, McCarter
& English, Newark, NJ, for plaintiff.
John J. Mulderig, Joseph A. Zechman, Brown
& Connery, Westmont, NJ, Steven R. Wall,
Marina C. Tsatalis, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
Philadelphia, PA, for defendant.
WOLIN, District Judge
*1 This matter comes before the Court the on
the motion of defendant, Scott Paper Company
("Scott"), for summary judgment against
plaintiff, Daniel M. Glenn ("Glenn"), pursuant
to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Glenn initially brought a fivecount complaint in the Superior Court of New
Jersey against Scott and Daniel Schafer
("Schafer"), Vice President in Charge of Sales
at Scott Worldwide Foodservice, a division of
Scott.
On grounds of diversity, Scott and
Schafer then removed the action to this Court,
pursuant to title 28, sections 1441 and 1446 of
the United States Code.
The Court
subsequently dismissed all claims with
prejudice as to Schafer. Scott now brings this
summary judgment motion on Glenn's
remaining claims.
In reference to Glenn's complaint, only
Counts One, Three and Four are relevant to
the pending motion.
In Count One, Glenn
alleges age discrimination in violation of New
Jersey's
Law
Against
Discrimination
("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 et seq.
In
Counts Three and Four, Glenn sets forth
Copr. © West 2004 No C

BACKGROUND
A. Glenn's Employment History-The Age
Discrimination Claim
Glenn was born on September 24, 1932. In
March of 1970, Glenn was employed by the
Hoffmaster Company, a manufacturer and
seller of tabletop products in the foodservice
industry. By June of 1985, Glenn was serving
as Hoffmaster's Eastern Regional Sales
Representative. At that time, Scott acquired
the Hoffmaster
Company
and
formed
Hoffmaster-The Food Service Business of
Scott Paper.
Scott retained the Hoffmaster
Company's management team to run the
newly formed division, and Glenn continued to
work in his regional management position.
Schafer joined the Hoffmaster Company in
1977 and held the Western Regional Sales
Manager position at the time of the Scott
acquisition.
He, too, retained his
management
position
within
Scott's
Hoffmaster Division.
In October of 1988, Scott acquired two other
manufacturing companies in the foodservice
industry and reorganized to form a new
organization-The
Worldwide
Foodservice
Business ("WFB").
WFB was comprised of
two product groups-one making container
products, the other making tabletop products,
which included Hoffmaster products.
As part of the reorganization, WFB Vice
President and Business Leader, Robert
Vanderselt ("Vanderselt"), selected a core
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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management team to oversee WFB operations.
The new team replaced the management
group previously retained from the original
Hoffmaster Company. Schafer was named to
the new management team under the title of
Vice
President,
Foodservice
Sales.
Vanderselt had considered Glenn as a
candidate for this position.
*2 With the formation of WFB, Glenn was
appointed
Foodservice
Regional
Sales
Manager for the East (the "Sales Position").
He received a salary increase and a high grade
position.
Glenn's responsibilities included
selling container and tabletop products and
managing container and tabletop sales
representatives. Within the WFB hierarchy,
Glenn was to report directly to Schafer.
On June 5, 1989, Vanderselt informed Glenn
that Schafer was not satisfied with Glenn's
performance and, in lieu of termination,
offered Glenn the position of Market/Customer
Development Manager (the "Development
Position").
The job was newly created and
designed
to
develop
and
lead
the
implementation of product and customer
innovations in key domestic and international
markets.
On June 6, 1989, Glenn accepted
the position at the same annual salary of
$81,000 and subsequently received a $2,500
bonus on June 25, 1989.
After Glenn's
transfer, Daniel Rodenbush-31 years old at
that time-took over the Sales Position.
By January of 1990, the extent of growth in
Glenn's area forced WFB to create another
Development
Position-filled
by
Scott
employee John Acton.
In March of 1990,
Glenn received a $3,000 increase in his annual
salary.
In July or August of 1990, Sharon
Robbins ("Robbins") replaced Vanderselt as
WFB Vice President and Business Leader. In
December
of
1990,
Richard
Leaman
("Leaman"), President of Scott Worldwide,
eliminated Glenn's Development Position and
terminated Glenn's employment with Scott.
B.
Events
Subsequent
to
Glenn's
Termination-The Defamation Claims
Shortly

after

Glenn's

termination,

from

2

December 14 through 17, 1990, WFB held a
sales meeting in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, at
which WFB introduced to its sales force
several new products, including the Custom
Easy line.
After leaving the Bryn Mawr
meeting, William Connelly ("Connelly"), WFB
National Marketing Manager, could not locate
certain Custom Easy marketing materials-a
mock order form and brochure-which he had
used in his presentation to the WFB sales
force. Connelly telephoned Francis McNamee
("McNamee"), WFB National Customer and
Marketing
Development
Manager,
and
advised him of the missing items. McNamee
offered that Acton might have taken the
Custom Easy materials to give to Glenn.
During January of 1991, rumors were
circulating throughout WFB that Acton had
been accused of stealing the Custom Easy
materials to give to Glenn.
At this time,
Schafer became aware of the rumor, as did
Glenn by way of Acton.
In March of 1991,
Joan Vissers-Damie ("Vissers-Damie"), Scott
Senior Creative Liaison, located the missing
materials in a box in Oshkosh, Wisconsin and
subsequently
informed
Connelly
and
McNamee of the discovery. In May or June of
1991, John Hull ("Hull"), a former Scott
employee, met McNamee in the Pittsburgh
airport. McNamee told Hull that Schafer had
been telling people that Acton and Glenn stole
the Custom Easy materials.
Hull and
McNamee discussed the matter in subsequent
conversations.
*3 Between January and June of 1991, Glenn
had a number of discussions with David
Shapiro ("Shapiro"), Senior Vice President of
Sales at the Marcal Paper
Company
("Marcal").
These discussions culminated
with Shapiro offering Glenn a position at
Marcal as Vice President of the Away From
Home Products Group at an annual salary of
approximately
$100,000.
Shapiro
subsequently decided not to create the new
Marcal position and withdrew the offer to
Glenn.
In early 1992, Glenn was a candidate for the
position of President at the Network Group.
Glenn never received an offer. In the middle
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of 1992, Glenn was a candidate for a job with
Dennis Ogden. Glenn never received an offer.
In July of 1992, Glenn commenced to work as
a broker for Amoco Foam Products Company presumably his current employment.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where
there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
The party
moving for summary judgment has the burden
of showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and once the moving party has
sustained this burden, the opposing party
must introduce specific evidence showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, Ml U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986);
Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d
458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989).
A genuine issue is not established unless the
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, would allow a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for that
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248- 49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11 (1986);
Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1395 (3d
Cir. 1989). If the evidence is merely colorable
or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2510-11; Radich, 886 F.2d
at 1395.
Whether a fact is material is
determined by substantive law. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; United States v.
225 Cartons, 871 F.2d 409, 419 (3d Cir.1989).
Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to his case, and on which
he will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Appelmans v. City of
Philadelphia, 826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987).
Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go
beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits,
depositions,
interrogatory
answers
and
admissions on file, designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Celotex, All U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2553;
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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Cooley v. Pennsylvania Housing Fin. Agency, 830
F.2d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 1987).
B. Glenn's Age Discrimination Claim
The crux of Glenn's age discrimination claim
is certain disputed remarks made by Schafer
at a WFB sales meeting in October of 1988.
During the course of the meeting, Schafer
allegedly stated that Glenn and some other
"older, unproductive" Scott employees were to
be terminated.
In later conversations,
Schafer allegedly referred to these older Scott
employees as "dinosaurs."
*4 Glenn contends that Schafer followed
through on his promise.
By December of
1988, several other older employees accepted
"voluntary retirement" packages.
Then in
June of 1988, Schafer, motivated by age bias,
instigated
Glenn's
transfer
to
the
Development Position, which was authorized
and implemented by Vanderselt.
Glenn
portrays the transfer to and subsequent
elimination of the Development Position as a
"two-step" dismissal process unlawfully based
on age.
1. Standards Applicable to New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination
Glenn brings his age discrimination claim
pursuant to New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1
et seq.
Age discrimination claims under
NJLAD are governed by the same standards
and burden of proof structures applicable to
the
federal
Age
Discrimination
in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. See
Retter v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 755 F.Supp. 637,
638 (D.N.J.1991), aff'd, 975 F.2d 1551 (3d
Cir. 1992); Giammario v. Trenton Bd. of Educ,
204 N.J.Super. 356, 361 (App.Div.1985), cert,
denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986).
Cf Erickson v.
Marsh & McClennan Co.. 117 N.J. 539, 550
(1990) (applying federal standards to NJLAD
sex discrimination claim in employment
context).
The plaintiff asserting an age discrimination
claim carries the ultimate burden of proving,
by a preponderance of evidence, that age was
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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the determinative factor in the adverse
employment action St Mary's Honor Ctr v
Hicks, No 92 602, 1993 WL 220265, at *6
(U S June 25, 1993), Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v Burdine 450 U S 248, 252 53, 101
S C t 1093 94(1981), Billet v CIGNA Corp , 940
F 2d 812, 816 (3d Cir 1991), Healy v New York
Life Ins Co , 860 F 2d 1209, 1216 (3d Cir 1988)
, cat denied 490 U S 1098, 109 S C t 2449
(1989) The plaintiff may meet this burden by
presenting either direct or indirect evidence of
unlawful discrimination
See Healy, 860 F 2d
at 1214
Direct or "smoking gun" evidence is usually
unavailable or difficult to acquire
In
McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 U S 792,
93 S C t 1817 (1983), the United States
Supreme Court outlined a detailed method for
establishing an inference of discrimination in
the absence of direct evidence
See also
Chipollim v Spencer Gifts, Inc , 814 F 2d 893,
897 (3d Cir), cert dismissed 483 U S 1052,
108 S C t 26 (1987)
McDonnell Douglas
implemented a three step analysis, which is
applicable in the summary judgment context
and allocates the burden of production as
follows
(1) plaintiff must come forth with
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, (2) if plaintiff succeeds
in establishing a prima facie case, the burden
then shifts to the defendant, who must
articulate some legitimate, non discriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection, (3) if
defendant is able to meet this burden, plaintiff
must be given the opportunity to come forth
with sufficient evidence to show that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant
should not be believed and that age was the
determinative
factor
for
the
adverse
employment action
See Hicks 1993 WL
220265, at *9, Burdine, 450 U S at 252 53,
101 S Ct at 1093
*5 The Third Circuit has steadfastly applied
McDonnell Douglas where a plaintiff seeks to
prove unlawful discrimination by means of
indirect evidence
See Healy, 860 F 2d at
1209, Chipollim 814 F 2d at 897 However,
the Court is aware of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Hicks, which clarified step
three in the McDonnell Douglas framework
Copr © West 2004 No Claim
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Previously, the plaintiff could meet the
burden of proof by establishing that the non
discriminatory reason proffered by the
defendant was not credible See Burdine, 450
U S at 253, 101 S Ct at 1094, Anastasw v
Schenng Coip , 48 Fair Empl Prac Cas (BNA)
1651, 1653 (3d Cir 1988)
Under Hicks, the
plaintiff does not necessarily meet the burden
by simply producing evidence that defendant's
articulated reason is pretextual, but must
prove that unlawful discrimination was the
determinative factor underlying the adverse
employment decision 1993 WL 220265, at *8
("It is not enough to disbelieve the employer,
the factfinder must believe the plaintiffs
explanation of intentional discrimination")
See also EEOCv MCI Int'l, Inc, No 90 1198,
1993 WL 294486, at *7 8 (D N J Aug 2, 1993)
(applying Hicks in summary judgment context)
Notwithstanding
the
Supreme
Court's
refinement in Hicks, the McDonnell Douglas
framework allows a plaintiff to convince the
court of discrimination where no direct
evidence is available
3 Glenn Has Presented No Direct Evidence of
Age Discrimination
Direct evidence, when presented to the trier
of fact, proves the existence of a particular fact
in question without the need for inference or
presumption
Randle
\
LaSalle
Telecommunications, Inc , 876 F 2d 563, 569 (7th
Cir 1989) Glenn alleges that Schafer vowed
to "get rid o f the "older, unproductive
workers" and, at other times, referred to these
older employees as "dinosaurs " Scott argues
that these statements fail as direct evidence of
discrimination
because
they
are
(1)
inadmissible
hearsay,
or
alternatively,
irrelevant as against Scott, because Schafer
played no role in Glenn's termination, (2) too
equivocal regarding discriminatory intent and
(3) too attenuated from the decision ultimately
terminating Glenn
Glenn argues that the alleged statements are
admissible against Scott pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which provide that
a statement is not hearsay when it is offered
against a party and is made by that party's
"agent or servant concerning a matter within
Orig U S Govt Works
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the scope of his agency or employment..."
Fed.R.Evid. 801(dX2XD).
While Schafer denies making the remarks,
Scott contends that such statements are
inadmissible hearsay against Scott because
Vanderselt and Leaman-not Schafer-were
responsible for the employment decisions
concerning Glenn in June of 1989 and
December of 1990.
Scott cites a number of
cases to support its argument that an agent's
allegedly discriminatory statements are not
admissible against the defendant employer
where the agent had no authority to dismiss
the plaintiff and no involvement in the
termination decision. See, e.g., Staheli Eudy v.
BWD Automotive Corp., 51 Fair Empl Prac.Cas.
(BNA) 724-25 (N.D.Ga.1989); Hill v. Spiegel,
Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 237 (6th Cir.1983).
*6 The Court finds the instant case
distinguishable, as the record indicates that
Schafer was involved in the employment
decisions.
Glenn concedes that Vanderselt
and Leaman wielded ultimate authority
respecting his employment, but proof exists
that Schafer played a role in both decisions.
It is undisputed that the disintegration of the
Schafer-Glenn relationship was the impetus
for Vanderselt's decision to remove Glenn
from the Sales Position. See Certification of
Steven J. Wall ("Wall Certification"), Exhibit
3.
See also Certification of Mark D. Lurie
("Lurie Certification"), Exhibit B, Schafer
Deposition at 169-70, 182-83;
Exhibit F,
Robbins Deposition at 62.
In addition,
Schafer provided input on the decision by
Leaman and Robbins to ultimately let Glenn
go and the severance package he would
consequently receive. See Lurie Certification,
Exhibit F, Robbins Deposition at 32-33.
Therefore, the Court concludes that otherwise
admissible proof of the alleged statements
may be offered against Scott as nonhearsay
under Rule 801(dX2XD).
The Court's determination on the hearsay
question appears also to dispose of Scott's
irrelevancy argument, in which Scott contends
that "[t]he biases of one who neither makes
nor influences the challenged personnel decision
are not probative in an
employment
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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discrimination case."
Medina-Munoz v. R.J.
Reynolds Co., 896 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir.1990)
(emphasis supplied).
As noted, Glenn has
offered evidence suggesting that Schafer did
influence the employment decisions affecting
Glenn.
Therefore, the Court concludes that
Schafer's alleged statements would not be
inadmissible as irrelevant.
The Court's preliminary determinations on
admissibility should not impart that the
alleged remarks constitute direct evidence of
discrimination.
The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has found that direct evidence exists
where the employer states that the employee
was fired because of a protected characteristic.
Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 791 (3d
Cir.1985), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S.Ct.
796 (1986). See also Randle v. LaSalle, 876 F.2d
563, 569 7th Cir.1989) (" 'direct' evidence
must not only speak directly to the issue of
discriminatory intent, it must also relate to
the specific employment decision in question");
Perry v. Prudential-Bache Sec, Inc., 738 F.Supp.
843, 851 (D.N.J. 1989) (remarks not deemed
direct evidence where superior did not state
that employee was to be fired "because of his
age" and any such conclusion could only be
inferred from the description of [employee] as
being 'old' "), ajf'd, 904 F.2d 696 (3d Cir.), cert,
denied, 498 U.S. 958, 111 S.Ct. 386 (1990).
The Court is sensitive to the Third Circuit's
directive that competing inferences as to a
statement's meaning should not be weighed on
a summary judgment motion. Siegel v. Alpha
Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50 (3d Cir.), cert, denied,
496 U.S. 906, 110 S.Ct. 2588 (1990) (summary
judgment improper where trial court should
have left to jury competing inferences of
remark "old dogs won't hunt"). However, the
court in Siegel was dealing with the plaintiffs
attempt to establish discrimination by
indirect, not direct, evidence. Therefore, the
Court concludes that Schafer's
alleged
statements cannot be considered direct
evidence of unlawful discrimination, as the
context in which they were made was not
sufficiently proximate to either Glenn's
transfer in 1989 or his ultimate termination in
1990. [FN1]

Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

^ ^

Page

Not Reported in F Supp
(Cite a s : 1993 WL 431161, *6 (D.N.J.))
4 Glenn Has Not Established A Prima Facie
Case of Age Discrimination
*7 To establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination the plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of evidence that he or she was
(1) a member of a protected class, (2) qualified
for the position, (3) dismissed despite being
qualified, and (4) ultimately replaced by a
person sufficiently younger to permit an
inference of age discrimination
Healy, 860
F 2d at 1218
In view of the record, the Court has serious
doubts as to whether Glenn can sufficiently
prove certain of the required elements To be
sure, Glenn was a member of a protected class
both when he was transferred from the Sales
Position and when the Development Position
was eliminated
In addition, the record
suggests that Glenn was qualified to remain
in both the Sales Position and the
Development Position
Glenn had received
satisfactory performance reviews prior to the
transfer and had been given a raise in the
Development Position prior to termination
See Certification of Glenn In Opposition To
Motion For Summary Judgment ("Glenn
Certification"), Exhibits 1 7
See also Scott
Appendix, Exhibit A, Glenn Deposition at
Exhibit P 6, Exhibit D, Vanderselt Affidavit
at \\ 18 20
Any contention by Scott that
Glenn was not qualified merely raises a
disputed material fact and precludes summary
judgment against Glenn
The Court
concludes that Glenn has satisfied the class
and qualification elements for a prima facie
case
Glenn's effort to satisfy the other two prima
facie elements is hampered by his weakly
supported 'two step ' dismissal theory Glenn
alleges
that
Scott
accomplished
its
discriminatory goal by transferring Glenn
from the Sales Position to the Development
Position, which was created only to be
eliminated a smokescreen for the unlawful
dismissal The Court must ascertain whether
the transfer from the Sales Position or the
elimination of the Development Position,
separately or taken together, were adverse
employment actions taken by Scott
Glenn's
Copr © West 2004 No C
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dismissal after the Development Position was
eliminated clearly constituted adverse action
by Scott
Conversely, it is not so clear that
the transfer to the Development Position fits
into a prima facie case of age discrimination
under these facts
Glenn has adduced no evidence that Scott
implemented the transfer as a means for
ultimately dismissing Glenn
Glenn's two
step theory rests on three points
First, he
cites the voluntary retirement of three older
employees occurring contemporaneously to his
transfer
Second, he asserts that the lack of
documentation regarding the creation and
subsequent elimination of the Development
Position raises an inference that the job was
designed merely as a way station on Glenn's
journey
toward
inevitable
termination
Third, Glenn identifies Schafer his comments,
his role in the transfer and his advice
respecting Glenn's severance
The Court
concludes that Glenn's theory and allegations
are not sufficiently supported in fact
Glenn speculates that his removal and
transfer were part and parcel of an overall
effort to terminate older employees
The
Court notes that "the mere offer of an early
retirement program does not support an
inference of discrimination " Colgan v Fishei
Scientific Co , 935 F 2d 1407, 1422 (3d Cir),
cert denied, 502 U S 941, 112 S C t 379(1991)
Beyond the fact that other older Scott
employees accepted voluntary retirement,
Glenn offers no personal knowledge or other
admissible evidence regarding the contents
and acceptance of the retirement packages
See L u n e Certification, Exhibit A, Glenn
Deposition at 194
*8 Glenn's two step dismissal theory connotes
a constructive discharge claim, which lurks
within the fact that he had no choice but to
accept the Development Position in lieu of
termination
When
considering
a
constructive discharge claim, the Third Circuit
employs an objective test to determine
whether the employer's conduct would have
foreseeably resulted in working conditions "so
unpleasant or difficult that a reasonable
person in the employee's shoes would resign '
to Orig U S Govt Works
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" Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070,
1079 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting Goss v. Exxon Office
Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3d Cir.1984)).
Glenn provides no objective facts to support
his subjective assertions that the Development
Position was a make-work, dead-end job, or
that Scott's "take it or be terminated" offer led
foreseeably to unbearable working conditions.
Glenn accepted the Development Position and
held it for approximately nineteen months,
notwithstanding
his
alleged
personal
reservations.
While he no longer managed
sales representatives, Glenn thrived in the
position and was well compensated. After the
transfer, Glenn received a $2,500 bonus and
his same $81,000 annual salary, along with a
subsequent $3,000 raise. See Scott Appendix,
Exhibit A, Glenn Deposition at 278, 322-23,
Exhibit P-6.
During Glenn's tenure, the
Development Position flourished to such an
extent that Scott was forced to create an
additional Development Position, filled by
John Acton.
See id., Exhibit D, Vanderselt
Affidavit at % 20.
In contrast to Glenn's
subjective portrayal, these facts undercut any
allegation that Glenn was constructively
discharged by the transfer to the Development
Position.
Ultimately, the timing of and circumstances
surrounding Scott's decision to eliminate the
Development Position were far too attenuated
from the decision to transfer Glenn nineteen
months earlier.
Glenn's failure to produce
evidence impedes his effort to pull together
the pieces of a discriminatory plot assignable
to Scott by way of Schafer's comments and
conduct.
Consequently, the Court will not
consider the transfer-either alone or in
conjunction
with
Glenn's
ultimate
termination-in determining whether Glenn
was dismissed despite his qualifications.
In
short, the record unreservedly indicates that
Scott did not dismiss Glenn until the
Development Position was eliminated.
As to the fourth element, after Glenn was
transferred, Scott placed Daniel Rodenbush,
aged 31, in the vacant Sales Position.
The
Court notes that this fact alone, in certain
circumstances, would raise an inference that
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the employment action was discriminatory.
However, having concluded that Glenn's
transfer is not pertinent to the discrimination
claim, the Court finds no relevancy in the fact
that Glenn, despite his qualifications, was
replaced in the Sales Position by a person
outside the protected class.
The Court must, however, assess Glenn's
claim in view of Scott's elimination of the
Development Position and ultimate dismissal
of Glenn. The record reveals that Scott came
to these decisions under the pressure of budget
constraints and financial duress.
See Lurie
Certification, Exhibits E, H. Where an
employer dismisses an employee in order to
reduce the work force, the employer generally
does not retain a position which can be filled
by someone outside the protected class.
Therefore, Glenn must provide evidence that
Scott, during its alleged downsizing, treated
persons outside the protected class more
favorably. Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901
F.2d 335, 342 (3d Cir.1990);
Massarky v.
General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118 (3d
Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 937, 104 S.Ct. 348
(1983).
*9 Glenn has failed to produce to the Court
such evidence, choosing instead to argue that
there were no "similarly situated employees,
as Glenn's position was sui generis." Glenn's
Memorandum Of Law In Opposition To Scott's
Motion For Summary Judgment at 36 n. 22.
Content to rest his prima facie case on the
unsupported allegation that the Development
Position was a smokescreen for unlawful
discrimination, Glenn does not even attempt
to adduce evidence concerning the scope of
Scott's downsizing at the end of 1990,
including a breakdown of the employees
affected.
Conversely, the record indicates
that forty to fifty salaried employees were
terminated between September and December
of 1990, as part of Scott's budget reduction
plan.
See Lurie Certification, Exhibit F,
Robbins Deposition at 27-28.
In view of the record presented, the Court, in
sum, concludes that (1) Glenn was not
dismissed-constructively or otherwise-when
he was transferred to the Development
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Position, (2) Glenn was terminated by Scott
despite his qualifications in December of 1990,
and (3) the record is without any evidence that
younger employees were treated
more
favorably than Glenn when he was released,
notwithstanding the fact that Rodenbush
replaced Glenn in the Sales Position in 1989
Therefore, the Court finds that Glenn has not
established a prima facie case of age
discrimination
under
the
recognized
standards
The Court acknowledges that, in most
discrimination actions, the "prima facie case is
easily made out " Massarky, 706 F 2d at 118
For the record, the Court notes that many of
the foregoing problems that obstruct Glenn's
prima facie case would also serve to defeat
Glenn's age discrimination claim if the Court
was required to carry out to completion the
McDonnell Douglas and Hicks analysis
Assuming that Glenn could establish a prima
facie case, the burden would then shift to Scott
to offer admissible evidence that would "allow
a trier of fact rationally to conclude that the
employment decision had not been motivated
by discriminatory animus " Chipolhni, 814
F 2d at 898 Scott has articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons to rebut a prima
facie case
Regarding the removal from the
Sales Position, Scott cites Glenn's poor work
performance and resistance to Schafer's
directives
and
policies
See Wall
Certification, Exhibit 3
Regarding Glenn's
final termination, Scott offers testimony of a
number
of
executives
concerning
the
company's financial problems and the need to
make cuts
See Scott Appendix, Exhibits E,
H
With Scott meeting Glenn's prima facie case,
all presumptions of discrimination would
disappear and Glenn would then be required
to present evidence sufficient to prove that age
discrimination was the determinative factor in
Glenn's dismissal See Hicks, 1993 WL 220265,
at *6 8
Evidence that Scott's articulated
reasons have been provided merely as a
pretext for discrimination might but may not
necessarily be sufficient to withstand Scott's
summary judgment motion Compare id at *6
Copr © West 2004 No Claim
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("proving the employer's reason is false
becomes part of (and often considerably
assists) the greater enterprise of proving the
real reason was intentional discrimination")
with Chipolhni, 814 F 2d at 898 ("in addition to
establishing his prima facie case by indirect
proof, a plaintiff can prevail by means of
indirect proof that the employer's reasons are
pretextual
without
presenting
evidence
specifically relating to age")
*10 At this stage as in the determination of
Glenn's prima facie case the survival of
Glenn's age discrimination claim depends
upon the extent of proof supporting the two
step dismissal theory [FN2] While the Court
does not suggest that an employer never could
utilize a two step dismissal process to mask a
discriminatory motive, the Court concludes
that Glenn's allegations cannot not survive
summary judgment on the evidence presented
here, given the nature and circumstances of
Glenn's employment in the Development
Position Even if a discriminatory motive
could be assigned to Schafer, the Court can
find no evidence in the record raising an
inference that Scott (1) actually terminated
Glenn constructively or otherwise based on
Schafer's recommendation or (2) developed
and eliminated Glenn's Development Position
in order to hide a discriminatory motive for
dismissing Glenn
To withstand Scott's motion for summary
judgment, Glenn must produce "more than a
mere scintilla of evidence" to support his
claims, and cannot simply recycle factually
unsupported allegations
See Williams, 891
F 2d at 458 [FN3] On the basis of the record
presented, the Court will grant Scott's motion
for summary judgment on Glenn's age
discrimination claim
C Glenn's Defamation Claims
As noted, Glenn's defamation claims are
based on events that occurred after the
elimination of the Development Position and
his release from Scott
Glenn asserts that
Scott employees, McNamee and Schafer,
published statements falsely accusing Acton
and Glenn with the theft of the Custom Easy
Orig U S Govt Works
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materials,
which,
in
actuality,
were
inadvertently misplaced after the WFB sales
meeting in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, in
December of 1990.
Glenn points to the following to support his
defamation claims: (1) statements allegedly
made by Schafer to a group at a lunch meeting
in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, (2) prior to revoking
Marcal's job offer to Glenn, Shapiro allegedly
informed Glenn that he had heard rumor of
Glenn's involvement in the theft of the
materials, (3) statements made by McNamee
within one month of the sales meeting,
suggesting that Acton stole the Custom Easy
materials for Glenn, (4) the statement made
by McNamee to Hull, a former Scott
employee, in the Pittsburgh airport in May or
June of 1991, indicating that Schafer was
telling people that Acton and Glenn stole the
missing Custom Easy materials, and (5) other
statements made by McNamee and other Scott
employees to Hull regarding
Schafer's
accusations.
Scott argues that the Court should summarily
dismiss Glenn's defamation claims because (1)
the record contains no evidence of defamation
that would be admissible at trial, (2) the
claims are time barred by the applicable
statute of limitations and (3) any defamatory
conduct by Schafer or McNamee is not
assignable to Scott as a matter of law. The
Court agrees with Scott on all three points.
1.
The
Record
Contains
Insufficient
Admissible Evidence of Defamation
To withstand a summary judgment motion,
the non-moving party must produce evidence
that can be reduced to admissible form at
trial.
Williams, 891 F.2d at 466 n. 12.
Hearsay problems plague Glenn's effort to
adduce evidence that a Scott employee did in
fact charge Glenn with the theft of the Custom
Easy materials.
In almost
every
circumstance
concerning
the
alleged
accusation,
Glenn
offers
testimony
of
individuals who attribute the accusations to
Schafer or McNamee, but never unequivocally
state they heard either of these individuals
make an accusation.
Weeding through the
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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record, the Court is not satisfied that Glenn
has produced enough admissible evidence to
withstand Scott's summary judgment motion.
*11 As discussed above, under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, a statement is not
considered hearsay where it is offered against
a party and is directly attributed to that
"party's agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of the agency or employment,
made
during
the
existence
of
the
relationship." Fed.R.Evid. 801(dX2XD). The
offering party must make a threefold showing,
through evidence independent of the proffered
statement,
that
(1)
an
employment
relationship existed between the declarant
and the party, (2) the statement was made
during the agency or employment relationship
and (3) the statement concerned a matter
within the declarant's scope of employment.
Boren v. Sable, 887 F.2d 1032, 1038 (10th
Cir.1989) (cited with approval in Lippay v.
Oiristos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1497 (3d Cir.1993)).
[FN4]
Given this evidentiary rule regarding partyopponent admissions, the Court would
consider nonhearsay-thus admissible against
Scott-any statement respecting the Custom
Easy materials made by Schafer or McNamee
during their employment relationship with
Scott.
See MCI Communications Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1143
(7th Cir.) (documents containing statements
attributable to high level management
constitute corporate admission under Rule
801(d)2(D) even if report is based on hearsay
or reflects opinion), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 891,
104 S.Ct. 234 (1983). [FN5]
While the Court concludes that certain of the
statements attributed to Schafer or McNamee
may be admitted as evidence against Scott,
Glenn's evidentiary problems are only
beginning.
Rule 805 provides that hearsay
statements
contained
within
hearsay
statements, also known as double hearsay, are
not excluded under the hearsay rules if each
segment of the combined statement, when
considered separately, falls within a hearsay
exception. Fed.R.Evid. 805.
Although the
alleged statements by Schafer and McNamee
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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are technically nonhearsay under Rule
801(dX2XD), Rule 805 provides a useful tool for
determining whether
there exists any
evidence of defamation admissible against
Scott
Utilizing the Rule 805 framework, the Court,
as noted, would be satisfied that most of the
alleged statements by Schafer and McNamee
regarding the theft of materials, when
considered alone, overcome the first hurdle m
the double hearsay analysis However, Glenn
repeatedly attempts to introduce these
admissible
statements
via
out of court
declarations of other unidentified declarants
Reviewing the record, the Court finds too
many phantom sources, which undermine the
reliability concerns that pervade the hearsay
rules See Boren, 887 F 2d at 1036 Regarding
the lunch meeting in Oshkosh, Glenn testified
as to "what I had been hearing from several
people "
L u n e Certification, Exhibit A,
Glenn Deposition at 12
In response, Glenn
then contacted Acton, [FN6] who investigated
the story through his superior at the time,
Michael O'Neil ("O'Neif), who according to
Glenn, told Acton that 'he did know about the
[accusation], they had heard Schafer say it
Mr O' Neil did know that Mr Schafer was
saying i t " Id at 30 31 (emphasis supplied)
*12 Viewed in a light most favorable to
Glenn, this evidentiary offering constitutes
Glenn testifying as to what he was told by
Acton regarding what Acton was told by
O'Neil regarding what Schafer was heard to
have said about the missing materials
The
record does not reveal that Acton, much less
O'Neil, heard the accusation directly from
Schafer
Respecting the Oshkosh meeting
and the O'Neil conversation, Glenn is unable
to direct the Court to any individuals who
heard Schafer make the alleged accusation
and whose out of court declarations are
admissible against Scott [FN7]
Where
declarants are identified as "they' and
'several people," the Court is simply not
satisfied
that
the
trustworthiness
requirements of Federal Rules of Evidence are
met
See Garden v Westinghouse Elec Corp ,
850 F 2d 996, 1003 (3d Cir 1988) (statements
Copr © West 2004 No Claim
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of unidentified declarants inadmissible)
Hearsay problems confound other attempts by
Glenn to introduce the alleged accusations
During the investigation into the missing
materials, Vissers Damie, the Scott employee
charged with the search, was told by her
supervisor,
Douglas
Schommer
that
"McNamee had accused Acton of taking [the
materials] to give to
Glenn "
Scott
Appendix, Exhibit I, Vissers Damie Deposition
at 13 [FN8] The record does not indicate that
Vissers Damie heard the accusation directly
from McNamee
In addition, Vissers Damie
was unable to identify the individual who
talked to Schommer, and could only offer that
Schommer told her that McNamee was the
"source" of the theft rumors
Lune
Certification,
Exhibit
I,
Vissers Damie
Deposition at 14, 32 In this instance, Glenn
again offers unreliable evidence based on
statements not directly attributable to any
identified individual
The Court now turns to Glenn's contention
that Shapiro had been advised of the alleged
theft and consequently revoked Marcal's offer
to Glenn Id , Exhibit A, Glenn Deposition at
69 70
According to Glenn, Shapiro never
identified the individual who informed him of
the rumor
Id at 70
In addition to the
unidentified declarant problem, Shapiro's
statement,
as offered
through
Glenn's
testimony, is hearsay and not within any
hearsay exception [FN9] In addition, Shapiro
has testified that he did not know of the rumor
until he became involved in this litigation
See Scott Appendix, Exhibit N, Shapiro
Deposition at 39 40
Finally, the Court reviews Hull's deposition,
wherein he testified t h a t (1) McNamee, on at
least three occasions, told him about Schafer's
accusations and (2) other Scott employees also,
at various times, had discussed the rumors
with him
In addition to his conversations
with McNamee, Hull discussed in separate
instances the alleged theft with Scott
employees Milt Napper, Penny Amundson,
Kathy Hable and Steve Gubelman See L u n e
Certification, Exhibit G, Hull Deposition at
59
The Court finds that unidentified
Orig U S Govt Works
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declarants also impede the introduction of the
statements from Admundson, Napper and
Gubelman via Hull's testimony. Id. at 76-78,
83-86.
As to Hable's statements, Hull was
unable to testify regarding the source of her
knowledge. Id. at 87-88. [FN10]
*13
Turning
to
the
Hull-McNamee
conversations, Hull testified that McNamee
said, "Schafer is going telling everybody that
Glenn and Acton stole it and tried to sell it to
Wisconsin Tissue Mills." Id. at 61.
Hull
reported a subsequent conversation, wherein
McNamee stated that "Schafer says he has
proof, and he continues to go around telling
people that Glenn and Acton stole it." Id. at
70. In addition, Hull asserted that he knew
"for a fact" that McNamee heard the
accusation directly from Schafer, because
McNamee told him so. Id. at 76.
The Court concludes that this paltry bit of
testimony is the only piece of admissible
evidence against Scott concerning Schafer's
alleged
defamation,
despite
serious
reservations regarding its reliability.
There
are no unidentified declarants in the chain of
reporting
which
culminates
in
Hull's
testimony.
On purely technical grounds,
hearsay rules are not violated when Hull
testifies that "McNamee said, 'Schafer said,
"Acton stole the materials for Glenn." ' "

occasions (the
"McNamee
Statements").
Certain of these out-of-court declarations to
Hull are also nonhearsay under Rule
801(dX2XD). The pertinent question as to the
McNamee
Statements
is not
whether
engaging in the discussions with Hull was
within McNamee's scope of employment. The
Federal Rules of Evidence merely require that
the alleged theft and accusations be matters
within the scope of McNamee's employment.
See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications, 708 F.2d at
1143.
The Custom Easy materials, their
disappearance
and
Schafer's
alleged
accusations were all matters within the scope
of McNamee's employment as WFB National
Customer and Marketing Manager and as a
subordinate to Schafer.
See Lurie
Certification, Exhibit L, Scott's Objections and
Answers
To
Glenn's
First
Set
of
Interrogatories at 23-25; Exhibit B, Schafer
Deposition at 61.
In sum, as to admissible evidence, the Court
agrees, in part, with Scott.
The record
contains second and third-hand accounts of
Schafer's alleged accusations.
The majority
of these
accounts-if
not hearsay
by
themselves - are based on unreliable hearsay
statements made by unidentified declarants
or, in one instance, rebutted by the declarant
himself.
However, the Court does find
admissible Hull's testimony regarding the
McNamee Statements.

In segment one of Hull's testimony, Schafer
allegedly makes the accusation within
McNamee's
presence
(the
"Schafer
Statement").
Schafer's
out-of-court
declaration
is nonhearsay
under
Rule
801(dX2XD)-a party-opponent admission by
Scott.
The Schafer Statement was made
during Schafer's employment with Scott and
the theft of the materials was a matter within
the scope of Schafer's responsibilities as Vice
President. In addition, the Schafer Statement
is not hearsay because it is not being offered
for the truth of its content, but rather, for the
fact that the statement was made. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cantu, 876 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th
Cir.1989).

*14 The Court comes to this conclusion with
certain reservations based on the fact that
Schafer's statement to McNamee, as revealed
by Hull, lacks clarity of context and content.
This only magnifies the reliability problem
associated
with
layering
out-of-court
declarations on top of other out-of-court
declarations. See Boren, 887 F.2d at 1037
(noting hearsay rule concerns for the accurate
reporting of facts, the court warned that with
each additional layer of hearsay, there is a
corresponding
decrease
in
reliability).
Nonetheless, the Court concludes that Hull's
testimony is admissible within the Federal
Rules of Evidence.

In segment two, McNamee relates Schafer's
accusation to Hull on at least three separate

The Court's inquiry, however, does not end
with this evidentiary ruling in favor of Glenn.
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Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Page 12

Not Reported in F.Supp.
(Cite as: 1993 WL 431161, *14 (D.N.J.))
The tenuous admissibility of Hull's testimony
does not foreclose questions concerning the
applicable statute of limitations or whether
Glenn, as a matter of law, can withstand
Scott's summary judgment motion.
The
Court determines that Glenn fails on both
grounds.
In reaching this conclusion, the
Court focuses narrowly on Hull's testimony
alone, given the inadmissibility of the balance
of Glenn's profferings.
2. Statute of Limitations and Republication
Moving beyond evidentiary concerns, the
Court must, as a preliminary matter,
determine from which state it is to draw the
substantive law and statute of limitations to
be applied to Glenn's defamation claims.
Sitting in diversity, this Court generally must
look to New Jersey law to guide the choice of
law decision. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020 (1940). However,
the Court sua sponte will not challenge the
application of a particular state's law where
(1) the parties implicitly agree as to the
governing law, (2) the state has an interest in
the litigation and (3) the state's relevant law
does not significantly conflict with the laws of
another state with a comparable interest in
the case. See Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, 735
F.2d 94, 96 (3d Cir.1984); Pierce v. Capital
Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 50102 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 861, 99 S.Ct.
181 (1978).
In the instant case, the parties implicitly
agree that New Jersey provides the applicable
law.
Glenn, the target of the alleged
defamation is a resident of New Jersey, and
the Court is satisfied that there are no
conflicts
between
New
Jersey
and
Pennsylvania defamation law that will
substantially affect the outcome. [FN11]
Accordingly, the Court applies New Jersey
law to assess Glenn's claims.
New Jersey law provides that defamation
actions must be brought within one year "after
the publication."
N.J.S.A. 2:14-3.
New
Jersey courts have strictly construed the
statute's fixed time period for bringing
defamation claims.
See Lawrence v. Bauer

Publishing & Printing, Ltd., 78 N.J. 371, 374-75
(1979). (citing statute's fixed period, court
rejected the "discovery rule" whereby a cause
of action in defamation accrues when the
plaintiff learns the state of facts which
constitute a claim).
Therefore, the plaintiff
must
alleged
with
specificity
the
circumstances giving rise to the defamation
action. See Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co.,
713 F.Supp.
533, 544
(N.D.N.Y.1989)
(defamation
claim
time-barred
where
complaint failed to allege when alleged
remarks were made); Zoneraich v. Overlook
Hospital, 212 N.J.Super. 83, 101 (App.Div.)
(claim dismissed where complaint did not
allege "when, where, by which defendants and
by what words ... plaintiff was defamed"), cert,
denied, 107 N.J. 32 (1986).
*15 Glenn commenced this suit on March 12,
1992.
Therefore, Glenn must allege and
consequently
adduce
evidence
that
a
defamatory remark, assignable to Scott,
occurred sometime after March 12, 1991. As
Scott contends, the Court finds no record
evidence that the Schafer Statement-or any
other alleged accusations charged to Schaferoccurred within the one-year statutory period.
Limited to Hull's testimony, Glenn offers
little proof as to the timing and specific
content and context of the Schafer Statement.
Consequently, the Court considers the Hull
testimony utterly insufficient to withstand
summary judgment with respect to the statute
of limitations. [FN 12] Failing the statute of
limitations as to the Schafer Statement, Glenn
argues that the McNamee Statements effected
a republication, resurrecting the Schafer
Statement and bringing it within the one-year
statutory period.
Hull testified that the
McNamee Statements occurred sometime after
April 1, 1991-in May or June of 1991. See
Lurie
Certification,
Exhibit
G,
Hull
Deposition at 62-67.
The McNamee
Statements were made within New Jersey's
one-year statutory period for defamation
actions.
Glenn's republication argument raises two
related, but separate issues:
(1) whether
Schafer would be liable as a result any
republication by McNamee within
the
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limitations period and (2) whether the
McNamee Statements, in and of themselves,
are defamatory.
Scott contends that the
McNamee Statements cannot breathe life into
the Schafer Statement, which considered alone
would be time- barred. The Court agrees.
"Publication" occurs where the allegedly
defamatory statement is communicated to a
third person "with a reasonable ground to
suppose that it will become known to others."
Kramer v. Monogram Models, Inc., 700 F.Supp.
1348, 1351 (D.N.J.1988), rev'don other grounds,
875 F.2d 66 (3d Cir.1989). Under New Jersey
law, where a third person has republished a
defamatory remark within the limitations
period, such republication does not operate to
create a new cause of action against the
original publisher, where the cause of action
respecting the original publication would be
time-barred. See id. Scott argues that a new
cause of action as to Schafer did not accrue
when McNamee, the third person, republished
the Schafer Statement.
The Court finds Kramer instructive. The facts
of Kramer could be described as follows. Party
1 issues to Party 2 a press release containing
alleged defamatory remarks about the
plaintiff.
Party 2 subsequently publishes
excerpts of the press release in a market
report and magazine. Plaintiff sues only Party
1 for defamation.
The issuance of the press
release to Party 2 occurred outside the statute
of limitations. The republication by Party 2
occurred within the statute of limitations.
The court concluded that the only publication
chargeable against Party 1 was the issuance of
the press release. Similarly, the Court holds
that the only publication chargeable to
Schafer would be the Schafer Statement.
[FN13]
*16 Determining that Glenn cannot reach
Scott through the Schafer Statement is only
one piece of the republication puzzle.
The
McNamee Statements do come within the
limitations period.
The survival of Glenn's
claims rests upon the Court's determination
whether the McNamee Statements are, as a
matter of law, defamatory.
The Court finds
against Glenn.
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

In New Jersey, "one who republishes
defamatory matter is generally subject to
liability as if he or she had originally
published it. Schiavone, 735 F.2d at 94. In the
republication context, the defense of truth
does not mean truthful republication of the
original statement, but rather that the
original statement does in fact prove to be
true. Lawrence, 89 N.J. at 461 ("if defendant
published that a third person stated that
plaintiff has committed a crime, it is no
justification that the third party did in fact
make that statement").
While these rules of law appear to weigh
against Scott, the Court is dissatisfied that
McNamee
published
or
republished
defamatory matter. In New Jersey, the court,
as a threshold matter, decides whether the
alleged statement may be construed as
defamatory. Decker v. Princeton Packet, 116
N.J. 418, 424-25 (1989). The statement "must
be taken in context and the publication
considered as a whole." Id. at 425. See also
Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 857
F.2d
96,
107 (3d
Cir.1988)
(context
examination covers many factors, including
"the nature of discussion in which the
allegedly defamatory statements were made"
and
"the
nature
of
the
listener's
understanding"), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1078,
109S.Ct. 1528(1989).
As to the content and context of the Schafer
Statement, the Court finds the record so
insufficient
that
making
a
threshold
determination
favorable
to
Glenn
is
impossible.
Through Hull's testimony, the
Court gleans little information about what
McNamee actually heard Schafer say. While
recognizing that false accusations of theft may
be defamatory, the Court deems Glenn's only
admissible evidence insufficient to support his
claims as to Schafer's conduct.
Even if the Schafer Statement is assumed to
be defamatory, the Court cannot construe the
McNamee Statements as a defamatory
republication.
Republication questions most
often arise where media publishers report
stories based on defamatory information
received from other persons. Generally, the
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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courts are wary of publishers' attempts to
immunize themselves from defamation claims
by framing stories as "reports" or "opinions."
See, e.g., Lawrence, 176 N.J.Super, at 389
("[s]urrounding the defamatory sting of their
words with terms such as 'reportedly/ 'may
b e / or 'could possibly be' will not protect a
publisher").
The
instant
case
is
distinguishable.
McNamee did report information to Hull
about Schafer's actions, but he did so in a
manner and context designed to inform and
refute the accusations. When McNamee met
with Hull, he knew the Customs Easy
materials had been found.
See Lurie
Certification, Exhibit L, Scott's Objections and
Answers
To
Glenn's
First
Set
Of
Interrogatories at 24. In addition, Hull's
testimony indicates that neither McNamee
nor Hull believed the rumors that Glenn
attributes to Schafer. See, Lurie Certification,
Exhibit G, Hull Deposition at 69-70.
McNamee did not adopt or republish the
Schafer Statement as his own or report it in a
manner couched in defamatory "suggestion or
insinuation." Lawrence, 176 N.J.Super. at 389.
Borrowing liberally from the Third Circuit the
Court concludes that the "facts indicate that
no one who heard the [alleged] slander
believed it, and those who repeated the
[alleged] slander did so only to express outrage
at the speaker.... [The Court believes] New
Jersey would not compensate for slander
under these facts." Nanavati, 857 F.2d at 109.
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the employee was hired to perform, (2) occurs
substantially within the job's space and time
limits and (3) is undertaken with a purpose to
serve the employer. See Aboud, 715 F.Supp. at
649 (quoting Restatement (2d) of Agency § 228

The
Court
undertakes
the
scope of
employment question by focussing on the only
piece of relevant and admissible evidence, the
Hull testimony, and determining whether any
liability of Schafer and McNamee could be
assigned to Scott.
The Court's analysis is
again constrained by the limited evidence as
to Schafer's statements and actions.
The
evidence leaves too many holes, including to
whom, and in what context, Schafer published
the accusation.
The Court cannot be sure
that Schafer, himself, was not merely passing
on
rumors
derived
from
unidentified
declarants or expressing a bona fide opinion.
See Scott Appendix, Exhibit B, Schafer
Deposition at 61-62.

3. Scott Cannot Be Liable In Defamation
Under Principles of Respondeat Superior

Nonetheless, the Court recognizes that there
is evidence that McNamee did hear Schafer
say something, somewhere about Glenn and
the Custom Easy material. Using its
imagination, the Court can envision a
discussion between Schafer and McNamee, in
which Schafer makes a direct accusation
against Glenn under conditions that meet the
three-pronged scope of employment standard.
Imagination, however, is not the most
appropriate juridical tool on motions for
summary judgment.
Glenn simply provides
no evidence that Scott would be liable for
Schafer's alleged conduct and comments.

*17 Finally, even if Glenn could adduce
evidence to adequately support his defamation
claim, the Court finds t h a t Scott would be
entitled to summary judgment based on
respondeat superior principles.
In New
Jersey, an employer may be liable for an
employee's torts only if the employee was
acting within his or her scope of employment.
GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F.Supp. 644, 649
(D.N.J. 1989); Gilborges v. Wallace, 78 N.J. 342,
351 (1978).
To determine scope of
employment questions, New Jersey considers
whether the conduct (1) is the kind for which

As to McNamee's actions, Hull's testimony
does establish context by placing one of their
meetings in the Pittsburgh airport.
Even
assuming that McNamee was on a business
trip, and that the subsequent conversation
with Hull occurred during business hours, the
Court is not satisfied that any evidence
suggests that McNamee's conduct should be
assignable to Scott. With Glenn providing no
evidence to the contrary, the Court is unable
to
conclude
that
McNamee's
duties
encompassed discussions with third parties
about the arguably tortious activities of a
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Scott vice p r e s i d e n t . In addition, G l e n n offers
n o t h i n g to prove t h a t M c N a m e e w a s g u i d e d by
a n y p u r p o s e to s e r v e Scott w h e n m a k i n g t h e
disclosures to H u l l
CONCLUSION
Glenn's
entire
case b o t h
the
age
discrimination
and
defamation
c l a i m s is
u n a b l e to s t a n d u p o n t h e w e a k e v i d e n t i a r y
f o u n d a t i o n s u b m i t t e d to w i t h s t a n d Scott's
motion.
H e c a n n o t oppose a valid m o t i o n
w i t h i n c o m p e t e n t or conclusory a l l e g a t i o n s
a n d t h e r e b y c o n t i n u e to p u r s u e his s p e c u l a t i v e
charges.
T h e r e f o r e , t h e C o u r t will g r a n t
Scott's s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t m o t i o n on a l l
counts.
FN1 Scott, at length, argues that Schafer's
statements, if made at all, were in refeience to
Glenn's obsolete sales philosophy
Glenn even
testified that he understood the lemarks in relation to
sales philosophy See Appendix to Scott's Statement
of Undisputed Facts ("Scott Appendix"), Exhibit A,
Glenn Deposition at 169 70
At this juncture, the
Court takes no position on the meaning that may be
assigned to the alleged remarks, but merely
recognizes that an inference must be drawn to tie the
statements to the employment actions taken by Scott
against Glenn
FN2 Glenn asserts that certain statistical evidence
supports an inference that Scott unlawfully
discriminated against Glenn
See Abrams v
Lightoker, Inc , 702 F Supp 509, 511 (D N J 1988)
(plaintiff asserting age discrimination claim may
"lely on a discriminatory pattern or practice as
mdiiect evidence ol discrimination")
Glenn points to two items to support an inference of
discrimination (1) a document produced by Scott
which lists certain Scott employees who reported to
Schater on December 31, 1988, June 1, 1989. and/
or December 31, 1990, and (2) a Wisconsin
agency's finding ot probable cause in an
administrative complaint of age discrimination filed
by a former Scott employee, Donna Wisnoski, who
was terminated in early 1992
Regarding the lists produced by Scott, Glenn ofters
that, ol the employees listed, most are youngei than
Schatei and those that aie older aie no longer
employed by Scott See Lune Certification, Exhibit
M, Scott's Supplemental Answeis To Glenn's First
Copr. © W e s t 2 0 0 4 N o C l a i m
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Set Of Interrogatories at Exhibit C, Exhibit B,
Schafer Deposition at 201-05
The Court is not
persuaded by this "statistical" evidence
Fust,
respecting Glenn's prima tacie case, these statistics
leveal nothing about the respective ages ol those
employees affected and those unaftected by the
cutbacks instituted by Scott in late 1990-at which
time Glenn was teimmated
Second, even if the
cited statistics support an inference of disci lmination
to establish a prima facie case, Scott has sufficiently
rebutted this inference and may succeed on its
summary judgment motion See Barnes \ Gencorp
Inc , 896 F 2d 1457, 1469 (6th Cir ) (employei may
rebut prima facie case based on statistics by (1)
showing plaintiffs statistical method is faulty (2)
attacking presumption that nondisci nninatory reason
for statistical disparity is unlikely or (3) showing that
even if bias was a factor somewhere, it did not play
a role in the action taken against the specific
plaintiff), cert denied, 498 U S 878, 111 S Ct 211
(1990)
Through its proferred expert analysis, Scott
convincingly argues that the statistics become
insignificant when reasons tor termination aie
properly factored
See Scott Appendix, Exhibit P
See also Healy, 860 F 2d at 1217-18 (statistical
evidence is lelevant to employer s defense and
supports summary judgment against employee)
In
addition, Glenn simply has produced no evidence to
counter Scott's work-force-reduction position
See
Barnes, 896 F 2d at 1469
As to the Wisnoski complaint, the Court deems the
determination by the Wisconsin Department ot
Industry, Laboi and Human Relations irrelevant to
Glenn's discrimination claim
Schater was not
Wisnoski's supervisor nor is there any evidence that
Leaman was involved in the decision to terminate
her
While an administrative determination of
probable cause regarding Glenn's claim would be
relevant, the Couit cannot conclude that the
Wisnoski action has any relevance heie Compaie
Morehouse v Boeing Co , 501 F Supp 390, 392-93
(E D Pa) (in employment discrimination, court
deemed inadmissible the testimony ot five other
former employees with seperate discrimination cases
pending against same employer), aff'd mem , 639
F 2d 774 (3d Cir 1980) with Abrams, 702 F Supp at
512 (prehminaiy EEOC finding that employei
disci lminated against plaintiff was admissible in
plaintiffs subsequent Title VII action against the
employer)
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FN3 Presumably frustrated by a lack of evidence to
support his claim, Glenn has accused Scott of
withholding and destroying relevant evidence The
Couit takes a grave view of such charges, which
warrant serious sanctions if proven tiue, or
alternatively, if proven false and made in bad faith
The Couit is stiuck by the timing of Glenn's
accusation-fust brought defending a summaiy
judgment motion attei completion of discovery At
no time did Glenn raise these concerns during the
discovery phase or bring them to the attention of the
magistrate Glenn never biought a proper motion to
compel, or a motion foi sanctions, pursuant to Rule
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Therefore, the Court finds it too late in the day for
Glenn to raise these discovery issues and does not
consider them on the pending motion
See
DesRosiets v Moran, 949 F 2d 15, 22 n 8 (1st
Cir 1991) (discovery violations waived where
untimely made), Clinchfield R Co v Lynch, 700
F 2 d 126, 132, 132 n 10 (4th Cir 1983) (where
party objects to discovery, party seeking discoveiy
must take initiative to request compulsory order)
FN4 Fedeial common law-not the forum state's
law—governs a federal court's interpretation of
"agency" under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)
Lippay, 996
F 2d at 1497
FN5 The record indicates that at some point after
McNamee left Scott, he made additional statements
to Hull respecting the Custom Easy materials See
Lune Certification, Exhibit G, Hull Deposition at 61
Because these statements weie made when no
employment relationship existed between Scott and
McNamee, they would not be admissible against
Scott See Boren, 887 F 2d at 1038
FN6 The Court concludes that Glenn had this
conversation with Acton, notwithstanding the fact
that a poition of Glenn's deposition transcript refers
to this individual as John "Abington " See Exhibit
A, Lune Certification, Exhibit A, Glenn Deposition
at 29 The Court notes that a portion of the Glenn
Deposition was revised by hand, changing
"Abington" to "Acton "
See, Scott Appendix,
Exhibit A, Glenn Deposition at 51-52
FN7 Glenn also alleges that two other Scott
employees informed him of alleged accusations at the
Oshkosh meeting Barbara Kontos, a secretary at
Scott, and Barbara Waite, a Scott customer service
Copr. © W e s t 2 0 0 4 N o C l a i m to
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representative
See Scott Appendix, at 46 49
Kontos did not attend the meeting and hei statements
are inadmissible because they are based on the
statements of an unidentified declarant Id at 46
("several people
had told her") Kontos'
declaration is also hearsay as against Scott-it is not a
Rule 801(d) party-opponent admission, as the theft of
the Custom Easy materials was not with the scope of
her employment
Accoiding to Glenn, Waite did attend the Oshkosh
meeting and consequently acquired first-hand
knowledge of Schafer's accusation
While the
source of Waite's knowledge is not attributed to an
unidentified declarant, the Couit concludes that her
statements to Glenn regarding the accusations are
also hearsay as against Scott
While both Kontos
and Waite may have learned of the alleged theft
during the course of their employment with Scott, the
theft of the Custom Easy materials was not a mattei
within the scope of their employment
FN8 Scott has admitted that, as the search for the
missing materials ensued, McNamee did "opine that
perhaps" Acton had stolen them
See Scott
Appendix, Exhibit J, Scott's Second Set of
Supplemental Answeis To Glenn's Fust Set of
Interrogatories at 6-7
The Court addresses the
consequences of the admission in the discussion
below regarding the applicable statute of limitations
See infra, at note 10
FN9 Shapiro, in effect, leports, "I was told of the
theft by a Scott employee " Glenn offers Shapiro's
statement for its ttuth-what Shapiro was told This
is hearsay as it is not a statement from a Scott
employee or agent undei Rule 801(d)(2)(D)
FN 10 Acton also testified that Hable informed him
of the rumor regarding the alleged theft
See Scott
Appendix, Exhibit G, Acton Deposition at 45,
Exhibit S, Hable Affidavit at K 3 Hable asserts that
she never heard the accusation dnectly tiom Schater
or McNamee Id , Exhibit S, Hable Affidavit at 1 4
FN 11 The Court acknowledges that Pennsylvania
may have a significant mteiest in having its
defamation law applied in the instant case Defendant
Scott is a Pennsylvania corporation
In addition,
certain of the McNamee Statements occuired in
Pennsylvania at the Pittsbuigh airport Howevei, the
Court finds there to be little conflict between
Pennsylvania and New Jersey law legarding the
ig U . S G o v t W o r k s
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statute of limitations and issues of republication
FN 12 The Court also concludes that Glenn's
detarnation action is time-baned to the extent it is
based on Scott s admission that McNamee initially
suggested that Acton stole the material
See Lune
Ceitification, Exhibit L Scott's Objections And
Answeis To Glenn s Fust Set Ot Interrogatories at
23-24
Eschewing any discussion of whethei
McNamee s statement could constitute legal
defamation, the Court simply notes that McNamee
made this statement within a month of the December,
1990, Bryn Mawr meeting, and prior to March 12,
1991
FN 13 The Couit notes that the couit in Kiamer
based its conclusions on the tact that there was "no
special relationship" between Party 1 and Paity 2
Kiamer, 700 F Supp at 1351
Had there been an
agency relationship between Party 1 and Party 2, the
court would have held that an action could have been
brought against either Party 1 or Party 2 within one
year of publication because as between principal and
agent there is no publication Id There is no third
person
In reflecting on the instant case, the Court finds
these conclusions ol some interest
First, Scott
assumes McNamee is a third person to whom the
Schater Statement is published
However, within
the WFB hierarchy, McNamee was subordinate and
lepoited to Schaler See Scott Appendix, Exhibit B,
Schafer Deposition at 61-62
Given the agency
relationship between Schaler and McNamee, and the
subject matter of the Schafer Statement, Kramer
would suggest that the Schafer Statement did not
constitute a publication, but that Glenn could bring
his claims against either Schater or McNamee based
on McNamee's publication within the statute of
limitations See Kramer, 700 F Supp at 1351 (given
the agency relationship, plaintiff may sue the author
or the mass media publisher within one yeai ot
publication)
The Court finds this portion of Kiamer unhelpful to
the instant case First, Kramer's discourse on agency
concerned the application of the single publication
rule, which is generally utilized in cases with mass
produced materials
The rule provides that a
plaintiff will have only one cause of action against a
media publisher, accruing on the date the publication
was fust circulated to the public
Kramer, 700
F Supp at 1351
The single publication rule is
simply inapplicable to the tacts underlying Glenn's

defamation claims-the statements by Schafer and
McNamee must be considered separately
Consequently, the Court treads carefully around the
Kramer court's focus on the agency relationship
between an author and the mass media publisher
The instant case does not involve a mass media
publisher, but concerns the agency and employment
relationship between a supenoi and a subordinate
The Court hesitates to conclude that the Schater
Statement, made to McNamee, did not constitute a
publication
Defamation may occur dunng a
principal-agent communication, even where such
communications have a qualified privilege
See
generally Coleman v Newark Morning Ledger Co ,
29 N J 357, 375 (1959) (a bona fide communication
on any subject mattei between parties with a
common interest or duty respecting the mattei is
privileged even if it contains actionable defamatory
content), Sokolay v Edltn, 65 N J Supei 112, 12528 (App Div 1961) (common interest to sustain
privilege where employees were mfoimed that coworker stole from employer)
1993 W L 4 3 1 1 6 1 (D.N.J.)
END OF DOCUMENT
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United States District Court, D.
Massachusetts.
Richard HUMISTON, Plaintiff,
v.
ATOTECH USA, INC., D e f e n d a n t
Civ. A. No. 94-40002-NMG.
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Employees Abroad and subject to local law
and practices. Buyers will respect local
standards and practices of employment
protection. For a period of six months from
Closing, Buyers may under no circumstances
institute operational dismissals affecting the
Transferred Employees Abroad.
The acquisition was completed in February,
1993. Soon thereafter, Chemcut Corporation
changed its name to Atotech USA, Inc.

("Atotech").
Nov. 28, 1995.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GORTON, District Judge.
*1 Plaintiff Richard Humiston ("Humiston")
brought this action against defendant Atotech
USA, Inc. alleging two counts of breach of
contract and one count of defamation.
Pending before this Court is defendant's
motion for summary judgment on all three
counts.
For the reasons stated below,
defendant's motion will be allowed.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1990, plaintiff Humiston was
Chemcut Corporation, an American
of a foreign corporation, Schering
regional manager in Chemcut's
sales and service department.

hired by
subsidiary
AG, as a
chemistry

In or about August,
1992, Schering
announced that Elf Atochem would be
acquiring Chemcut and other Schering
affiliated divisions. Notice of the merger was
provided to Chemcut employees, including
Humiston, and two days later, on August 21,
1992, a Purchase and Sale Agreement ("P & S
Agreement") between Schering and Elf
Atochem was signed. The P & S Agreement
contained the following language in Article
("Art") 24:
(b) The relevant Buyers will pursue the policy
of promoting stable and long term
employment opportunities for Transferred
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

One month after the closing, in March, 1993,
Humiston was terminated by Atotech for
"insubordination."
Humiston alleges in
Counts I and II, respectively, that his
termination constituted a breach of his
employment contract and the P & S
Agreement
between Schering and
Elf
Atochem. Humiston further alleges in Count
III that Atotech published
defamatory
statements relating to his termination that
caused injury to his reputation and standing
in his professional community.
In response to Count I, defendant Atotech
maintains that Humiston was, at all times, an
at-will employee and could be terminated at
any time, with or without cause.
With
respect to Count II, Atotech argues that
Humiston was not an intended beneficiary of
the P & S Agreement between Schering and
Elf Atochem and thus was not entitled to
contractual protection under the Agreement.
Atotech further argues that Humiston's
defamation claim in Count III is unfounded
because Humiston failed to present admissible
evidence to support his defamation claim and
employers enjoy a conditional privilege to
speak to prospective employers about former
employees.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary Judgment shall be rendered where
the pleadings, discovery on file and affidavits,
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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if any, show "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and ... the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court must view the
entire record in the light most favorable to
Humiston, the nonmoving party, and indulge
all reasonable inferences in his favor.
O'Connor v. Sleeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st
Cir.1993).
*2 With respect to a motion for summary
judgment, the burden is on the moving party
to show that "there is an absence of evidence
to support the non- moving party's case."
FDIC v. Municipality of Ponce, 904 F.2d 740, 742
(1st Cir.1990), quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d
202 (1986).
If the movant satisfies that
burden, it shifts to the non-moving party to
establish the existence of a genuine material
issue. Id.
In deciding whether a factual
dispute is genuine, this Court must determine
whether "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." Andersen v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., All U.S. 242, 248 (1986); accord AponteSantlago v. Lopez-Rivera, 957 F.2d 40, 41 (1st
Cir.1992) (citing Andersen ). The nonmovant's
assertion of mere allegation or denial of the
pleadings is insufficient on its own to establish
a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ. P.
56(e). The nonmovant must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. The Court must view the entire record
in the light most hospitable to the non-moving
party and indulge all reasonable inferences in
its favor. O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 907.

2

Folmsbee v. Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc.,
417 Mass. 388, 394 (1994); see also Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 100-01
(1977); Fenton v. Federal St. Bldg. Trust, 310
Mass. 609, 612 (1942). According to the
general rule and plaintiffs own admission,
then, Atotech was free to terminate Humiston
with or without cause.
Massachusetts courts have recognized narrow
exceptions to that general rule. Employers
may be held liable for terminating at-will
employees in violation of a clearly established
public policy. See Hobson v. McLean Hosp.
Corp., 402 Mass. 413, 416 (1988); Smith-Pfeffer
v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State
Sch.,
404 Mass.
145,
149-50 (1989).
Terminating
an
employee
for
"gross
insubordination", however, is not contrary to
any public policy recognized by Massachusetts
courts as an exception to the at-will
employment rule.
In some at-will terminations, Massachusetts
courts have implied a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to impose liability on the
employer.
Fortune, 373 Mass. at 100 05.
Massachusetts courts have narrowly construed
this exception, however, holding that the
discharge of an at-will employee without cause
is not, by itself, a violation of an employer's
obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Gram
v. Liberty Mutual, 384 Mass 659, 671 (1981).
Because plaintiff has failed to present
evidence that even suggests improper motive
or bad faith by Atotech in its discharge of
Humiston, the Court finds that this narrow
exception is not applicable.

B. Analysis
1. Count I-Breach of Employment Contract
Count I of Humiston's complaint alleges that
Atotech breached its employment contract
with Humiston by terminating Humiston for
"gross
insubordination."
Plaintiff
has
admitted in his deposition, however, that he
was an at-will employee of Atotech (Vol. II, p.
103-5; Vol. Ill, p. 133). Under Massachusetts
law, "[t]he general rule is that an employment
at-will contract can be terminated at any time
for any reason or for no reason at all."
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

*3 Defendant's motion for summary judgment
on Count I, therefore, will be allowed.
2. Count II-Breach of Contract
Humiston further alleges that he was an
intended beneficiary of the P & S Agreement
between Schering and Elf Atochem and, as
such, claims that he can enforce the
contractual provision in Art. 24 of the P & S
Agreement forbidding dismissals within the
first six months of Elf Atochem's acquisition of
Schering and its subsidiaries.
Under
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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Massachusetts law, it is the contracting
parties' intent that determines whether a
third party is an intended or incidental
beneficiary. Market Service Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
Tifco, Inc., 403 Mass. 401, 405 (1988).
In support of his claim that he was an
intended beneficiary, Humiston points to
specific language in Art. 24(b), which states:
"For a period of six months from Closing,
Buyers may under no circumstances institute
operational
dismissals
affecting
the
Transferred Employees Abroad."
Based on
that language, Humiston argues that there
exists a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether he was an intended or incidental
beneficiary of the P & S Agreement.
Atotech maintains that Art. 24(b) was
intended "to prevent the immediate postacquisition dismantling of the Schering
divisions or the wholesale lay-off of that
entity's former employees."
Atotech has
submitted an affidavit from the Vice
President/General Counsel of Elf Atochem,
who reiterates that this was the intent of the
parties in negotiating the P & S Agreement
and states that the contract was not intended
to shield individual employees from adverse
employment decisions. Furthermore, Art. 24
clearly states t h a t previous employees would
continue to be governed by "local standards
and practices" in effect prior to the
acquisition.
If Humiston was an at-will
employee prior to the acquisition by Atotech,
his at-will employment continued after the
acquisition by Atotech.
In viewing the record in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, the only evidence this
Court has located in support of Humiston's
claim that he was an intended beneficiary is
the second to last paragraph of the notice
allegedly sent to all Schering employees on
August 19, 1992. That notice states that "Elf
Atochem will not be allowed to give notice to
employees during the first 6 months after
their transfer." A reasonable jury could not,
however, return a verdict for Humiston on the
basis of the August 19, 1992 memo by itself.
The preceding paragraph of the notice clearly
states that "Atochem accepts the present local
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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personnel and social policies of Schering's
subsidiaries ..." Furthermore, pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), Humiston "may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of the
[defendant's] pleading, but ... must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial."
The Court concludes that
plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether he was an
intended beneficiary of the P & S Agreement.
Because plaintiff has failed to do so,
defendant's motion for summary judgment on
Count II will be allowed.
3. Count Ill-Defamation
*4 Count III alleges that an Atotech
representative made defamatory statements to
Humiston's subsequent employer, LeaRonal,
in response to an inquiry from LeaRonal.
In his deposition, Humiston refers to
statements made to him by a Mr. Schaefer at
LeaRonal (Vol. I, p. 37-46). These statements,
in turn, were relayed to Mr. Schaefer by a Mr.
Kessler, based on phone conversations that
Mr. Kessler had with a Mr. Hanlon, an
executive vice-president at Atotech.
This is
the only evidence that plaintiff has presented
concerning the nature or content of the
allegedly defamatory statement.
This
evidence, however, is double hearsay and
inadmissible at trial.
On that basis alone,
Humiston fails to show the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact on his
defamation claim.
Furthermore, regardless of the content of Mr.
Hanlon's statements to representatives at
LeaRonal and the truth or falsity of such
statements, Mr. Hanlon had a conditional
privilege as an official of Atotech to disclose
defamatory
information
concerning
an
employee in the employment context as long
as he did not abuse his privilege or act with
actual malice, recklessness or ill will. Burns v.
Barry, 353 Mass. 115, 119 (1967).
Plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that Mr. Hanlon
abused his privilege or acted maliciously. Foley
v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 95 (1987).
There has been no such showing by plaintiff in
this case.
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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Defendant's motion for summary judgment on
Count III, therefore, will be allowed.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of
defendant for summary judgment on Counts I,
II and III is ALLOWED.
So Ordered.
1995 WL 708660, 1995 WL 708660 (D.Mass.)
END OF DOCUMENT
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SEE COURT OF APPEALS RULES 11 AND
12
Court of Appeals of Tennessee.
Donita PIPER, et al.,
v.
Curtis MIZE.
No. M2002-00626-COA-R3-CV.
Jan. 6, 2003 Session.
June 10, 2003
Appeal
from
the
Circuit
Court
for
Montgomery County, No. 50000474; John H.
Gasaway, III, Judge.
Rodger N. Bowman, Clarksville, Tennessee,
for the appellants, Donita Piper and Lori
Turner.
Christopher
J.
Pittman,
Clarksville,
Tennessee, for the appellee, Curtis Mize.
WILLIAM B. CAIN, J., delivered the opinion
of the court, in which BEN H. CANTRELL,
P.J., M.S., and STELLA HARGROVE, SP. J.,
joined.
OPINION
WILLIAM B. CAIN, J.
*1 Plaintiffs in this case are citizens of
Montgomery
County.
Defendants,
Paul
Avallone, Wayne Gill, Curtis Mize and
Yvonne Van Der Touw are also citizens of
Montgomery County who, in varying degrees,
were alleged to be involved in the printing
and distribution of a newspaper known as The
Rattler. Defendant Avallone was the sole
writer, publisher and editor of each issue of
The Rattler. Defendant Mize is a businessman
who allowed copies of the October 5, 2000
edition of The Rattler to be placed on the
counter at his place of business for free
distribution. The trial court granted summary

1

judgment in favor of Defendant Mize and
finalized the judgment as to Mize under
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02.
Plaintiffs appeal, and we affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
At the time of the events involved in this
defamation suit, Johnny Piper was Mayor of
the City of Clarksville, Tennessee. Plaintiff/
Appellant, Donita Piper, was his wife.
Plaintiff/Appellant, Lori Turner, was a former
candidate for Mayor of Clarksville and was
the Grants Writer for the City of Clarksville.
On or about February 1, 2000, a person or
persons not enamored with the merits of the
Piper administration began distribution of an
underground newspaper called The Rattler.
Referring to itself as a "slander sheet" this
publication proclaimed itself to be "the first in
venomous gossip." To say that the various
issues of The Rattler were uncomplimentary of
Mayor Piper, his wife Donita Piper and Grants
Writer Lori Turner would be a most charitable
understatement. This appeal, however, does
not provide a proper forum for a full
adjudication of the issues between those who
wrote, edited and published the various issues
of The Rattler on the one hand, and Plaintiffs,
Donita Piper and Lori Turner, on the other.
The record shows that Defendant/Appellee
Curtis Mize neither wrote, edited nor
published any issue of The Rattler, but such was
the handiwork of Defendant Paul Avallone.
The issues drawn between Plaintiffs on one
hand and Paul Avallone and the other
Defendants on the other remain before the
trial court.
Pursuant
to the
finality
designation entered by the trial court under
Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02, only
the Curtis Mize case is before this Court, and
only such acts as the record shows to be
attributable to Defendant Mize are at issue in
this appeal.
While the Complaint filed in this case is
extensive and does not distinguish the relative
degrees of alleged culpability of Defendants,
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the record before the Court establishes that
the participation of Defendant Curtis Mize in
The Rattler saga is limited to his action in
allowing a single edition of The Rattler, to wit,
the October 5, 2000 edition, to be placed on
the counter at his place of business, along with
other free publications, for his customers to
take if they so chose.
The meat of the October 5, 2000 issue of The
Rattler, as it relates to this case, is an article
entitled "Sex Scandals Still Rock City Hall."
Under this eye catcher is said, "Loud mouths
and gossips had a field day earlier in the year
when rumors of Mayor Piper's infidelity with
his grants gal, the vivacious and every spunky
Ms Lori Turner, spread like a Montana
wildfire through the nooks and crannies of this
otherwise quiet mini metropolis on the
Cumberland River." The article continues
with a recitation that, "as the story goes," the
Mayor's wife, Donita Piper, catching him in
the act with Ms. Turner the previous January,
"clobbered him with a nine iron." [FN1]
FN1 The October 5, 2000 issue ot Tfie Rattler
contains the disclaimei, "Vie Rattler is a miracle
blend ot tact, fiction, tiuth, opinion and satue It
uses inventive names in all its stories, except in
cases where public figures are being satirized Any
other use ot real names is accidental and
coincidental It you aie a thin-skinned public official
and don't like being satirized, give up the easy
money and the perks ot power and get out of the
spotlight " The effect ot this caveat, if any, addresses
itselt pnmai lly to the issues between and among the
parties still before the trial couit.
*2 Curtis Mize answered the Complaint with
general denials and, after discovery, filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial
court granted the Motion holding:
On November 15, 2001, the defendant, Curtis
Mize, filed a motion for summary judgment.
In support of his motion, the defendant
simultaneously filed a memorandum of law, a
statement of undisputed material facts and
ten (10) exhibits consisting of publications,
correspondence, portions of depositions,
requests for admissions and an affidavit by
the defendant. On December 18, 2001, the
plaintiffs filed a brief in response to the
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defendant's motion. On December 18, 2001,
the defendant filed his reply to the plaintiffs'
brief.
The Court has considered all of the above,
deems the facts asserted by the defendant to
be undisputed, and finds that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
further finds that the defendant is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs timely appealed.
In granting the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendant Curtis Mize, the
trial court had before it undisputed facts
establishing:
1. Paul Avallone, is the sole writer, publisher
and editor of each issue of the newspaper
known at (sic) "The Rattler " except the
October 10, 2000 alleged edition of "The
Rattler " which was not written, published, or
distributed by Avallone.
2. Paul Avallone talked to no one about his
planned newspaper before he began
publishing "TheRattler."
3. Paul Avallone, alone, distributed the
various issues of "The Rattler."
4. Paul Avallone printed and distributed
thousands of copies [of] various issues of "The
Rattler."
5. No one except Yvonne Van Der Touw knew
prior to Paul Avallone's deposition in this
lawsuit that Paul Avallone was the writer,
publisher, and editor of "The Rattler."
6. Curtis Mize did not print any issue of "The
Rattler."
7. Curtis Mize did not write any story found
in any issue of "The Rattler."
8. Curtis Mize did not take any pictures used
in any issue of "The Rattler "
9. Curtis Mize did not pay any printing costs
of any issue of "The Rattler."
10. Curtis Mize did not tell Paul Avallone to
publish any issue of "The Rattler."
11. Curtis Mize did not give Paul Avallone
any story idea to use in any issue of "The
Rattler"
12. Neither of the plaintiffs ever requested,
either orally or in writing, that Curtis Mize
retract any of the statements contained in
any edition of "The Rattler."
13. The plaintiffs' complaint specifically
asserts that the February 1, 2000, October 5,
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2000 and October 10, 2000 editions of "The
Rattler" contain defamatory statements
concerning the plaintiffs
14 Among the "stones" contained in the
February 1, 2000 edition of "The Rattler " are
stories asserting the following that the
Republican National Convention would be
held in Clarksville in 2004 and that an
additional 18,673 parking spaces had been
located in downtown Clarksville
*3 15 Among the "stories" contained in the
October 5, 2000 edition of "The Rattler " are
stories asserting the following that God
announced that one local politician was going
to win an upcoming election, and that Mayor
Johnny Piper's head exploded on television
during the taping of a program
16 Paul Avallone did not write, publish or
distribute any copies of the document
purporting to be the October 10, 2000 edition
of "The Rattler "
17 Curtis Mize did not write, publish or
distribute any copies of the documents
purporting to be the October 10, 2000 edition
or'The Rattler "
18. The plaintiffs cannot identify any harm
suffered by them due to the actions of Curtis
Mize
19 There were rumors in the community of
Clarksville, Tennessee, before February 1,
2000, that Mayor Johnny Piper had allegedly
had an affair and that the plaintiff, Donita
Piper, caught her husband in such an affair
and hit him with a golf club
20 Plaintiff Lori Turner is a former
candidate for Mayor of the City of
Clarksville
21 Plaintiff Lori Turner has been the subject
of numerous articles in both the "Our City "
newspaper and "TheLeaf Chionicle "
newspaper
22 Plaintiff Lori Turner has been the
featured speaker at various civic groups in
the past 7 years
23 Plaintiff Lori Turner has hosted a local
radio talk show
24 Plaintiff Donita Piper is married to the
Mayor of Clarksville, Tennessee
25 Plaintiff Donita Piper has traveled out of
the state and country as the spouse of the
Mayor of Clarksville, Tennessee
26 Plaintiff Donita Piper has written stories

3

and has been a guest commentator for "The
Leaf-Chronicle " newspaper
27 Curtis Mize did not distribute any copies
of the February 1, 2000 edition of "The Rattler
28 Paul Avallone anonymously left several
copies of the October 5, 200[0] edition of "The
Rattler " at the front door of Curtis Mize's
business before Curtis Mize arrived at work
one day in early October 2000
29 Along with the October 5, 2000 edition of
"The Rattler," Curtis Mize also has allowed
other free publications, such as "Out City " to
be placed on his counter at work for
customers to take if they choose [FN2]
FN2 These undisputed facts are taken verbatim
from the Defendant's Rule 56 03 Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts filed with his Motion toi
Summary Judgment The Statement ot Undisputed
Facts is indeed, undisputed by Plaintiffs/Appellants
DEFAMATION
Certain near universal rules of law form a
backdrop for our consideration The law of
defamation consists of the twin torts of libel
and slander Lara v Thomas, 512 N W 2d 777
(Iowa 1994), Batt v Globe Engineering Co , 774
P 2d 371 (Kan Ct App 1989) "It is reputation
which is defamed, reputation which is injured,
and reputation which is protected by the law
of defamation " 50 Am
J u r 2nd Libel and
Slander § 2 (1995), see also Gobin v Globe PubVg
Co , 649 P 2d 1239 (Kan 1982)
As regards a private person, "To establish a
prima facie case of defamation in Tennessee,
the plaintiff must establish that 1) a party
published a statement, 2) with knowledge that
the statement is false and defaming to the
other, or 3) with reckless disregard for the
truth of the statement or with negligence in
failing to ascertain the truth of the statement
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580 B
(1977), Press, Inc v Verran, 569 S W 2d 435,
442 ( T e n n l 9 7 8 ) " Sullivan v Baptist Mem'l
Hosp , 995 S W 2d 569, 571 (Tenn 1999)
*4 As regards a public official or public
figure, Tennessee follows section 580(a) of the
Restatement of Torts providing
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§ 580 A. Defamation of Public Official or Public
Figure. One who publishes a false and
defamatory communication concerning a
public official or public figure in regard to his
conduct, fitness or role in that capacity is
subject to liability, if, but only if, he
(a) knows that the statement is false and that
it defames the other person, or
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters.
Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 442.
" 'Publication' is a term of art meaning the
communication of defamatory matter to a
third person." Sullivan, 995 S.W.2d at 571-72
(citing Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick
Co., 876 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tenn.1994). "This
being a civil and not a criminal suit for libel,
it is essential that there be publication; that
is, a communication of the defamatory matter
to a third person. This is so for the reason that
the gravamen of the act is the pecuniary
damage to the character or credit of the party
libeled. No such damage can arise, of course,
without publication." Freeman v. Dayton Scale
Co., 19 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tenn.1929). There is
a difference between civil and criminal actions
for liable where publication is concerned. "In
the former, publication must be made to some
third person, or in such public manner as to
reach third persons; but, in criminal
proceedings, publication may be made by
communicating the printed matter alone to
the party libeled." Fry v. McCord, 33 S.W. 568,
571 (Tenn. 1895).
If the person allegedly libeled is a "public
official or public figure," only clear and
convincing proof of actual malice on the part
of the defendant will survive a motion for
summary judgment. Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers,
Inc., 720 S.W.2d 69, 75 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986).
The defamation action at bar is a libel action,
as opposed to one for slander. Three questions
are dispositive of the case:
1. Did Curtis Mize "publish" the October 5,
2000 issue of "The Rattler"?
2. Are Donita Piper and Lori Turner "public
figures"?
3. If so, does the record disclose sufficient
evidence of actual malice on the part of
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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Curtis Mize?

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
As to the questions of whether or not
Defendant Mize published the October 5 issue
of The Rattler and whether or not Donita Piper
and Lori Turner are "public figures," the
standard of review of a grant of summary
judgment is well settled by Byrd v. Hall, 847
S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993) and Evco Corp. v. Ross,
528 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn.1975). The trial court,
and this Court on appeal, must look at all the
evidence and take the strongest legitimate
view of it in favor of the opponent of the
motion allowing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the opponent and discarding all
countervailing evidence. If, after doing so,
there is any dispute as to any material fact or
any doubt as to the conclusion to be drawn
from the evidence, the motion must be denied.
*5 As to the third question, assuming
Plaintiffs are actually "public figures,"
Defendant can be held liable only if actual
malice is supported by clear and convincing
evidence.
A
different,
and
rather
controversial, standard of review is applicable
on summary judgment. In addressing this very
issue, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,
106 S.Ct. 2505; 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 255-56 (1986),
held:
In sum, we conclude that the determination
of whether a given factual dispute requires
submission to a jury must be guided by the
substantive evidentiary standards that apply
to the case. This is true at both the directed
verdict and summary judgment stages.
Consequently, where the New York Times
"clear and convincing" evidence requirement
applies, the trial judge's summary judgment
inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists
will be whether the evidence presented is
such that a jury applying t h a t evidentiary
standard could reasonably find for either the
plaintiff or the defendant. Thus, where the
factual dispute concerns actual malice,
clearly a material issue in a New York Times
case, the appropriate summary judgment
question will be whether the evidence in the
record could support a reasonable jury finding
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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either that the plaintiff has shown actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence or
that the plaintiff has not.
In sum, a court ruling on a motion for
summary judgment must be guided by the
New York Times "clear and convincing"
evidentiary standard in determining whether
a genuine issue of actual malice exists-that
is, whether the evidence presented is such
that a reasonable jury might find that actual
malice had been shown with convincing
clarity.
This holding by the Court evoked two of the
most vigorous dissenting opinions in print
with Justice Brennan observing:
The Court today holds that "whether a given
factual dispute requires submission to a jury
must be guided by the substantive
evidentiary standards that apply to the case,"
ante, at 255. In my view, the Court's analysis
is deeply flawed, and rests on a shaky
foundation of unconnected and unsupported
observations, assertions, and conclusions.
Moreover, I am unable to divine from the
Court's opinion how these evidentiary
standards are to be considered, or what a trial
judge is actually supposed to do in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.
In my view, if a plaintiff presents evidence
which either directly or by permissible
inference (and these inferences are a product
of the substantive law of the underlying
claim) supports all of the elements he needs
to prove in order to prevail on his legal claim,
the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case
and a defendant's motion for summary
judgment must fail regardless of the burden
of proof that the plaintiff must meet. In other
words, whether evidence is "clear and
convincing," or proves a point by a mere
preponderance, is for the factfinder to
determine. As I read the case law, this is how
it has been, and because of my concern that
today's decision may erode the
constitutionally enshrined role of the jury,
and also undermine the usefulness of
summary judgment procedure, this is how I
believe it should remain.
*6 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257-58, 268
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist observed:
The Court, apparently moved by concerns for
intellectual tidiness, mistakenly decides that
the "clear and convincing evidence" standard
governing finders of fact in libel cases must
be applied by trial courts in deciding a
motion for summary judgment in such a case.
The Court refers to this as a "substantive
standard," but I think it is actually a
procedural requirement engrafted onto Rule
56, contrary to our statement in Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), that
"[w]e have already declined in other contexts
to grant special procedural protections to
defendants in libel and defamation actions in
addition to the constitutional protections
embodied in the substantive laws." Id., at
790- 791.
The Court, I believe, makes an even greater
mistake in failing to apply its newly
announced rule to the facts of this case.
Instead of thus illustrating how the rule
works, it contents itself with abstractions and
paraphrases of abstractions, so that its
opinion sounds much like a treatise about
cooking by someone who has never cooked
before and has no intention of starting now.
Id. at 268-69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Tennessee echoed to follow the Anderson
majority in Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers, Inc.,
wherein this Court held:
Plaintiff also contends that summary
judgment was inappropriate even if he was a
public figure because there is a genuine issue
of fact of whether the Times and Thompson
were guilty of "actual malice."
... New York Times Co. v. Sullivan [376 U.S. 254,
84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) ] makes
actual malice a constitutional issue to be
decided in the first instance by the trial judge
applying the Times test of actual knowledge or
reckless disregard of the truth [and][u]nless
the court finds, on the basis of pretrial
affidavits, depositions, or other documentary
evidence, that the plaintiff can prove actual
malice in the Times sense, it should grant
summary judgment.
Wright, J., concurring, Wasserman v. Time,
Inc., 424 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C.Cir.), cert, denied,
398 U.S. 940, 90 S.Ct. 1844, 26 L.Ed.2d 273
(1970).
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"[A] public figure cannot resist a newspaper's
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56
by arguing that there is an issue for the jury
as to malice unless he makes some showing,
of the kind contemplated by the Rules, of
facts from which malice may be inferred."
Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394
F.2d 774, 776 (D.C.Cir.1968).
Whether there is "actual malice" is a proper
question to be decided on motion for a
summary judgment.
On motion for summary judgment where
plaintiff, as in this case, is a "public figure,"
it is incumbent upon him to show "actual
malice" with "convincing clarity." See New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-286,
84 S.Ct at 729, 11 L.Ed.2d at 710.
Trigg, 720 S.W.2d at 74; see also Tomlinson v.
Kelley, 969 S.W.2d 402 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997).
*7 It is, therefore, incumbent upon this Court,
in reviewing this grant of summary judgment
as to the issue of actual malice, to determine,
not whether there is material evidence in the
record supporting Plaintiffs, but whether or
not the record discloses clear and convincing
evidence upon which a trier of fact could find
actual malice.
PUBLICATION
"Publication" as used in the tort of
defamation has no relationship to the ordinary
meaning of the term as used in everyday life.
In the law of defamation, it is a term of art
meaning the communication of defamatory
matter to a third person. Quality Auto Parts, 876
S.W.2d at 821; Sullivan, 995 S.W.2d at 571-72.
"Publication" is an element of the tort which
the plaintiff must prove or suffer his
complaint to be dismissed.
The term "publication" causes some confusion
in a libel case such as this because it is both a
business term meaning printing and
distribution of written materials and a legal
term meaning communication of libelous
matter to a third person. Painter,
"Republication Problems in the Law of
Defamation." 47 Va.L.Rev. 1131 (1961); 62
Harv.L.Rev. 1041 (1949). Moreover,
"publication" used as a legal term in the
Isenberg case and in T.C.A. § 39-2702 does not
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determine how many causes of action are
created by printing and distribution of a
libelous book. Rather, use of the legal term in
those instances merely indicates that
publication is an essential element of a libel
action without which the complaint must be
dismissed.
Applewhite v. Memphis State University, 495
S.W.2d 190, 192-3 (Tenn.1973).
A distinction must, likewise, be drawn
between the use of the term "publication" in a
criminal indictment and its use as an element
of the civil tort.
It is proper to state that there is a marked
difference between civil and criminal actions
for libel,-so far, at least, as the question of
publication is concerned. In the former,
publication must be made to some third
person, or in such public manner as to reach
third persons; but, in criminal proceedings,
publication may be made by communicating
the printed matter alone to the party libeled.
The reason for this difference is that in a civil
action of libel the gravamen of the action is
the pecuniary damage to the character or
credit of the party libeled, but in a criminal
action the ground of the offense is the
liability of the words written to provoke a
breach of the peace. In the civil action the
only publication that could injuriously affect
the credit and character is that made to third
persons, as no damage to credit or character
could result from a letter or writing known
only to the party to whom it is sent, and not
communicated to others.
Fry, 33 S.W. at 571-72 (citations omitted); see
also Insurance Research Service, Inc. v. Associates
Financial
Corp.,
134
F.Supp.
54,
61
(M.D.Tenn.1955).
While the undisputed facts show that
thousands of copies of all editions of The Rattler
were freely distributed in the Clarksville
community by its publisher, Paul Avallone,
and others, the case before the Court as to
Curtis Mize is limited to what the undisputed
facts show to be his individual conduct. He is a
political opponent of the Piper administration
and makes no secret in deposition that his
sympathies lie with the writer, publisher and
editor of The Rattler. The same undisputed facts
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show, however, that his participation in any
distribution of The Rattler was limited to
allowing a number of copies of the October 5,
2000 issue to be placed on the counter of his
place of business, along with other free
newspapers, for his customers to take if they
elected to do so. There is no evidence in the
record that any copy of the October 5, 2000
edition of The Rattler ever reached the hands of
a third party by any action of Curtis Mize, or
that any third party ever took a copy of The
Rattler from the counter in his place of
business. Donita Piper testified:
*8 Q. Okay. How many copies of the Rattler
did Mr. Mize give out?
A. Again, I have no knowledge of that.
Q. Okay. To whom did Mr Mize give copies of
the Rattler?
A. Again, I don't know who his employees
are. I don't know who his clients are. I don't
know who his friends are. They would
probably be able to answer that better than I,
but I don't have any knowledge of who.
When asked in deposition what third party
had received a copy of The Rattler from either
Curtis Mize or his place of business, Lori
Turner could name no person, save a single
individual named Roger Freeman, and as to
this person, she testified:
Q. Well, didn't you say Mr. Freeman didn'the tried to give him a copy and Mr. Freeman
or Pastor Freeman didn't take it?
A. Correct.
Q. So do you have the names of anybody who
can corroborate that they received a copy of
the Rattler from Mr. Mize?
A. No.
An unsuccessful effort to deliver an alleged
libelous document to a third person will not
suffice to establish "publication."
There appears to be no question in the law of
defamation that liability is not established
unless the allegedly defamatory statement is
in fact understood by a third person as
referring to plaintiff. Restatement of the
Law, Torts, Sec. 564 and comments; 53
C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 82a, p. 133; 33
Am. Jur., Sec. 89, p. 102; Annotation 91
A.L.R., p. 1171; Tompkins v. Wisener, 33 Tenn.
458.
" * * * It is necessary that the recipient of the
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defamatory communication understand it as
intended to refer to the plaintiff * * *. If,
however, the recipient does not understand
that the plaintiff is intended thereby, the fact
that the defamer intended to refer to him is
immaterial." Restatement of the Law, Torts,
Sec. 564, Comment, paragraph a.
Insurance Research Service, Inc., 134 F.Supp. at
61. In this same Restatement of Torts context,
the Court of Appeals of Georgia held:
"In order to effect the publication of a libel
there must be a reading of it. Not only that,
there must be an understanding of its meaning by
the person reading it... Since the gravamen of
civil libel is injury to reputation, where the
evidence demands a finding that the libel was
not read by those to whom it was alleged to
have been communicated, and there is no
evidence authorizing an inference that it was
communicated to anyone else who read it, or
will be presumed to have read it, the case
must fall." (Emphasis supplied.) Allen v.
American Indem. Co., 63 Ga.App. 894, 895-896,
12 S.E.2d 127 (1940). "It is not enough that
the language used is reasonably capable of a
defamatory interpretation if the recipient did
not in fact so understand it." Restatement of
the Law, Torts 2d, § 563, Comment c, p. 163.
Sigmon v. Womack, 279 S.E.2d 254, 257
(Ga.CtApp.1981).
We are not dealing, in this appeal, with a
publisher of a newspaper or magazine where
mass distribution would authorize a finding
that the publication was read and understood
by some third party within the context of
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 563, but
rather with a very limited posting of the
October 5, 2000 issue of The Rattler, by one who
had no part in the writing, publishing, editing
or actively disseminating the scandal sheet.
No competent material evidence has been
offered that Curtis Mize "published" the
October 5, 2000 issue of The Rattler within the
meaning of the "publication" element of the
tort of defamation. Summary judgment was
properly granted by the trial court.
PUBLIC FIGURES
*9 The "actual malice" requirements of the
landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
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do not apply to Donita Piper and Lon Turner
unless it is first determined that they are
'public figures' within the meaning of New
York Times Tennessee adopted standards in
sections 580A and 580B of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1977) in establishing the
distinction between defamation as to a public
official or public figure and defamation of a
private person As to a public official or public
figure, one can only be held liable if he knows
that the statement is false and that it defames
another person, or if he acts in reckless
disregard of such matters As to a private
person, he may be held liable if he knows that
the statement is false and that it defames the
person, acts in reckless disregard of these
matters, or acts negligently in failing to
ascertain them Press, Inc , 569 S W 2d 435
The disparity in treatment of these two
classes of citizenry is inextricably interwoven
with freedom of the press as defined in the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and in Article 1, section 19 of
the Constitution of Tennessee The right of the
news media to criticize official conduct is the
basis for the distinction between public figures
and private persons In the colorful words of
Chief Justice Henry
From the days of the lonely pamphleteer
operating clandestinely in Colonial America
and crying out against the usurpations of the
Crown, we have elected to reap the benefits
and bear the burdens of a free and courageous
press It may disturb our tranquility, i[t] may
vex our peace of mind, it may outrage our
sensibilities, it may shock our conscience, and
it may even momentarily shake our beliefs in
the right of freedom of the press, but so
deeply grounded is our national commitment
to a free press that we as a nation tolerate its
abuses The Quid pro quo is that we profit by
the very freedom that sometimes causes us to
squirm
Press, Inc , 569 S W 2d at 442
The heart of the New York Times' rule says,
"The constitutional guarantees require, we
think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement
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was made with 'actual malice' that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not New
York Times, 376 U S at 279 80 [FN3]
FN3 The Rule was extended to public figures by
Curtis Publishing Co v Butts 380 U S 130 (1967)
and by Gertz \ Robett Welch Inc 418 U S 323
(1974)
In determining the "public figure" status of
Appellants, the Tennessee Supreme Court
gives guidance
The term "public figure" has been defined
variously by the courts as reference to the
above cases will indicate Included within
this classification must be those who have
thrust themselves into the vortex of
important public controversies, those who
achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that
they become public figures for all purposes,
and in all contexts, those who voluntarily
inject themselves, or are drawn into public
controversies, and become public figures for a
limited range of issues, and those who
assume special prominence in the resolution
of public questions There, no doubt, are other
involvements that would invoke the * public
figures" designation
*10 Finally, we think that a critical concern
must be the nature and extent of the
individual's participation in the particular
controversy See Gertz, supra The status of
the individual and the nature and extent of
his involvement must be considered in those
cases wherein the defamed party is involved
in an activity affecting the public, but may
not precisely fit into the pattern of a public
official or public figure It is a fact of life that
one may be a public official today, a public
figure tomorrow and a nonentity the next
His status must, in the last analysis, be
dependent not only upon title or some
convenient nomenclature, but also upon the
character, nature, purpose, intent and extent
of his participation in the particular
controversy
Press, Inc , 569 S W 2d at 441
The undisputed facts show that Donita Piper,
at the time of the events involved in this case,
was the wife of the Mayor of the City of

Copr © West 2004 No Claim to Orig U S Govt Works

W**tlrfw

Page

Not Reported in S.W.3d
(Cite as: 2003 WL 21338696, *10 (Tenn.Ct.App.))
Clarksville, that she traveled extensively out
of the state and out of the country as the
spouse of the Mayor, and that she has written
stories and has been a guest commentator for
The Leaf-Chronicle newspaper. Lori Turner was
the incumbent Grants Writer for the City of
Clarksville. She had been a candidate for
Mayor of the City of Clarksville; had been the
subject of numerous articles in both the Our
City newspaper
and
The Leaf-Chronicle
newspaper; had been a featured speaker at
various civic groups in the past seven years;
and had been host of a local radio talk show.
Both Donita Piper and Lori Turner are "public
figures" within the parameters laid down by
Press, Inc. v. Verran .
ACTUAL MALICE
In this case, the Complaint does not allege,
and the record does not contain, any evidence
of a conspiracy. While the Complaint alleges
joint and several liability as to all Defendants,
the proof offered does not establish joint
activity, at least as to Defendant/Appellee
Curtis Mize. He must, therefore, be judged on
this Summary Judgment Motion on the basis
of his individual activity.
Evidence of "actual malice" within the New
York Times-Verran standard is, at best, weak as
to Mize and certainly does not rise to the
dignity of "clear and convincing evidence."
Summary judgment for Mize is mandated by
Tomlinson v. Kelley.
Public figures who desire to pursue
defamation actions bear a heavy burden of
proof because of our society's commitment to
the principle that "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686
(1964). In order to recover damages, they
must prove with convincing clarity that the
defendant acted with actual malice. See Press,
Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 551
(Tenn.1978); Moore v. Bailey, 628 S.W.2d 431,
433 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1981).
The concept of actual malice in defamation
cases connotes more than personal ill will,
hatred, spite, or desire to insure. See Masson v.
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510,
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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111 S.Ct. 2419, 2429, 115 LEd.2d 447 (1991);
McCluen v. Roane County Times, Inc., 936
S.W.2d at 939; Windsor v. Tennessean, 654
S.W.2d 680, 688 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1983). Rather,
it is limited to statements made with
knowledge that they are false or with
reckless disregard to their truth or falsity. See
Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d at 441; Cloyd
v. Press, Inc., 629 S.W.2d 24, 27
(Tenn.Ct.App. 1981); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 580A (1977). Determining whether a
defendant acted with reckless disregard
requires the finder of fact to determine
whether the defendant "in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his [or her]
publication." Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers, Inc.,
720 S.W.2d at 75 (quoting St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323,
1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968)).
*11 Tomlinson, 969 S.W.2d at 405-06.
It is admitted by Plaintiffs that rumors of an
affair between Mayor Piper and Lori Turner
were rampant in the community long before
the October 5, 2000 edition of The Rattler. The
best that can be said of the proof is that it
establishes that, Mize did not subjectively
believe the rumors, that he did not investigate
the validity of the rumors, and that he was a
political opponent of Mayor Piper. These facts
fall considerably short of being "clear and
convincing evidence" of actual malice on the
part of Curtis Mize. Summary judgment was
properly granted. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254;
Gertz, 418 U.S. 323; Liberty Lobby, Inc., All
U.S. 242; Press, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 435; Trigg,
720 S.W.2d 69; Tomlinson, 969 S.W.2d 402.
As to the allegations of outrageous conduct
and false light invasion of privacy, no proof is
offered that the conduct of Curtis Mize "has
been so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond the pale of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized society."
Major v. Charter Lakeside Hosp., Inc., 1990 WL
125538, at * 3 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug. 31, 1990).
The rumors contained in the October 5, 2000
issue of The Rattler were already prevalent in
the Clarksville community long before
October 5, 2000. No basis exists for a claim of
false light invasion of privacy. Langford v.
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

^ _
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Vanderbilt
University,
287
S.W. 2d
32
(Tenn.1956); Fann v. City of Fairview, 905
S.W.2d 167 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994); West v. Media
Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W. 3d 640
(Tenn.2001).
CONCLUSION
Whatever
may
be
the
rights
and
responsibilities between and among parties
still before the trial court is not material to
this appeal. On this Rule 54.02 designation of
finality and the appeal of the Plaintiffs as to
Curtis Mize, we are called upon to adjudge
whether or not the trial court correctly
granted summary judgment to Curtis Mize.
We find summary judgment to have been
properly granted and, in all respects, affirm
the judgment.
Costs of this cause are assessed
Appellants.
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